What does 2025 hold for Ethiopia?
The past 11-and-a-half months have hardly been quiet for Ethiopia. The beginning of the year started with the bombshell Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Somaliland, the geopolitical impact of which continues to reverberate. Insurgencies in Oromia and particularly Amhara have escalated further, compounding massive humanitarian emergencies and diminishing the government presence to a largely militarised one. Political and civic freedoms remained in retreat in 2024 in Ethiopia, with journalists, politicians and civil society groups all coming under attack. While unlocking international lending, major macro-economic reform has hurt many of Ethiopia's worst-off as immense sums have simultaneously been ploughed into transforming Addis into a kind of quasi-Dubai. Of course, Ethiopia does not operate by the Gregorian calendar and already marked its new year on 11 September, but it is worth looking ahead to 2025 and what it might herald for the Horn's most populous country.
The disparate Fano insurgency in the Amhara region shows no sign of easing but has rather escalated in line with successive military offensives. For several months, an increasing number of drone strikes have been deployed against the insurgency, comprised of disparate and competing militia coalitions, drawing more support to the insurgency. And having failed to kill most of the insurgency's senior commanders, including the rivals Eskinder Nega and Zemene Kassie, or seriously dent the capacity of the most influential militias, this highly militarised strategy is likely to continue into 2025. The humanitarian, socio-economic and political costs of the fighting, particularly in the epicentres of Gojjam and Wollo, will thus persist, with millions displaced, thousands of schools shuttered, and healthcare devastated. Still, due to the destabilising impact of the Fano insurgency on Amhara, its neighbouring regions, as well as Addis, it is probable that some form of settlement will be sought with at least a faction or two, though Zemene Kassie's Gojjam militia has insisted it intends to keep fighting. However, it is unlikely that the conflict will be solved holistically without acknowledging its deep-rooted issues, and this would only signal a temporary reprieve. The multiple constituencies and interests that form the Fano insurgency are also likely to complicate any attempts at an inclusive peace settlement.
Though a peace accord was recently signed with a splinter faction of the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), this insurgency, too, remains resilient, particularly in western Oromia under Jaal Marroo's command. And, in the coming months, unless significant political concessions are offered to the OLA, it will likely continue expanding its influence closer to Addis. Though some splinter OLA fighters under Sagni Nagasa will soon be disarmed, the recent accord may have actually undermined the prospects for a broader peace in Oromia.
In Tigray, meanwhile, the political settlement is being tested to the limit by a destabilising schism within and between the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Tigray Interim Administration (TIA). The implementation of the Pretoria agreement has badly stalled, with reconstruction, resettlement of IDPs, the removal of Eritrean and Amhara forces, and issues of genuine transitional justice all left by the wayside. Whether these divisions come to a head and draw in the security forces remains to be seen, but the federal government has managed to stoke intra-Tigray division in a way the war was unable to. The scars of the 2020-2022 war remain ever-present in the northern region, and the psycho-social impacts of the conflict will last a lifetime for many.
In 2024, democratic and civil rights have also continued to deteriorate, with arbitrary detentions and disappearances of several well-known politicians. The murder of Bate Urgessa from the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) in April, seemingly by regional security forces, shocked much of the country, while hundreds of local and national officials have been detained. The Ethiopian Authority for Civil Society Organizations has shut down over 1,500 civil rights organisations this year alone and recently ordered the suspension of the Center for Advancement of Rights and Democracy (CARD). In large parts of Oromia and Amhara, as well as other regions experiencing more periodic instability, such as the Somali region, the internet has been severed for weeks. Legitimate political opposition, including the Ogaden National Liberation Front and the OLF, have faced increased harassment and limitations at the hands of the government. This trend, too, is likely to persist into the New Year; as the control of the federal and regional administrations slip further, it has resorted to autocratic measures to maintain their hold on power.
Without peace and massive funding in 2025, the immense humanitarian poly-crises will likely endure across Ethiopia, particularly in Amhara, western Oromia and Tigray. Over 21 million people are currently estimated to require some form of humanitarian assistance, with need far outstripping delivery in 2024. Moreover, following multiple aid scandals implicating both federal agencies and major international humanitarian organisations, there is a reduced appetite to sink funding into Ethiopia in a period of limited money. But the humanitarian and socio-economic costs will continue to be colossal– thousands may well starve to death, and the impacts of malnutrition on young children cannot be reversed.
Despite the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank's-necessitated financial surgery, the economic situation, too, is likely to continue to compound the broader instability and disenchantment across Ethiopia in 2025. As federal funds are diverted en masse to the security sector, the supposed 'beautification' of Addis and key supporters of the government, spending on healthcare, education, and welfare concurrently diminish. Meles Zenawi's 'developmental economy' has been entirely cast aside in favour of a privatised model. Telecom and other sectors have been opened up for investment, but this form of 'trickle-down' economics has not yet translated into tangible support for most Ethiopians. With inflation exceeding 30% and a heavy taxation burden, the federal government will struggle to stimulate sustained and equitable growth.
However, though Ethiopia is beset by domestic trouble, it remains a highly influential, if waned, regional power. The sheer scale of Ethiopia– 120 million people and counting– makes it a significant economic market and demographic weight in the Horn. And though the military is reviled domestically in large parts of the country, it remains an important bulwark against Al-Shabaab in central and southern Somalia. Tensions appear to have been cooled-- even temporarily-- between Mogadishu and Addis with last week's Turkey-negotiated Ankara Accord, but whether Ethiopia participates in the next iteration of the African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia remains to be seen. However, the ad hoc and highly personalised foreign policy of the federal government, encapsulated by the MoU and search for 'sea access,' makes it challenging to anticipate what the coming months might bring. The MoU may be suddenly pursued with full force or another grand vision may take its place, no matter the diplomatic cost. Still, the 2018-2022 alliance between Asmara and Addis is now well and truly shattered, and how it evolves or deteriorates will continue to play an influential role in Ethiopia's politics in the coming year.
The Ethiopian state is undergoing a tortuous contraction as its role in the country's peripheries– and even close to Addis– is reduced to one of military policies. This is inflicting lasting scars on Ethiopia's political settlement and sowing the seeds of further discontent and violence if not adequately tackled. Addis still has the levers to reverse this inexorable slide towards greater instability, but whether it will turn to them in 2025 appears unlikely. As with several other countries in the Horn today, the reinforcing poly-crises and humanitarian emergencies, political instability, and armed conflict make the auspices for the coming months bleak.
The Ethiopian Cable Team
