Issue No. 302

Abiy and Putin Seal Ethiopia Nuclear Deal
 

Yesterday, the head of the UN's atomic watchdog, Rafael Grossi, stressed the alarming status of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant on the Dnieper River in Ukraine, which has been without power for several days. Having been seized by the Russian military in 2022, Moscow has repeatedly stoked fears of nuclear fallout-- and the spectre of the Chernobyl disaster-- by cutting off electricity as it has sought to consolidate its hold over the plant. Such repeated severing of power and intermittent shelling near Europe's largest nuclear power plant is playing with nuclear fire. And yet last Thursday, PM Abiy Ahmed and Russian President Vladimir Putin witnessed the signing of an agreement to build a nuclear power plant in Ethiopia.

Having overseen the lavish inauguration of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) earlier this month, PM Abiy Ahmed has his eyes already trained on other prizes. Prophecied by his mother to become "the seventh king of Ethiopia," Abiy is never happier than when announcing his vision for the country or cutting ribbons to inaugurate a new piece of infrastructure. A new Russian-Ethiopian plan to construct a nuclear plant squarely reflects this, as well as Abiy's own vision of Ethiopia as an ascendant power on the global stage. During celebrations of World Atomic Week in Moscow, Abiy stated that the government is already looking past GERD, saying that "Our vision goes beyond today. To transform our nation, we look ahead and embrace what is possible." He also repeatedly declared that clean nuclear energy —much like sea access — is required to turbocharge Ethiopia's already bright future. And the latest grand piece of Russian-Ethiopian cooperation comes shortly on the heels of the portentious inauguration of the Moscow-backed Ethiopian naval headquarters in early September.

The symbolism of the opening of these naval headquarters in landlocked Ethiopia is hard to miss. Having upstaged Cairo in the completion of the GERD-- the largest hydroelectric dam on the continent, Abiy's attention appears trained more fiercely than ever on Assab, the Eritrean port on the Red Sea. For several weeks, and particularly since the dam's opening, the mercurial leader's rhetoric has consistently insisted that it is just a matter of time before Ethiopia is back on the arterial waterway. A recent Ethiopian military statement compared Asmara's control of Assab to 'banditry.' 

Much of the military preparation appears to be in place for an invasion to claim Assab, but there are also questions about Ethiopia's capacity, not least whether Addis has the necessary financial support from its Gulf patrons to prosecute such a war. At the same time, Moscow has repeatedly sought to diversify its military assets in the Red Sea, having previously discussed a base with Eritrea and, more recently, agreed with the Sudanese army to establish a logistical site. In March, Moscow and Addis agreed on another deal, with Russia agreeing to provide development and training to the Ethiopian navy. Such training may soon be put to use.

In the meantime, however, there is now the issue of a proposed nuclear plant to contend with. Even though one might expect the priority to be connecting and expanding the Ethiopian grid to the GERD, the stated intention is part of efforts to diversify the country's overwhelming reliance on hydroelectricity, with the GERD offering over 5,000 MW in power, as well as the Gibe III, Tezeka, Fincha, and Awash dams all contributing. Abiy's government has repeatedly looked to nuclear power for diversification, and the agreement follows years of discussions between officials in Addis and Russia's state-owned energy company, Rosatom. 

In turn, all agreements have emphasised the development of peaceful use of nuclear energy rather than military, with a three-year roadmap signed in 2023 to institutionalise cooperation in nuclear technology. While in Moscow, Abiy further stated that a Nuclear Science and Technology Centre is about to be established. Certainly, atomic energy has much to offer if delivered correctly, with a single sizeable nuclear power plant capable of producing up to a few thousand MWs in power. Even amid a stuttering 'green transition' globally, the promise of nuclear energy remains profound, and such clean power should not be limited to the remit of a few wealthy, industrialised nations. But in Africa, only South Africa has active nuclear power plants, though Niger reportedly plans to build two 2000-megawatt reactors with Rosatom as well.

But many, if not most, elements remain unknown about the latest Ethiopia-Russia nuclear deal. There is no suggestion that Moscow is looking to develop Ethiopia's nuclear enrichment capabilities with an eye to any kind of weapon. But there are considerable differences within the types and technologies of the reactors themselves, with a larger model requiring a more robust grid and considerable investment. Where in Ethiopia it might be located is another likely contentious issue, not least because of the widespread insecurity that continues to plague much of the country. Once arguably the most developed area outside of Addis, Tigray remains in ruins, while western Oromia and much of Amhara are engulfed in insurgencies. And other questions that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) might ask, such as how radioactive waste will be handled and what role Ethiopia's nuclear regulatory body will play, are also hardly insignificant.

That is even before coming to the question of cost, and though, of course, such a signing ceremony is more about the theatrics than the brass tacks, who will carry the financial burden and at what price tag remains to be seen, with the average cost of a single large plant estimated at USD 7.5bn. Although previously buoyed by the injection of state spending into its military-industrial complex for the Ukraine war, the Russian economy appears to be flagging —as does Ethiopia's. Whether Addis can afford to build a nuclear power plant when tens of millions of citizens require urgent humanitarian assistance this year is a tall ask indeed.

Still, the warm imagery of Abiy and Putin together overseeing the signing ceremony is arguably more significant than whether the plant will be built. The shift from vague Russian-Ethiopian bonhomie to more concerted engagement has been striking in the past year, and it calls to mind the 1970s and 1980s, when the Soviet and Derg regimes were close allies. Today, both Russia and Ethiopia are members of the expanded BRICS+ alliance, a rough coalition of countries resistant to US hegemony and inclusive of several countries opposed to any norm-based multilateral order. Though a much-waned international and regional force, the strategic position and influence of Addis should not be dismissed, and Russia, as well as the jostling ascendant 'Middle Powers', are all keen to maintain some form of relationship. Still, Addis's attempts to court China, Russia, the US, the UAE, and others do not appear to be borne from a grand strategy, but rather from an ad hoc, moment-to-moment positioning.

Building the GERD is one issue, a massive domestic achievement notwithstanding the Egyptian opposition, but a Russian-built nuclear power plant in Ethiopia will no doubt cause alarm in Paris, London, and Washington-- as well as Ethiopia's neighbours. Moscow has hardly proven itself a neutral or trustworthy interlocutor when it comes to atomic material and energy, supporting North Korean attempts to develop nuclear weapons, for instance, as well as the ongoing danger from Zaporizhzhia today. Though building an actual plant is likely many years off, and the promise of green and nuclear energy has immense potential, Ethiopia should seriously consider looking this Russian gift horse in the mouth.