Issue No. 296

Polarisation keeps Tigray on the boil 
 

The damaging fallout of Tigray's polarisation rumbles on. Late last week, clashes erupted again in Southern Tigray as members of the Tigray Defence Force (TDF) sought to arrest an opposition militia member, triggering protests and fresh recriminations. Several people were injured in the violence, as the Tigray Interim Administration (TIA) continues to seek to reassert control over the region's governance-- barring Western Tigray. However, facing concerted resistance from several angles, including Addis, the fallout from the destabilising political rift in Tigrayan politics over the past year shows few signs of easing.

For almost a year, Tigray's post-war recovery has been hindered by the split between two power centres —the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), led by Debretsion Gebremichael, and the deposed TIA President, Getachew Reda. Simmering tensions about the direction of Tigray and the party exploded into the open last August, with the TPLF hosting a Party Congress in defiance of the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) as well as Getachew. At that time, virtually no progress had been made on Pretoria, and the directionless limbo of the TIA was driving mounting frustrations within much of Tigray. The bubbling Debretsion-Getachew divisions then exploded into public view as the TIA president, himself a senior party member, sought to constrain the resurgence of the TPLF with the apparent backing of Addis. The relationship between the TPLF and Addis has also badly soured this year, with senior officials returning to clamouring war-like rhetoric reminiscent of the months before the Tigray war against the backdrop of worsening Ethiopia-Eritrea relations. 

For months, the grinding stalemate played out in public, with each faction, led by Debretsion and Getachew, seeking to mobilise their respective supporters in rallies and fiery addresses. And while Getachew may have controlled many of the TIA's instruments, eventually the army and general support fell behind the TPLF —as it had done during the war. Tensions came to a head in March, with the TPLF and aligned security forces seizing key offices in Mekelle and other Tigrayan towns, prompting Getachew to depart the region. And having been ousted as leader of the TIA, Getachew joined the federal government as an advisor for East African affairs —a poorly defined role that has offered him a platform from which to attack the TPLF, particularly its deepening ties with Eritrea. His political relevance has been significantly diminished since.

For those who regarded Getachew's foot-dragging on implementing Pretoria as complicity with Addis, this appointment only confirmed their suspicions. Since his arrival in Addis, Getachew and several other exiled opposition Tigrayan politicians founded Simret —a new party that espouses democratic values and seeks to break the hegemonic hold the Marxist TPLF party has had on Tigray for decades. These values, in and of themselves, are perhaps commendable, with there being little real opposition to speak of in Tigray's political landscape. Further, the party's economic capture and the involvement of senior TPLF officials and commanders in the ongoing 'gold rush' in Tigray have drawn widespread criticism from within the region in recent months. However, any alignment with Addis, which is happily stoking divisions that it could not instigate during the war, sticks in the craw for many. Simret has now joined with several other opposition parties, including Baytona and the Tigray Independence Party, with former military commander Tsadkan Gebretensae as chair. The military commander, too, has been highly critical of the TPLF, calling upon youth to rise up against the establishment. 

But since the inauguration of the well-respected TDF commander Tadesse Werede as the new TIA president in April, there has been unsurprisingly greater cohesion within and between the Tigrayan government and army. That is no small part due to Werede contending with the full-throated return of the TPLF within the political structures of the government. But considering how close Tigray came to collapse under the pressure of the Getachew-Debretsion schism, the situation is far more internally stable today than it was 6 months ago. Even so, the political splits within the TPLF partially penetrated the military, though the majority of commanders sided with the TPLF's 'old guard.' Indeed, Getachew's attempted ousting of several commanders was one of the factors that precipitated his own removal. The militarisation of Tigrayan politics was a major concern– and remains so, with some of the army commanders who have defected now mobilised in the Afar region.

Such mobilisation of forces has intersected with the situation in Southern Tigray, which has repeatedly and violently flared in recent weeks. Since Getachew's removal, the new government in Mekelle has gradually sought to reassert control over Southern Tigray, but it is facing an uphill battle. Attempts to replace district officials in late July by Tadesse's TIA have failed so far, with much of the administration in Southern Tigray remaining loyal to Getachew. In a blow, Asmelash Reda —the proposed head of the new leadership committee —publicly declined to join the administration, revealing that he had not been informed of or agreed to the role. 

Many residents remain wary of the TDF's presence in Southern Tigray, while the federal government has further backed disgruntled former Tigrayan officials and militias, known as the Tigray Peace Force (TPF), based in Afar. Although the numbers are less than 1,000 and the alliance within these forces is far from stable, it is a clear manifestation of Tigray's political degeneration, with several skirmishes between the TPF and the TDF having erupted since the beginning of July. And in recent days, members of the 'Army 15' unit have also rejected the TPLF's leadership, with their leader General Gu'ush Gebre 'Fenqel' citing the developing ties between Mekelle and Asmara as well as the TIA's administrative changes in Southern Tigray. These forces have been stationed near Adigrat, close to the Eritrean border, and are reported to have witnessed first-hand the growing relationship with Asmara. 

Resolving the Southern Tigray dilemma, staving off attempts from external bad-faith parties to destabilise the region, and ensuring a more representative government are all pressing questions for Tadesse's government. But the administration today also faces an issue of capacity rather than intention. Starved of funds from the federal government and with the TPLF's legality in Addis in doubt, the TIA is operating in a quasi-limbo. Nor is it helped by the TIA's leadership failures to effectively communicate with the Tigrayan population, with many furious at the reports of outreach towards Asmara and fearful of the chance of a return to war. While Tadesse is a highly skilled commander, political communication is not his natural arena.

The federal government has successfully exploited the divisions within the Tigray leadership, but it has also pushed the TPLF towards Asmara, creating a dangerous feedback loop that could accidentally drive the countries back into war. For the Ethiopian government, war against Tigray cannot be politically or diplomatically sellable-- nor is it militarily feasible. Nevertheless, there has been a clear shift towards conflict with Eritrea, with arguments of Afar unity, historical claims to the sea, and an economic chokehold all being used to justify preparations for a possible invasion by Ethiopia. Tigray-- again-- would be caught in the middle.

With conflict repeatedly threatened against Mekelle, the rationale behind the Eritrean-TPLF alliance, dubbed 'Tsimdo', has been one of reactive survival for the party, as well as an enduring fear of Tigray being encircled again in any conflict. But while it's gravitating towards Asmara may make some strategic sense in the short-term, it has angered many whose families and friends suffered at the Eritrean army's hands. Nor should Eritrea be trusted as a reliable partner. Today, the internal situation in Tigray is arguably more stable than it was at the height of the Getachew-Debretsion schism, but the region is by no means out of the woods yet. No move towards a more inclusive form of governance appears likely in the near future by the TIA, while the simmering tensions in Southern Tigray, stoked by Getachew and others, may yet boil over. Above all, though, the looming threat of a return to war by Eritrea and Ethiopia should have all on alert. The Tigrayan people can ill-afford another return to such a destructive conflict.

The Ethiopian Cable Team