Issue No. 283

Redrawing Identity in Benishangul
 

On 15 March 2025, the Benishangul-Gumuz Regional Council voted to lift the parliamentary immunity of Yohannes Tesema, a senior member of the opposition Boro Democratic Party (BDP)-- and remand him to prosecutors. The arrest of Tesema, alongside two other colleagues, followed weeks of ratcheting tensions surrounding gerrymandering regional constitutional amendments that the BDP and others have loudly protested. Authorities have since charged Tesema with inciting ethnic conflict via social media on flimsy grounds. But the tensions in the peripheral Benishangul-Gumuz region are further emblematic of a broader national political decay, with Addis-sanctioned regional governments moving to consolidate their grip on power-- no matter the destabilising consequences.

Earlier this year, Benishangul-Gumuz's Regional Council approved a raft of contentious amendments. Citing the need to address "longstanding questions" on inclusivity, the changes drastically expanded the region's parliamentary seat number from 99 to 165. Under Ethiopia's ethnic-federal system, like the Gambella and Harari regions, Benishangul-Gumuz's constitution explicitly cites 5 indigenous groups of the Berta, Gumuz, Mao, Komo, and Shinasha as the 'founder nationalities.' However, the Council's changes proposed dropping the explicit designation of 'founder' nationality seats that are cordoned off for the indigenous groups. Other amendments included increasing the number of Regional Council seats as well as reforming several districts. Benishangul-Gumuz's ruling Prosperity Party justified the sweeping changes through vaguely defined "social and economic needs," arguing they are merely technical in nature to adjust polling stations and districts to match population and geography. 

However, opposition in Ethiopia's westernmost region has argued that the Council has dramatically increased representation without new census data and encroached on seats reserved for indigenous ethnicities. The 66 new seats blatantly diminish the traditional bloc, handing a host of positions to those aligned with the ruling administration. And beyond the BDP, traditional representatives from the Berta and Gumuz have expressed concerns that their council influence could be undermined by these redrawn boundaries that favour 'settler' communities-- particularly the Amhara and Oromo. Despite the discontent, the amendment passed in March, with the administration continuing to insist it complied with constitutional procedure and warning against anyone fomenting instability. 

The sparking political schisms are well-established in Benishangul-Gumuz, mirroring the historic marginalisation of the region, as well as the enduring 'founder-settler' tensions. Only formally incorporated into the Ethiopian state under Emperor Menelik II's militarised westward expansion in the 1890s, the Berta and the Gumuz communities were more closely linked to their Sudanese counterparts up until the late 19th century. Governed by a patchwork coalition of Islamic sheikhdoms and animist chiefdoms, many only paid nominal allegiance to Menelik II's administration. Subsequently, the annexation of the Berta and Gumuz communities, among others, came amid the violent European 'Scramble for Africa' to prevent the encroachment of Anglo-Egyptian Sudan from Khartoum and to secure the lucrative gold mines in the area. In the proceeding decades, these groups were subsequently subjected to forced Christianisation, taxation, and conscription—policies that disrupted traditional governance structures.

Nor did the development of the modern-day Benishangul-Gumuz region improve under the imperial Haile Selassie regime and the Derg era. It took until 2012 for a bridge to be constructed across the Blue Nile that severs the region, as well as an arterial road between the key Metekel and Assosa zones. In the mid-1980s, the land grievances between the indigenous groups and the 'settler' Amhara and Oromo were accentuated further, with tens of thousands of impoverished Amhara peasants from Wollo resettled by Addis in the fertile region during the brutal Ethiopian famine.

The establishment of the Benishangul-Gumuz Regional State under the 1995 Constitution was supposed to usher in a new era of self-rule for its "indigenous nationalities." But in practice, ethnic federalism entrenched fresh hierarchies, as well as contradictions. In 2002, the revised regional constitution recognised the Berta, Gumuz, Shinasha, Mao, and Komo as the "owners" of the region and granted political privileges, but their actual power remained circumscribed by both the federal centre and the demographic dominance of so-called "non-natives," the settlers from Amhara, Oromia, and Tigray. And while the regional constitution provided for cultural and linguistic autonomy, it also institutionalised ethnic identity as the primary vehicle for accessing power. Tensions between indigenous groups and settlers began to sharpen, with 'nativist' political elites accusing highland communities of large-scale land acquisitions that have displaced the traditional populations. 

Yet the then-ruling Benishangul-Gumuz People's Democratic Unity Front (BGPDUF), a satellite party of the Tigrayan-led Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), lacked meaningful autonomy and often served as a rubber stamp for federal policy. From Addis, the region continued to be regarded through a securitised lens, as well as peripheral to the central state. In turn, much like their counterparts in the Somali Regional State and Afar, the region's political elites were early backers of Abiy Ahmed's Prosperity Party, hoping that the lot of Benishangul-Gumuz and their own relative influence might change with a new government. But since 2019 and the folding of the BGPDUF into the Prosperity Party, the politics of Benishangul-Gumuz have become more militarised, while the region remains devoid of credible internal power-sharing arrangements.

