Issue No. 284

Deteriorating human rights in Ethiopia's Somali Region 
 

The Somali Regional State (SRS) of Ethiopia has a tortured history of conflict, repression, and political marginalisation. For decades, successive Ethiopian governments have overseen severe human rights abuses, securitising the peripheral region and often brutally targeting individuals perceived as anti-government. Emblems such as Jail Ogaden have been notorious as symbols for this repression, where detainees endured systematic torture, sexual violence, and extrajudicial killings by the Liyu police and regional authorities. In the 21st century, these human rights violations were routinely 'justified' under the 2007-2018 counterinsurgency operations against the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). And with tensions rising once more between the ONLF and the SRS government, human rights conditions in Ethiopia's easternmost region have deteriorated once again.q

Mustafa Omar 'Agjar's' appointment in 2018 as SRS president, following the removal of Abdi Mohamoud Omar, better known as Abdi Illey, initially raised hopes for reform. His early actions hinted at a potential breakthrough in the region's cycle of violence, which included closing down Jail Ogaden and facilitating the ONLF's peace agreement. Moreover, optimism increased that Omar's administration could bring accountability to Illey's Liyu forces and promote reconciliation, including with the neighbouring Afar and Oromia regions.

However, recent evidence indicates a troubling regression regarding the human rights situation in the SRS. Victim testimonies suggest that, despite the rhetoric, Omar's government has instead maintained the oppressive machinery it promised to dismantle. Arbitrary arrests are on the rise again, with dissent being harshly suppressed and security forces persisting in using excessive violence against opposition movements. Over the past two months alone, more than 100 individuals have been arbitrarily detained for social media commentary and political reasons, many of whom have disappeared into secret detention facilities in Jijiga and Gode. These secret facilities are similarly characterised by torture and inhumane conditions akin to the atrocities documented at Jail Ogaden under Abdi Illey's government. Further, families have reported a state-sponsored ransom system, with officials demanding ETB 50,000 for the release of detainees. Extortion practices of this kind are eerily reminiscent of the collective punishment tactics employed by regional authorities during the previous administration.

Another concerning trend has crept back into the SRS-- the politicisation and wielding of the judiciary against dissent. For instance, four youths detained last month for their Facebook posts have been sentenced to prison terms ranging from three to five years. It has become readily apparent that the judiciary in the SRS lacks independence, particularly in politically sensitive cases, and often serves as a tool of repression rather than a means of arbitrating justice. Further, the secret detention facilities in Jijiga and Gode are operating without oversight, keeping detainees hidden from human rights monitors and their families.

Moreover, similar to his predecessor, the courts routinely approve politically motivated charges and refuse bail to suppress dissent. Despite federal reforms, including the closure of detention centres like Maekelawi, the SRS remains essentially a lawless area where empowered regional officials act with near-total impunity. Freedom of expression has also considerably declined, with over 15 independent media outlets closed, leaving state-controlled SRTV as the main broadcaster. Conspicuously absent from SRTV's coverage has been any reference to dissent or the intermittent clashes over the contested three kebeles with the Afar region, instead solely pushing government narratives. Vague anti-terrorism and cyber-security laws criminalise investigative reporting, and the region's only independent TV faces raids and shutdowns to intimidate independent journalism. More broadly, journalists and opposition movements alike have been increasingly silenced through arrests, surveillance, and legal harassment.

The best-known opposition movement-- the ONLF-- is further facing increased harassment, with senior party officials warning of a potential return to conflict. In 2018, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed signed a peace deal with the ONLF, promising reforms and regional autonomy, but inconsistent implementation has badly eroded trust. Although aligned with Addis, Agjar has feared both threats from the ONLF and from the federal government to his position, and has repeatedly sought to undermine the popular former insurgent group turned political party. With elections on the horizon, regional administration-backed factions have furtively attempted to replace ONLF Chairman Abdirahman Maaday with Abdikarim Sheikh Muse in recent weeks. A highly inflammatory and short-sighted move, it could yet precipitate the ONLF taking up arms again.

It is also symptomatic of the incumbent SRS administration, which has cynically refined the tactic of exploiting clan divisions to maintain power. Inter-clan conflicts have surged in the SRS under Agjar's government, with regional officials implicated in inciting dozens of cases. At least 294 incidents of inter-clan violence were recorded between 2018 and 2025, including the Dawacaley massacre near the Somaliland border, which resulted in the reported deaths of hundreds of civilians. The SRS administration's divide-and-conquer strategy mirrors one at the federal level, which has similarly sought to inflame ethnic sentiments, particularly during the Tigray war. And while effective in securing short-term power, this approach has inflicted deep societal scars, making genuine reconciliation increasingly unattainable and hindering prospects for development and peace.

Agjar's focus on suppressing dissent and the federal government's own self-inflicted mistakes has further exposed the SRS to cross-border threats from Al-Shabaab. In July 2022, the jihadists carried out an enormous attack that resulted in the deaths of more than 200 security personnel. More than just an incursion, however, it has signalled a major strategic change as the extremist group sought to establish a permanent presence in Ethiopia through its Jaysh al-Habash wing. Taking advantage of porous borders and disillusioned youth, the militants are continuing to expand their presence in the Bale Mountains and elsewhere.

But so too have prospects for development stalled, with corruption having boomed under Agjar's government and public resources systematically looted. In 2021, ETB 1.2 billion in security funds vanished, justified as expenses for the Afar war without any audit or accountability. Meanwhile, major infrastructure projects, such as Jigjiga's ETB 1.4 billion water scheme and the ETB 200 million Degahbur water project, have been plagued by fraud, resulting in substandard outcomes. And other initiatives, such as the Shilabo water project and a water plan for Wangey Woreda, remain unfinished despite being announced 6 years ago. Most egregiously, 200 ETB million allocated for 2022 drought relief was reported to have been diverted to Prosperity Party political campaigns, even as people, livestock and children suffered devastating losses.

Moreover, while millions in the region endure hunger and water shortages due to recurring droughts and mismanagement, the SRS government has squandered immense sums on Amhara YouTubers and influential figures to bolster Agjar's image as a reformer and a potential candidate for Ethiopia's premiership. Elements of the Amhara elite, at odds with PM Abiy, have sought to leverage Agjar's support to oppose the current leadership, portraying him as a possible candidate to 'save' Ethiopia and replace Abiy. And while he remains deeply unpopular in the SRS and dependent on Addis's support, Agjar has also been highly critical of the federal government. Last week, the SRS president travelled to Kenya, chartering a lavish VIP plane to attend a seemingly trivial ceremony in Garissa before holding political rallies for Somali communities in Nairobi. During a discussion with members of the Somali diaspora, he declared that Ethiopia is effectively bankrupt and its economy is collapsing. Agjar blamed this downturn on PM Abiy's poor leadership and the ongoing insurgencies in Amhara and Oromia.

SRS President Agjar's shift from reformist promises to repression reflects Ethiopia's growing authoritarianism. Nevertheless, resilience persists with young activists documenting abuses, opposition parties increasingly united, and communities resisting divisive tactics. Still, while a return to armed conflict with the ONLF or other armed groups would have terrible consequences, Agjar and his cronies continue to push the region's fragile politics towards the edge. And these dangers threaten beyond the SRS's borders, further jeopardising Ethiopia's already fragmentary dynamics and rising instability. While the SRS is just one region in crisis among many in Ethiopia, it should not continue to be overlooked, as the region is similarly in dire need of external support to arrest its ongoing democratic backsliding.