Issue No. 282

The High Stakes of Tigray's Political Transition
 

A new figurehead may be leading the Tigray Interim Administration (TIA), but the problems of Ethiopia's northernmost region continue unabated. Still caught between the looming threat of war between Addis and Asmara, and roiled by the destabilising intra-Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) schism, the newly appointed president of the TIA, Lieutenant General Tadesse Werede Tesfay, and Commander-in-Chief of the Tigray Defence Forces (TDF), has no small task on his hands. And having only been in post a few weeks after the deposition of Getachew Reda, the new TIA president's administration could soon be blown off course by the unfolding battle over the TPLF's re-registration.

Lt. Gen. Werede remains a highly respected figure within Tigray and undoubtedly has a distinguished résumé, including having overseen the UN peacekeeping operation in the disputed Abyei region on the Sudan–South Sudan border. But he comes to office at a highly fraught moment for Tigray, with the Pretoria Agreement's implementation having been relegated to the back burner and the relationship between the TPLF and Addis in dire condition. The riven factional politics of the TPLF have paralysed and militarised the governance of the region in recent months, as two cliques led by Getachew and Debretsion Gebremichael vied for power. The former, widely regarded as having aligned himself with Addis, was forced from his position in March, with Debretsion's faction asserting control over government bodies in Mekelle, Adigrat, and other key towns, drawing its support from rural party cadres and the TDF. Subsequently, perhaps stung by the loss of Getachew, Addis briefly flirted with the ill-conceived notion that candidates for the TIA presidency be nominated via email before eventually acquiescing to Lt. Gen. Werede's nomination by the TPLF in April.

While he is undoubtedly aligned with the party, Lt. Gen. Werede has not been regarded as a member of the 'old guard' that has dominated Tigray's politics for decades. His cabinet, however, reflects the victor from the TPLF struggle—slimming down the number of ministers from 27 to 21 and appointing Ammanuel Assefa, the party's number two, as vice-president. And broadly, the appointed ministers generally fall into the Debretsion TPLF faction over the deposed Getachew bloc, which has drawn criticism from a number of smaller and pro-independence Tigrayan parties. Among others, Salsay Weyane Tigray has accused the TPLF of abandoning the Pretoria Agreement provisions in favour of consolidating power within Tigray and using the flawed peace process as a vehicle for political resurrection. Despite the broader popularity of Lt. Gen. Werede, hopes for a democratic transition and liberalisation of the civic space in Tigray remain doubtful in light of the resurgence of the old party cadres in the region's politics.

Lt. Gen. Werede has outlined three priorities for his leadership—restoring law and order, revitalising the regional economy, and fully implementing the Pretoria Agreement. Of the three, the final is certain to prove the most fraught. There is an understandable degree of scepticism amongst many, if not most, Tigrayans about the feasibility of returning over a million displaced persons, as well as resolving the contested territorial occupations in Southern and Western Tigray, with Addis yet to prove itself a willing partner. But the question of restoring law and order also raises uncomfortable questions for the TIA, too, with ongoing issues of securitisation within Tigray, particularly the lucrative informal gold mines that have gone into overdrive.

In his opening weeks, the new TIA president has further called fresh attention to the ongoing occupation of "nearly 40%" of Tigray by "invaders", particularly Amhara and government-aligned militias, as well as Eritrea. And this will undoubtedly prove one of the major challenges of the administration, with Addis continuing to shirk its duty by removing non-federal armed groups from Tigray's constitutional territory. The fertile Western Tigray remains a highly contested tinderbox, with Eritrean forces using the region as a conduit to transfer arms and supplies for the Fano insurgency in Amhara. Western Tigray is also a hub for a volatile and transnational grey economy involving people trafficking, smuggling, and the minerals trade. Multiple influential actors from Eritrea, Sudan, and Ethiopia all have vested interests in the sesame-growing region, and returning Tigrayan oversight and displaced persons is far from their priorities. Further, Addis may want to prevent the TDF regaining access to the Sudanese and its allied Sudanese army, as well as to avoid incensing the Amhara nationalists who lay claim to Western Tigray. Meanwhile, hundreds of thousands of displaced Tigrayans remain stuck in overcrowded camps, with malnutrition rates worsening rapidly due to the dismantling of USAID.

Another escalating challenge to the revamped TIA administration pertains to the rising tensions between the TPLF and the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE). The dispute boils down to the NEBE ruling that the TPLF's Party Congress in August 2024 was both illegitimate and that the Marxist party must re-register—a move Debretsion and others have outright condemned. They contend that this is a sabotage of the Pretoria Agreement, arguing that the accord stipulates the restoration of the TPLF to its pre-war status, as it does the removal of its 'terrorist' label. Senior members of the TPLF also assert that Addis is wielding the compromised NEBE to delegitimise the party, and potentially to seize its assets. The roots of this disagreement stem from the TPLF and Addis's contrasting views of the circumstances under which the Pretoria Agreement was signed, with the federal government considering the accord a total surrender. While the implications of the suspended TPLF being entirely deregistered are unclear, senior TPLF officials are warning that it threatens the foundations of the Pretoria Agreement and could precipitate a return to armed conflict.

Today, though Addis may have ceded its direct control of Tigray, it nevertheless holds a number of levers to undermine and destabilise the region, including through the NEBE. Another is the growing reports that Getachew Reda and other disaffected Tigrayan politicians are planning to form a rival political party intended to challenge the TPLF's dominance, which could potentially serve as a vehicle for the federal government's interests. Still, while the Prosperity Party has sought to quash any political rivals—particularly those that support the ethnic federal politics of the previous government—with a war still threatened with Asmara, the TDF remains an enticing force that the federal government will want to call upon. But when senior officials, such as Suleiman Dedefo, attack the TPLF as a "criminal group" operating outside constitutional norms, it only pushes Tigrayan political actors closer to Asmara as well as to the increasingly cohesive Fano insurgency. This alleged outreach, too, has caused a number of rifts within the Tigrayan political elite.

A broader trend further threatens the implementation of Pretoria, which PM Abiy Ahmed has learnt to Ethiopia's detriment—that war can be an excellent way of consolidating one's own personal power. If the federal government feels it cannot constrain the TPLF as it is seeking to do, it may instead ramp up efforts to actively destabilise the political party and, by extension, the TIA and the region at large. Lt. Gen. Werede has repeatedly proven himself an adept military commander, including from the mountains of Tigray between 2020 and 2022, but navigating the choppy political waters of the coming months is certain to present another host of challenges for the new president.