Issue No. 309

Sometimes it is better to refrain from commenting, particularly if you are a four-star Ethiopian lieutenant general. This week, a clip of Zewdu Belay, a senior commander within the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF), speaking to hundreds of soldiers has circulated online, sparking widespread controversy. In the video, Belay urges the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), Fano insurgents, and the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) to cease their fight against Addis so the Ethiopian military might better prepare for a "major operation" against Assab. It was hardly subtle; another slice of bellicose rhetoric from a senior Ethiopian government official towards Eritrea. But not only that, it begs another question about the scale of the ENDF's overstretched capabilities in relation to its own domestic opposition.
 
Amid rising violence between Mekelle and Addis-backed proxy forces in Afar, as well as the sustained threat of war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the Fano insurgency in Amhara has been somewhat overlooked. But the latest major offensive by the arrayed Fano insurgents in late September and early October should give Addis some pause for thought. Although accurate reporting is difficult to ascertain, and with Fano and government propaganda flooding the airwaves, the insurgents 'Operation Arbegna Adem Ali (Aba Nadew)' undoubtedly struck a heavy blow against the beleaguered ENDF. More coordinated than ever, Fano launched a series of raids across government positions in woredas in North Wollo, South Wollo, North Shewa, East Gojjam, and other areas, resulting in heavy fighting and the capture of swathes of rural villages and towns. By some estimates, as many as three divisions of the ENDF-- totalling several thousand men-- were destroyed, with considerable prisoners captured as well. 
 
In early October, the 12th ENDF Division in North Wollo was reported to have collapsed after Fano forces overran supply routes around Woldia within just 48 hours. With morale at rock bottom, fleeing soldiers cited hunger and ammunition shortages on the frontlines of the gruelling asymmetric warfare-- now well over two years in. The ENDF is grappling with structural depletion in the wake of the Tigray war, compounded by heavy losses in Oromia against the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) and those against Fano. Not only that, but the simmering ethnic bushfires across Ethiopia, from the Oromia-Somali region boundary disputes to militia clashes within Benishangul-Gumuz, are stretching the military as well. In turn, the growing dependence on ad hoc local militias, including press-ganged Oromo 'volunteers', who lack both cohesion and discipline, is a poor alternative. Purges of ENDF officers suspected of harbouring pro-Amhara sympathies have further corroded the officer corps.
 
Meanwhile, since the simmering conflict exploded into full view in August 2023, the disparate Fano movement has evolved from a series of guerrilla forces with varying capacities and political aims into a far more consolidated and effective fighting force. Former Amhara Special Forces Commander General Tefera Mamo-- also known as the 'Simien Lion'-- recently declared that all of Fano had merged into a single "gigantic army" under a "Supreme Command Council." Having joined the Fano insurgency in mid-2024, Mamo has come to play an increasingly prominent role by overseeing the 'Menelik Command' in eastern Amhara, raising his profile to the likes of Zemene Kassie, the much-revered commander within Fano's Gojjam faction. 
 
Mamo's claims of a single army do not quite stand up to scrutiny, but there has certainly been a coalescence of Fano branches. Last year, over half a dozen factions operated in the Amhara region, including the Amhara Fano in Wollo, led by Mire Wedajo, and the Shewa Fano Governorate, led by Meketaw Mamo. At the heart of the divide, however, was the schism between those—mostly aligned with Zemene Kassie— who advocated for Amhara nationalism and sustained armed struggle, and the coalition built by Eskinder Nega, who has emphasised Amhara political interests within Ethiopian nationalism. However, despite several mergers that have occurred since, including the combination of four major wings to form the Amhara Fano National Force (AFNF) this year, cleavages still remain, particularly with the faction led by former journalist Nega, convicted of treason and terrorism under the TPLF administration. And even though much of Fano now operates under a single banner, the divergent political aspirations within the assorted members remain, ranging from improbably overthrowing the Abiy administration to asserting irredentist claims over parts of neighbouring Benishangul-Gumuz, Oromia, and Tigray.
 
Even so, the insurgents now number in the tens of thousands and are more heavily armed than ever, having sourced considerable weapons from their Eritrean allies and smuggling networks via Sudan. Arms continue to stream along the Eritrean-facilitated supply routes through the Tekeze basin into North Gondar and Wollo, while Eritrean intelligence officers are believed to be embedded with specific Fano commands as well. Videos circulating online have shown Fano fighters using Chinese-made Zijiang M99 anti-material rifles, as well as captured ZU-23 anti-aircraft guns, supposedly seized from Wollo and reportedly one of several in their possession. And while it has been quite some time since Fano seized one of the major towns in Amhara, such as Bahir Dar or Lalibela, it has consolidated its hold across much of the rural areas of the region, squeezing ever-tighter on the siloed ENDF presence. Meanwhile, trade routes from Addis to Bahir Dar and Dessie have been repeatedly severed, resulting in trade paralysis and choking administrative functions.
 
It has been apparent for some time that the government's hold across the Amhara region has been faltering, reduced to a highly militarised and siloed presence in a handful of the major towns. According to UN estimates, there are now well over 500,000 displaced civilians in Amhara, but with supply lines and transport corridors blighted by insecurity as well as the broader reduction in humanitarian assistance, malnutrition and preventable diseases are commonplace. Approximately 4.4 million children in the Amhara region are out of school as well, with many schools and other key pieces of infrastructure damaged in the relentless drone strikes carried out by the government. Insecurity beyond the insurgency has risen as well; kidnappings and armed robberies by militias and criminal groups have become widespread. Many of these are believed to have been carried out by the varied anti-Fano forces mobilised by the government, formed along ethnic Oromo and Amhara lines.
 
Such devastating losses cannot be indefinitely sustained by the ENDF, but nor does there seem to be a prospect of Addis seeking a political settlement or accommodation with Fano, even if it is doubtful whether commanders such as Zemene Kassie would countenance one at this current juncture. The most significant development of all, however, is the reports of growing cooperation among elements of the TPLF, the Fano command, and the Eritrean government. Hardly a convergence of ideology, with the Amhara Special Forces, Fano militias and Asmara responsible for many of the worst atrocities in Western Tigray, it is borne from strategic interest and shared antipathy towards Addis. The scale of this alignment is contested, and to what extent it would come into play in the event of a full-out war between Addis and Asmara or Addis and Mekelle, rather than this growing proxy activity. But Zewdu Belay's remarks-- beyond a burst of sabre-rattling-- perhaps point to a deeper strategic anxiety within Addis, one that Ethiopia is now confronting a fluid but growing alignment of its adversaries.