Issue No. 287

Tigray's divided politics caught between Addis and Asmara
 

The factionalism that has defined Tigray's regional politics in recent months shows no sign of easing. With Getachew Reda having been ousted as Tigray Interim Administration (TIA) president in March, his replacement—Lt. Gen. Tadesse Werede—has inherited a hornet's nest of competing interests, with Addis and Asmara both dangerously seeking to ingratiate themselves amidst the looming threat of conflict. While the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) has successfully re-established its monopoly on the politics of Ethiopia's northernmost region, questions regarding the return of displaced persons, the resolution of the occupation of Western Tigray, and the party's participation in future elections remain unresolved-- and intensifying.

Having been expelled as TIA president, Getachew has doubled down on aligning himself with the federal government, being appointed as advisor minister to PM Abiy Ahmed on Eastern African Affairs. As part of these new apparent responsibilities, Getachew and other senior federal officials travelled to Port Sudan on behalf of the Ethiopian government to entreat with the Sudanese Armed Forces, though they were denied a meeting with General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. However, what is abundantly clear is that Getachew's position in Addis and his new party, known as 'Simret', is aligning with the federal government's ongoing efforts to thwart the resurgence of the TPLF. In a series of interviews since his departure, Getachew has attacked his former party on a number of fronts, most recently accusing the TPLF's stated intentions to replace the administrators of Southern Tigray-- where he previously enjoyed his support base-- as a scheme directed by the Eritreans. 

Considering his prominent position within the TPLF during the destructive war, it is quite extraordinary to see the former TIA president embrace Addis's talking points so readily. But this factionalism and trading of alliances is not a new phenomenon within the history of Ethiopian and highlander politics, with Ethiopian and Eritrean political elites often reinterpreting partnerships to pursue their own interests. The shifting sands of coalitions within the Horn of Africa, and increasingly influenced by the Middle Powers from the Gulf, have become staggering. But for Tigrayans still enduring the daily traumas of the genocidal conflict, both the TPLF's quiet outreach to Asmara and Getachew's faction alignment with Addis is extraordinarily painful-- and considered a betrayal by many.

Simret has already been handed provisional registration from the National Election Board of Ethiopia on 26 May—in stark contrast to the ongoing suspension of the TPLF. The speed with which the NEBE endorsed Simret points to the Prosperity Party's appetite for wielding various vehicles to challenge the TPLF. The revocation of the TPLF's registration should be understood as purely political, justified as part of an ongoing disagreement over the party's congress last August. But alongside Simret, another concerning dynamic is the arrival of a new militia faction in the neighbouring Afar region—armed and supported by the federal government and reportedly led by Brigadier General Gebre Egziabher Beyene with the explicit intention of contesting the TIA's authority. However, beyond branding Simret itself as a liberal reformer, it has struggled to recruit grassroots support among young Tigrayans due to its links to Addis—and has faced several internal resignations already as well. And though the aspiration of breaking the TPLF's political monopoly within Tigray is an understandable cause, Getachew's position has further been compromised within Tigray by his alignment with the Prosperity Party. Still, this is less the case with General Tsadkan Gebrenetsae-- who has publicly backed attempts to dismantle the TPLF's political dominance-- being a well-respected commander who is overtly less political. 

Simultaneously, Asmara is further seeking to insert itself into the fragmented politics of Tigray to various ends. During his annual speech on the anniversary of Eritrean independence, long-serving dictator Isaias Afwerki issued a series of not-so-subtle warnings about the supposed dangers of 'Oromummaa,' the popular Oromo social and political movement that ultimately contributed to the overthrow of the previous Ethiopian government. Alarmed by Addis's warmongering rhetoric and military mobilisation in Afar, Asmara is consistently shifting forces along its border with Ethiopia in preparation for renewed conflict.

As part of these rising tensions, this year has seen growing interactions between Eritrean officials and elements within the ruling TPLF to the concern of Addis. Rather ironically, the occasional blasts of warmongering rhetoric towards Tigray from senior Ethiopian officials have only drawn elements within Mekelle closer to Asmara. Such gradually warming relations were evidenced by Debretsion Gebremichael's congratulation of Eritrea on its independence in a recent speech. But Asmara's attempts to insert itself into its southern neighbour's politics, as well as supporting Ethiopian opposition movements, is nothing new, having previously sponsored the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and currently training and arming the Fano insurgency in the Amhara region.

There is a degree of strategic sense in maintaining some relations with Asmara, with the Eritrean forces still capable of acting with impunity within Tigray and no international peacekeeping force nor ally that can reign in Isaias. And the fragility of the supply lines into Tigray was once again exposed by the federal government's severing of supply lines for several days at the end of May and early June. But the extent and nature of the relations with Asmara must be carefully regarded, and to view Eritrea as somehow some sort of genuine ally when Eritrean troops were massacring Tigrayan civilians only a couple of years ago is a strategic mistake. Further, one just has to look at how quickly the rapprochement between Addis and Asmara faded after the signing of the Pretoria agreement to see how ruthlessly Isaias will pursue his own perceived interests. Nor should the lure of the gold mines and sesame trade in the highly militarised and contested Western Tigray draw Tigrayan political actors into a bear hug with Eritrea.

Amidst all this, the humanitarian situation has not eased, nor are signs of genuine justice or reconciliation on the horizon. Instead, the discussion and the accusation of genocide and human rights violations are being weaponised and directed at Addis and Asmara by the rival Tigrayan factions. Other tensions are enduring as well, including the competing territorial claims over Western Tigray, and particularly Wolkait as known by the Amhara that lay claim to the region. The clamouring for the implementation of Pretoria misrepresents the enduring reality that the federal government would prefer to keep Tigray subdued and in a state of 'no war, no peace.' And that there is no serious framework for implementing Pretoria either, with the African Union unable and unwilling to hold the signatories of the flawed agreement to account either. In this context, there is, of course, nuance within the factions of Getachew and Debretsion, as well as others within the Tigrayan political context, but their gravitation towards the big power centres in Addis and Asmara threatens to crush Tigray between their escalating tensions.