Issue No. 301

Military Reshuffles and Abiy's Fortress Politics
 

On Saturday, PM Abiy Ahmed promoted dozens of military officers to senior positions within the Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF), rewarding a tranche of loyalists and allies further to cement his grip over the security organs of the state. Four Lt. Generals have been made the rank of full General-- Desta Abiche, Yimer Mekonnen, Alemishet Degfie and Diriba Mekonnen. Two more have been promoted to Lieutenant General, 17 to Major General, and 43 to Brigadier General. Coming shortly after the exit of Central Bank Governor Mamo Mihretu, further changes are still anticipated within diplomatic and political circles by the prime minister in the coming days. However, alongside enduring fears of a coup within the palace by the prime minister, the promotions further fuel speculation that Addis is continuing to prepare for war with Eritrea.

Ominously, the last security reshuffle of this scale occurred just a couple of days after the outbreak of the devastating Tigray war in November 2020, when PM Abiy replaced the entire leadership of the military in one fell swoop, as well as the foreign minister. Among those elevated at the time were the current ENDF Chief of Staff, Berhanu Jula, Temesgen Tiruneh, who was appointed as spy chief, and Demeke Mekonnen, who was selected as foreign minister. Today, the first two remain within senior positions in government as close allies of Abiy. However, Demeke-- an ethnic Amhara-- resigned from his position as deputy PM and foreign minister last year, purportedly over the government's brutal prosecution of the counter-insurgency against the Fano militias. At the time, Demeke's resignation was another signal of the broadening gulf between the remaining Amhara politicians still within the federal government and the Oromo figures who dominate the senior echelons of the Prosperity Party. And the latest series of promotions again elevates a significant proportion of Oromo loyalists, reflecting the diminished ethnic base of the federal government across the country. 

This time around, the motivation for reshuffling the beleaguered military leadership may be to promote more pliant loyalists happy to prosecute the potentially imminent war against Eritrea. Although the Port of Assab has been repeatedly touted as the intended target by senior Ethiopian officials, the scale and nature of any invasion remain unclear, as does whether regime change in Asmara may also be on the cards. Even if the war does not happen — with Abiy is famously mercurial — it is clear that the prime minister wants individuals within the military who will follow his orders to forcibly restore 'sea access' to Ethiopia if he so chooses.

The latest promotions come amid a broader reshuffling of key government appointees in Addis. On 19 September, it was announced that Eyob Tekalign, previously the State Minister of Finance, would replace the suddenly outgoing Governor of the National Bank of Ethiopia, Mamo Mihretu. One of the few relatively independent figures in Addis, Mamo resigned after just two years in post, having overseen a swathe of financial reforms in the country as part of the IMF bailout, including the controversial floating of the Ethiopian Birr and the liberalisation of the banking sector. Eyob, on the other hand, is far closer to the patronage machinery of the government, sitting on the boards of the EthioTelecom, Ethiopian Electric Power, and Ethiopian Investment Holdings. However, whether the new governor has the capacity to turn around the stumbling Ethiopian economy —troubled by widespread insecurity and battling swollen inflation and a parallel exchange market —is not Abiy's concern. Among other anticipated changes are the replacement of Ethiopia's ambassador to Kenya in the coming weeks, again reminiscent of the widespread changes to the foreign ministry and diplomatic corps made by the incumbent Prosperity Party administration in 2020. Today, Ethiopia's diplomatic presence is a pale imitation of its former self under the long-serving Foreign Minister Seyoum Mesfin between 1991 and 2010, who was killed during the Tigray war by Ethiopian soldiers.

The rewarding of dozens of trusted military officials with senior posts reflects a broader distrust from the prime minister regarding a possible threat from within the military to his position. Last July, Abiy publicly warned against unspecified individuals attempting a coup, whom he referred to as "my fathers and my elder brothers," stating that "we are soldiers" and that it would fail. He further accused an unspecified country — widely understood to be Eritrea — of financing the attempt, which never publicly materialised. The veracity of this particular claim is difficult to gauge, but Asmara has certainly armed and trained significant numbers of Fano militiamen, sustaining alliances that it developed during the 2020-2022 war. However, since coming to power, Abiy has not simply cycled through ENDF commanders and politicians, but has also actively worked to build parallel military structures. Among these are the Republican Guard, which is answerable to the prime minister, rather than the traditional military structures of the ENDF. 

Such paranoia about a coup has bled into the widespread securitisation of Addis, with thousands of police deployed to the streets to prevent any protests emerging, and often arbitrarily arresting individuals on an ethnic basis. Hand-in-hand has been the effort to transform Addis into a quasi-Dubai, with billions of dollars poured into demolishing homes for building grand new promenades and towering skyscrapers. The consistent references to Dubai from senior politicians are apt; a wealthy, glittering new city with little apparent history and no political dissent tolerated. The jewel of the rebuilt city will be Abiy's vast fortress on the Yeka Hills, which is being constructed in immense secrecy at a cost of roughly USD 10 billion. Purportedly bankrolled by the Emiratis, the extravagant complex is reportedly equipped with numerous secret tunnels and routes throughout to prevent a coup d'état attempt. 

Nor are these recent reshuffles likely to definitively change the battlefield in Oromia and Amhara, with the ENDF still bogged down on multiple fronts in gruelling insurgent conflicts. At this stage, the various threats from 'outside' — Oromia, Amhara, and Tigray — are not cohesive enough to topple the Addis government, with the Oromo Liberation Army, Fano insurgency, and the Tigray People's Liberation Front all wrestling with and advocating for distinct sets of political demands. However, the ENDF is nevertheless stretched on multiple fronts, with its officer core decimated by the purge of senior Tigrayan—and subsequent Amhara—commanders since 2020. Training programmes for recruits have been accelerated into just a few months, with reports of door-to-door forced conscription of teenage boys in Oromia for deployment in Amhara now widespread as well. Consequently, many of the soldiers on the frontlines in Amhara are in dire need of rest, having been deployed into a brutal counter-insurgency fight for months on end and bogged down by continual hit-and-run attacks from Fano militias in Gojjam and Gondar.

But beyond these conflicts, from Southern Tigray to the contested Afar-Somali kebeles to Gumuz insurgents in the west, there are few regions untouched by simmering political violence that threatens to escalate further. With the prioritisation of militarised politics and an ever-growing role of the security sector within Addis, it is highly improbable that a cohesive national political settlement, required to tackle these widespread grievances, is in the offing. So, rather than seeking a political solution to these conflicts —albeit a complex endeavour due to the splintered nature of the broad insurgency in Amhara —Addis continues to prioritise military 'solutions', with no clear end in sight. And the promotion of these latest military officials, even if some are competent, will not solve the endemic political-security crises that are bubbling across the country, nor issues such as poor morale within the ENDF.

Perpetual militarised reshuffles are no sign of a healthy body politic. And while the latest promotion of 66 senior ENDF commanders may further cement Abiy's grip on the capital's politics and within the military—for now, at least—it may simply be a precursor to even greater instability if it emboldens the prime minister to invade Eritrea. With more shake-ups reportedly imminent in the coming days and amid the bellicose drum-beating rhetoric from Addis, it is hard to miss the echoes of November 2020.