Issue No. 273

The Oromo Equation
 

Between 19-22 February, several major Oromo opposition parties met in Addis to discuss Oromia's sustained upheaval, including the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) insurgency. For several years now, the region has been gripped by still-worsening humanitarian, political, and security crises, while the regional opposition has been essentially co-opted into the government or splintered and unable to mount a response to the deteriorating situation. In this light, the two principal Oromo opposition parties-- the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC)-- met in Addis alongside representatives from the ruling Prosperity Party and Oromo civil society actors.

Following the conference, the OLF, OFC, and others pledged to work toward forming a "Transitional National Unity Government of Oromia" and to "ensure democratic governance, self-determination, and expanded public services until a permanent system is established through a popular mandate." This is not the first time that Oromo opposition groups have called for the formation of either a transitional regional or federal government, though Addis has roundly dismissed the proposals on each occasion. Other major resolutions included reiterating Oromo territorial claims over parts of Benishangul-Gumuz, Amhara, and the Somali region, as well as the historic assertion over Addis-- also known as 'Finfinnee' by Oromos. 

Regarding security, the communique outlined integrating the OLA into the regional security architecture as part of the transitional administration after a political process. Describing the OLA as "Oromo freedom fighters," the statement also urged "all genuine Oromo forces to resolve their political differences and galvanise their unity in rallying behind this initiative to save the nation." An OLA statement, however, immediately rejected the entire premise of the conference, arguing that it was complicit in a broader attempt by the federal government to claim it represents the Oromo people. The insurgent group further asserted that the opposition parties lack the legitimacy or leverage to negotiate with the Abiy government.

The OLA's out-and-out rejection of talks under this umbrella is notable, with the insurgents led by Jaal Maaroo still dominating western Oromia and much of the rural areas of the region. For several years, the federal government has pursued a harsh form of counter-insurgency against the OLA, with its forces accused of committing a litany of serious human rights violations. And across Oromia, the humanitarian situation has badly deteriorated, with armed conflict driving mass displacement and economic disruption that has taken a severe toll on Oromo communities. In turn, there has been a noticeable breakdown in government presence and services in Oromia. Kidnappings have become increasingly common, with travel by road dangerous, as evidenced by the recent abduction of over 50 traders en route from Debre Libanos to Yaya Gulele. 

Fighting between the OLA and government forces has declined somewhat since early December 2024 when a splinter faction of the insurgent group in central Oromia led by Sanyi Nagasa negotiated a peace agreement. Hundreds of fighters under his command have since entered government rehabilitation camps, while Nagasa and two other senior former OLA commanders were recently handed positions within the Oromia regional administration. Still, Jaal Maaroo's forces are more than capable of carrying out significant raids, assassinating the Sululta district administrator Ato Abebe Worku, just 25 km from Addis, on 12 February. Part of the rationale behind December's haphazard peace deal with the Nagasa OLA faction was to try to limit the OLA's encroachment towards the capital. For years, Addis's counter-insurgency operations in Oromia have included a variety of groups, such as the Oromia Special Forces, police, paramilitaries, and government-aligned militias. However, the escalating conflict in Amhara has forced their redeployment away from Oromia, leaving areas exposed for further OLA penetration. 

Though PM Abiy Ahmed came to power in large part as a result of the national opposition Qeerroo movement to the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front, support for the ruling Prosperity Party amongst the ethnic group has all but collapsed. Since coming to power, violence has surged against Oromo civilians and the unique political/ cultural structures which they hold. In January, over a dozen Karrayyu Gadaa leaders and elders were seized by security forces, allegedly for refusing to engage with the reintegration of OLA fighters, citing the integrity of the Gadaa system, the Oromo traditional system of governance. Senior Oromo figures– particularly Jawar Mohammed– have also returned to the fore to criticise the federal government. 

But while Oromia remains the political epicentre of Ethiopia, with Amhara and Tigray both sidelined, the Oromo elite remains divided. Addis has repeatedly sought to either co-opt or suppress Oromo political opposition, waging war against the OLA while attempting to bring elements of the Oromo nationalist movement into the government. Key posts within the government and military architecture continue to be held by Oromo, and there remains a more general highland-lowland divide that has perforated Ethiopian politics for decades. But PM Abiy has also increasingly shuffled key Oromo ministers, promoting a number of politicians hailing from southern Ethiopia to consolidate his position.

Meanwhile, the Oromo conference also reflected the government's quiet stoking of tensions between Oromia and neighbouring regions over competing territorial claims. The Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and others from the Somali region have already criticised the OLF-OFC communique, while Amhara commentators also reiterated their opposition to the Oromo territorial claims. But these divisions comprise another dynamic fuelled by the federal government, the attempts by Addis to cast itself as the sole protector of Oromos from other ethnic groups. The OLA referred to this in their February statement, alleging that Addis is attempting to forge a false narrative suggesting that "northerners" are "consolidating" to threaten the Oromo.

The looming spectre of more conflict in northern Ethiopia– either with a faction of the riven Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) or, more likely, with Eritrea– complicates Addis's ambitions to pacify Oromia. And with the Amhara region increasingly beyond federal control, PM Abiy badly needs to demonstrate that his government is capable of restoring some semblance of normalcy to Ethiopia - not simply swivelling between ethno-political brush fires that threaten to converge into a dangerous national conflagration.