Issue No. 264

The disparate Fano insurgency in the Amhara region shows no sign of easing but has rather escalated in line with successive military offensives. For several months, an increasing number of drone strikes have been deployed against the insurgency, comprised of disparate and competing militia coalitions, drawing more support to the insurgency. And having failed to kill most of the insurgency's senior commanders, including the rivals Eskinder Nega and Zemene Kassie, or seriously dent the capacity of the most influential militias, this highly militarised strategy is likely to continue into 2025. The humanitarian, socio-economic and political costs of the fighting, particularly in the epicentres of Gojjam and Wollo, will thus persist, with millions displaced, thousands of schools shuttered, and healthcare devastated. Still, due to the destabilising impact of the Fano insurgency on Amhara, its neighbouring regions, as well as Addis, it is probable that some form of settlement will be sought with at least a faction or two, though Zemene Kassie's Gojjam militia has insisted it intends to keep fighting. However, it is unlikely that the conflict will be solved holistically without acknowledging its deep-rooted issues, and this would only signal a temporary reprieve. The multiple constituencies and interests that form the Fano insurgency are also likely to complicate any attempts at an inclusive peace settlement.

Though a peace accord was recently signed with a splinter faction of the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), this insurgency, too, remains resilient, particularly in western Oromia under Jaal Marroo's command. And, in the coming months, unless significant political concessions are offered to the OLA, it will likely continue expanding its influence closer to Addis. Though some splinter OLA fighters under Sagni Nagasa will soon be disarmed, the recent accord may have actually undermined the prospects for a broader peace in Oromia. 

In Tigray, meanwhile, the political settlement is being tested to the limit by a destabilising schism within and between the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Tigray Interim Administration (TIA). The implementation of the Pretoria agreement has badly stalled, with reconstruction, resettlement of IDPs, the removal of Eritrean and Amhara forces, and issues of genuine transitional justice all left by the wayside. Whether these divisions come to a head and draw in the security forces remains to be seen, but the federal government has managed to stoke intra-Tigray division in a way the war was unable to. The scars of the 2020-2022 war remain ever-present in the northern region, and the psycho-social impacts of the conflict will last a lifetime for many.

Without peace and massive funding in 2025, the immense humanitarian poly-crises will likely endure across Ethiopia, particularly in Amhara, western Oromia and Tigray. Over 21 million people are currently estimated to require some form of humanitarian assistance, with need far outstripping delivery in 2024. Moreover, following multiple aid scandals implicating both federal agencies and major international humanitarian organisations, there is a reduced appetite to sink funding into Ethiopia in a period of limited money. But the humanitarian and socio-economic costs will continue to be colossal– thousands may well starve to death, and the impacts of malnutrition on young children cannot be reversed.

Despite the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank's-necessitated financial surgery, the economic situation, too, is likely to continue to compound the broader instability and disenchantment across Ethiopia in 2025. As federal funds are diverted en masse to the security sector, the supposed 'beautification' of Addis and key supporters of the government, spending on healthcare, education, and welfare concurrently diminish. Meles Zenawi's 'developmental economy' has been entirely cast aside in favour of a privatised model. Telecom and other sectors have been opened up for investment, but this form of 'trickle-down' economics has not yet translated into tangible support for most Ethiopians. With inflation exceeding 30% and a heavy taxation burden, the federal government will struggle to stimulate sustained and equitable growth.

However, though Ethiopia is beset by domestic trouble, it remains a highly influential, if waned, regional power. The sheer scale of Ethiopia– 120 million people and counting– makes it a significant economic market and demographic weight in the Horn. And though the military is reviled domestically in large parts of the country, it remains an important bulwark against Al-Shabaab in central and southern Somalia. Tensions appear to have been cooled-- even temporarily-- between Mogadishu and Addis with last week's Turkey-negotiated Ankara Accord, but whether Ethiopia participates in the next iteration of the African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia remains to be seen. However, the ad hoc and highly personalised foreign policy of the federal government, encapsulated by the MoU and search for 'sea access,' makes it challenging to anticipate what the coming months might bring. The MoU may be suddenly pursued with full force or another grand vision may take its place, no matter the diplomatic cost. Still, the 2018-2022 alliance between Asmara and Addis is now well and truly shattered, and how it evolves or deteriorates will continue to play an influential role in Ethiopia's politics in the coming year.

The Ethiopian Cable Team