Like most of the country, the Benishangul-Gumuz region has witnessed a surge in armed violence in recent years, peaking in 2021 amidst the destructive Tigray war. Alongside long-running strains, increasing Amhara irredentist claims on the gold-rich Metekel zone helped trigger fighting. Gumuz militias, in particular, targeted Amhara and Oromo communities, Sudanese refugees, and government infrastructure. Known as the 'Kumer insurgency,' hundreds were killed and tens of thousands displaced, mostly from highland communities in Metekel and Kamashi zones. Attempts by the federal government to 'pacify' the area saw significant numbers of troops and allied Amhara militias, including Fano, deployed to Benishangul-Gumuz. Human rights organisations subsequently documented extrajudicial killings, mass detentions, and scorched-earth tactics by both insurgents and government forces. Local elites who attempted to mediate or criticise the federal approach, such as former regional president Ashadli Hassan, were pushed out or silenced. Eventually, though a memorandum of understanding was signed between the insurgent Gumuz People's Democratic Movement (GPDM) and the regional government in late 2021, the rifts, epitomised by the recent constitutional amendments, have endured. 

Citing security concerns, the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) cancelled the June and September 2021 elections in Benishangul-Gumuz before also postponing the December 2021 run-off indefinitely. At the time, more than 100,000 registered voters were effectively disenfranchised, as the region's 9 seats in the House of Peoples' Representatives and 99 seats in the Regional Council remained vacant. To remedy this, NEBE scheduled "outstanding" elections in June 2024, but they were conducted under heavy security. The handling of these polls by Addis led opposition parties, including the Benishangul-Gumuz Democratic Party (BGDP), to accuse the federal government of both undermining ethnic federalism as well as treating the indigenous group's concerns as a security threat rather than a political challenge. 

But perhaps few projects better encapsulate the disconnect between federal ambitions and local needs more than the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Still unfinished, the project began construction in 2011 under immense fanfare, but in Benishangul-Gumuz, the GERD has become a symbol of federal overreach and an unwelcome monument to their dispossession. Tens of thousands of people were displaced by the dam's construction and reservoir filling, many without adequate compensation. Land expropriations and environmental degradation have also disproportionately affected the Gumuz and Berta communities, which rely on seasonal riverbanks for cultivation and grazing. And most of the region, ironically, remains without power despite hosting Africa's largest hydroelectric dam.

Meanwhile, Benishangul-Gumuz's politics continue to be shaped by its western border with both Sudan and South Sudan. The Nilo-Saharan Gumuz and Berta, among others, straddle both sides of the porous border, with informal trade networks, both licit and illicit, influential in its socio-economic and political dispensation. Insurgents in Benishangul-Gumuz are reported to have procured weapons and logistical support from traders in South Sudan and Sudan. Since large-scale conflict erupted in Sudan in April 2023, thousands of refugees have poured into Benishangul-Gumuz, further adding strain to the host-settler relations and limited government services. Addis has grown increasingly wary of these transnational networks, particularly amid rising tensions with Egypt and fears that it may attempt to destabilise the region as part of the broader disputes over the Nile water basin. The Sudanese government has previously also made claims to part of Benishangul-Gumuz territory (the Guba district in Metekel) on historical grounds related to the dam's location.

Despite a lull in major clashes, the situation in Benishangul-Gumuz remains volatile. A brief attempt by the federal government to broker a local peace process in the Kamashi zone collapsed in March after local elders walked out, claiming that Addis was dictating the process. And in May, new reports emerged of federal troops conducting mass arrests of young men in the Assosa area, accusing them of links to the Gumuz insurgency. Local political actors are also becoming more vocal in their disillusionment, with several former Prosperity Party members having recently broken ranks and reportedly engaged in talks to form a new party after the scheduled 2026 federal elections. Rumours that a regional referendum that agitates for greater autonomy are similarly increasing, and though fighting has eased, it may not take much for the indigenous-settler relations to explode again. There is certainly a need to address the schism between Gumuz communities and the Amhara in particular, as well as the issues of representation for the non-indigenous groups. But the constitutional amendments have little to do with these issues, and far more to do with consolidating power in the ruling administration.

Further amendments, a referendum or elections may prove another flashpoint-- and not just in Benishangul-Gumuz. It is widely anticipated that the Prosperity Party is planning to overhaul the ethnic federal model for Ethiopia's politics to a more centralised model, but it is likely to have major reverberations in the various splintering political settlements from the eastern Somali region to Ethiopia's Sudanese border. Many of the remaining opposition parties are warning of the shrunken democratic space and harassment, particularly following the weaponisation of the NEBE against several movements. Few expect the 2026 elections to be free or fair, but at this rate, they may prove highly destabilising as the arrayed Prosperity Party administrations begin jockeying to maintain power.