With northern Ethiopia and Eritrea teetering on the brink of a return to full-scale conflict, the grim morass that has become Tigrayan politics shows no sign of easing. Recent days have again been dominated by accusations and counter-accusations by the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) in Mekelle and the deposed Tigray Interim Administration (TIA) leader Getachew Reda from Addis over violent clashes in Southern Tigray. And so, rather than marking the 5th anniversary of the eruption of the Tigray war in 2020 with a commitment to set aside petty factionalism and self-enrichment, or the dangerous gravitation towards Addis or Asmara, a Tigray that remains in ruins continues to limp on.
Since July, intermittent clashes between the Tigray Defence Force (TDF) and the so-called Tigray Peace Force (TPF) militia operating from the Afar region have pockmarked Southern Tigray. The contested territory, which juts down and borders the Afar and Amhara regions, has remained the epicentre of tensions between the remaining elements of Getachew's faction and his replacement, Tadesse Werede, with the new TIA administration having sought to reassert itself since Getachew's ousting earlier this year. Addis, meanwhile, has sought to stoke such divisions, employing Getachew as an 'Advisor on East Africa' to the prime minister and registering his 'Simret' political party at breakneck speed. Most concerning, however, has been the reports of clandestine support for the Tigray Peace Force, also dubbed the 'Hara Meret' (Free Land) faction. Believed to number fewer than 1,000 men, the assorted militias comprise an assorted selection of former Tigrayan officials and soldiers with various axes to grind with the TPLF.
And so, last Thursday, the Afar Region Communication Bureau asserted that Tigrayan forces had crossed into the Megale woreda within Zone Two, as well as two other locations and opened fire on pastoralist civilians. The administration further claimed that the "TPLF forces" refused to withdraw "despite appeals from peace-loving Afar elders." It is challenging to take such claims seriously, given that the Afar governing elite has been wholly co-opted by Addis. The region appears to be a staging post for Addis proxies, not only into Tigray but also increasingly into Eritrea, amid the clamouring from the Prosperity Party concerning 'returning' the Eritrean Port of Assab to Ethiopian control. Senior Ethiopian officials are now openly questioning the legality and existence of the Eritrean state. To this end, several armed Afar nationalist groups have been activated within the region, such as the Red Sea Afar Democratic Organisation (RSADO), which recently announced the graduation of several hundred newly armed fighters and a capacity for naval operations.
However, both the TIA and TPLF have denied that Mekelle-aligned forces have carried out any incursion into Afar, detailing in separate announcements a radically different version of events. In a letter addressed to the international community, TPLF Chairman Debretsion Gebremichael asserted that there was instead an incursion of TPF fighters into Southern Tigray, coinciding with a visit from Tadesse to the region, as well as alleging that the government had conducted a drone strike against a Tigrayan military position early in the morning, harming an unspecified number of soldiers and civilians. Describing the strike as a "clear and alarming breach" of the Pretoria agreement, Debretsion further accused Addis of "using the armed fighters of Hara Meret in a bid to provoke another war."
The TIA released another similar statement the same day, denying the incursion but nevertheless refuting that there had been a "violation of the Afar-Tigray border, from either side." Instead, it spurned the "deliberate efforts to create and arm groups in Afar with the intention of instigating conflict and destruction on the peoples of Tigray and Afar." While there were reports of unspecified aerial activity near Abala and Erebti at the time of the alleged strike, the federal government in Addis has not commented on the accusation. It is difficult to ascertain what exactly has taken place, but further violence between the TPF and TDF should come as little surprise, even if still immensely concerning. A drone strike, on the other hand, from the government would represent a severe breach of the already gravely damaged Pretoria agreement, and another concerning ratchet of tensions between Mekelle and Addis.
Jumping back into the fray has been Getachew, who accused Tigrayan leaders in Mekelle of provoking the clashes to reignite violence in the interests of the Eritrean regime, referred to as 'Shabi'a'. He went as far as to assert that the federal government had shown restraint despite provocations from Mekelle. A stalwart communicator for the TPLF during the war, Getachew has made a complete political about-turn in recent months, just recently attending the exclusive 'Sof Omer Weg' meeting led by PM Abiy Ahmed in Oromia. The former TIA president ignores comments made by his new comrades as well, including the chilling statement by Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) Field Marshal Berhanu Jula, who referred to the TPLF as a "clique" that should be "eliminated." Another senior Prosperity Party official has claimed that the Tigrayan government have been unearthing heavy weapons not handed over during the DDR process to Addis, and is now transporting them to Eritrean border towns. Those within the TPLF aligning themselves with Asmara are playing directly into the hands of those who would return war to Tigray, with echoes of the rhetoric ahead of the outbreak of war in 2020 unmissable.
Five years after the war's outbreak, Tigrayan leaders have seemingly learned nothing, continuing their self-enrichment and factionalism while gravitating dangerously toward either Addis or Asmara. The infighting exploited by both Abiy and Isaias Afwerki has left Tigray's politics at its lowest ebb, with no vision for post-war governance or rejuvenation. The incursions from the TPF into Tigray are immensely alarming, a further attempt by the federal government to maintain the grim 'no war, no peace' limbo in Tigray. But there has been little suggestion that the TPLF either has the answers to navigate the region out of such a political quagmire, partly of its own making, nor the devastation left by the war. One place to start would be a genuine forum of all parties, people and factions from across the Tigrayan political spectrum to chart a course forward. Tragically, it appears more probable that Mekelle, Addis, and Asmara will continue to inch closer to war, with the Tigrayan people stuck in the middle once more.
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