Issue No. 275

War looms as Tigrayan divisions deepen
 

Since the beginning of March, the destabilising schism within and between the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Tigray Interim Administration (TIA) has rapidly escalated. The TPLF faction, led by Debretsion Gebremichael and backed by the majority of the Tigray Defence Forces (TDF) leadership, has now consolidated its hold on central and north-eastern Tigray and moved to assert itself over key towns, including Adigrat and parts of Mekelle. Amid the broader strains, this appears to have triggered the departure of TIA President Getachew Reda from Tigray for Addis, possibly ending his fraught time as regional leader. While the possibility of armed intra-Tigrayan conflict remains unlikely for now, the concerning backdrop of escalating Addis-Asmara tensions threatens to plunge the broader region into renewed conflict. On 10 March, TIA Vice-President General Tsadkan Gebretensae publicly warned of a return to war.

Tensions between the TPLF's rival power centres exploded into plain view last August when Debretsion's faction hosted a party summit without recognition from the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) and without Getachew's support. Since then, both sides have increasingly jostled for regional control and legitimacy, paralysing Tigray's post-conflict reconstruction and governance. The reasons behind the TPLF's fracturing are layered, with some arguing that Getachew's 'reformist' faction is attempting to democratically reshape the Marxist party, still dominated by an older generation of liberation veterans. Others point to the free-for-all over Tigray's informal gold trade as a motivating factor, alongside the vested financial interests of Debretsion's faction within the region's industries. There are also divergences on issues such as the DDR process, with the TPLF 'old guard' preferring a staggered initiative following the withdrawal of occupying Amhara and Eritrean forces. But the principal issue has been the abject failure to implement the Pretoria agreement, with Tigray's economic and social reconstruction having barely begun as war looms once more. Pretoria's guarantors, though not explicitly stated in the poorly worded document, including the US, have failed to push Addis towards implementation. 

Despite all this, the politics of the TPLF remains highly opaque and personalised, with the Tigrayan public isolated from the party's decision-making processes. Months of repeat negotiations led by senior Tigrayan religious, military, and civil society figures have all failed, while the two factions increasingly manoeuvred over key districts and towns. Most concerning of all, there are now widespread perceptions that Getachew has aligned himself with Addis while Debretsion's faction is working with Eritrea. Tigrayans are understandably furious at the dangerous political squabbling and their leaders' outreach to Addis and Asmara, the two forces primarily responsible for the region's devastation during the war. Many are concerned that if war breaks out between Addis and Asmara, Tigray could be pulled into the conflict due to its geo-strategic position on the Eritrean border. During the Badme War of 1998-2000, Tigray faced the brunt of the brutal fighting on its land.

The federal and Tigrayan implementation of the Pretoria agreement—the flawed cessation of hostilities accord that ended the 2020-2022 Tigray war—has been badly stalled for some time. Though the factional rhetoric grew increasingly histrionic, Tigray's well-respected security forces remained neutral until late January. Following a two-day closed summit, around 200 senior commanders endorsed the restructuring of the TIA, criticising the failure to implement the Pretoria agreement and backing Debretsion's 14th Party Congress conclusions. 

On 5 March, Getachew, in an effort to salvage his flagging presidency, called upon Debretsion's military forces to halt their consolidation over territory in the region's north and east. Describing the move as illegal, Getachew asserted that deploying Tigray's military would lead to a return to conflict. This was followed by Getachew attempting to suspend three senior Tigrayan commanders aligned with Debretsion—namely General Yohannes Wolde-Giorgis, General Maisho Beyene, and General Migibaye Haile—on 10 March.

The response from Debretsion's faction was immediate, framing Getachew as a dictator and stating that he lacked the authority to dismiss the military commanders as the party had removed him as TIA president. Particularly significant, Tigray's Peace and Security Office (PSO), led by Tadesse Werede, publicly rejected Getachew's leadership the next day, refusing to implement the TIA president's orders to suspend the generals. For several months, Tadesse had remained generally neutral, repeatedly urging the two sides to come together and negotiate. This time, though, the PSO stated that it would not recognise the suspension, arguing that the decision lacked procedural legitimacy. Getachew's attempt to compel the PSO to reinforce his position backfired, with the key institution refusing to be drawn.

The next day, on 11 March, military units and TPLF officials stormed the Adigrat mayor's office, removing the Getachew-appointed mayor and installing their own candidate. Debretsion-aligned forces further established checkpoints from Adigrat to Mekelle and expanded their presence in Tigray's east. In the most brazen move yet, dissident soldiers took control of Mekelle's mayor's office and FM radio station on 13 March. In several towns and cities, residents have been reported to have withdrawn cash and stockpiled essentials amid fears of a return to conflict.

Amid these scenes, Getachew departed for Addis, meeting with Ethiopian Foreign Minister Gedion Timotheos to lobby support from the federal government after previously calling for federal intervention in the Tigrayan divide. In a pointed comment, the foreign minister subsequently accused Debretsion's faction of working with "foreign powers," a clear allusion to Eritrea. And on 13 March, Getachew again labelled the actions of his rival factions as a "coup attempt," something that was quickly dismissed by his successor, TPLF deputy chairman Amanuel Assefa.

Yet Getachew also retains support within the region, particularly among Tigray's younger population and in the south. A complete military takeover directed by Debretsion has the potential to ignite—if not an armed internal confrontation—significant public unrest. This is especially concerning given reports of violent conduct by security forces aligned with Debretsion's faction against civilians. But any attempt by Addis to forcibly restore their ally Getachew to power could also well result in a return to destructive conflict between Ethiopia's federal government and Debretsion's faction. The TPLF chairman may look to Asmara for military support if that proves to be the case,  reaching a Faustian bargain with President Isaias Afwerki. 

This week, though, it appears that some kind of consensus may have been reached. Reports emerged that General Tadesse Werede has taken over the leadership of the TIA following negotiations with PM Abiy Ahmed and Debretsion Gebremichael, among others, in Addis. Tadesse is a well-respected general who has been closely involved in the peace process. The TPLF previously proposed to Addis that he assume leadership in late 2024 from Getachew, but the federal government has remained largely silent on the intra-Tigrayan tensions, preferring to let the divisions deepen.

Part of the Tigrayan delegation dispatched to Addis has already returned to Tigray, but significant tensions and uncertainties remain. The absence of a regional multilateral peace architecture regarding both intra-TPLF tensions and Addis-Asmara relations has been glaring, with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and African Union remaining absent. Moreover, the African Union's leverage has been reduced even further in this particular context, given the poor relations between Djibouti and Eritrea and with the recent Djiboutian foreign minister now leading the multilateral body. And though the new US administration has yet to comprehensively outline its Horn of Africa priorities, it is unlikely that Washington will deploy any considerable diplomatic weight to prevent a slide towards conflict.

Tigray can ill afford another war, either internal or regional, with the humanitarian and economic situation remaining so catastrophic. Senior Tigrayan officials have sought to reassure Addis and Asmara that they have no appetite or interest in conflict and are committed to the Pretoria agreement. But events may be out of their hands, with the growing militarisation in Afar in Ethiopia and Eritrea calling up its forces, propelling the region back towards conflict. The situation remains highly fluid, but there are still actors with influence across the broader Red Sea region that could pull Addis and Asmara back from the brink of conflict. The fallout of such a war-- not just for Tigray but for the broader Horn of Africa-- would be immensely consequential, threatening to draw in a host of state and non-state actors and expanding the Gulf's proxy conflicts. Meanwhile, the TPLF and TIA divisions could not come at a worse moment for Ethiopia's northern region, with war looming. The reported removal of Getachew may stabilise the TPLF's internal schism for the time being, but the threat of Tigray being dragged back into conflict by Addis and Asmara is unconscionable. Gulf and influential Western powers must move-- and fast-- to prevent the slide back towards conflict in northern Ethiopia.