Issue No. 263

In early December, the Oromia regional government led by Shimelis Abdisa and a splinter faction of the insurgent Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) inked a peace agreement. The ceremony, attended by senior federal and regional political and military officials, was heralded as a new chapter for Oromia, while President Shimelis Abdisa urged other armed groups to follow suit and lay down their weapons. Details of the agreement remain scarce, but it has allowed the government to frame itself as a peacemaker for Oromos, even while instability persists across much of the region and country. And while Sagni Negasa's forces' surrender may blunt OLA operations to a degree, it will not resolve the insurgency-- its roots are much more profound.

Cracks within the OLA leadership began to deepen after two rounds of failed peace talks in Tanzania in April and November 2023, mediated by Kenya, Norway, and the regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). In November, talks broke down again after the OLA, represented by Kumsa Diriba, better known by his nom de guerre 'Jaal Marroo,' rejected a vague 'Pretoria-style' accord and instead demanded broader and deeper political reform in Oromia and at the national level. Jaal Marroo remains the OLA's figurehead despite the nominally inclusive structure of the insurgent force, which includes a 7-member executive and a 57-member general assembly. In September 2024, Sagni Negasa, the former commander in Oromia's central zone, pronounced independence from Jaal Marroo and denounced his leadership. Negotiations with the government soon followed, which were made possible by the Oromo diaspora and elders. Part of the rationale for the talks also appears to be that Sagni Negasa's forces in central Oromia were coming under increasing military pressure from government forces. 

Following the agreement, government officials have suggested that as many as 800 former fighters have already begun moving into designated military camps in West Shewa and elsewhere for disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration. Whether they are subsequently re-deployed to a military theatre– either to central Oromia to fight against their former comrades or Amhara against the disparate but still-growing Fano insurgency– remains to be seen. In a press briefing on 6 December, Sagni revealed that the agreement consists of 13 provisions, principally focused on security issues and the future of the former OLA fighters. Committees incorporating the government and Sagni's faction have been formed to oversee its implementation. By all accounts, it appears radically different to what was discussed in Dar es Salaam in November 2023.

Unsurprisingly, the peace deal with Sagni Negasa has been dismissed as a "joke" by the principal OLA faction led by Jaal Marroo, insisting that it is another attempt by Addis to splinter Oromo resistance. A statement on 1 December asserted that the agreement was an attempt to deflect from the government's military failures and that Sagni Negasa had already been removed from the OLA. Its broader framing was that the peace deal was, in fact, part of an effort to divide Oromos and stoke inter-ethnic divisions between the Oromo and Amhara. Amid persistent and destabilising insurgencies in both regions, Addis and the Oromia regional government have accessed divisive inter-communal policies in a bid to maintain and exacerbate Oromo-Amhara tensions.

Others, too, have voiced concerns about the accord, including Jawar Mohammed, the Oromo leader once central in the Qeerroo movement. His star has waned somewhat, but Jawar has increasingly returned to his criticisms of the Oromia and federal administrations. Among other issues, he noted that the federal government has a poor track record of implementing domestic peace agreements. Most recent is the Pretoria agreement, which concluded the fighting in Tigray in November 2022, but Addis has also been criticised for its failure to adhere to accords signed with the OLA's forebear, the Oromo Liberation Front, and the Ogaden National Liberation Front. Another surface-level agreement in Oromia that does not tackle the set of political, socio-economic, and cultural demands from historically disenfranchised Oromo communities will not be sufficient to pacify the restive region.

The developments with the OLA also cannot be separated from the backdrop of a struggling Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) in Amhara. Successive large-scale military offensives against the Fano militias in 2024 have thus far failed, resulting in increasingly high attrition rates for the ENDF and allied forces. The guerrilla tactics of the coalition of militias, particularly effective in the Gojjam area led by Zemene Kassie, have remained highly durable. Moreover, their varied support from disenchanted groups, ranging from young, urban Amhara nationalists to rural farmers unable to plough their crops, has allowed them to resist the militarised tactics of the federal government. Fighting two major insurgencies on two fronts amid a broader deterioration of security across Ethiopia is proving unsustainable for the ENDF. 

In turn, these attrition rates in Amhara have driven forced conscription in the Oromia region as the government rushes to fill the frontline gaps. In recent weeks, reports of security forces going door-to-door in Adama, Jimma, Bishoftu, and other towns and press-ganging young men into militias for training have emerged. A recent report by the state human rights body, the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC), further uncovered that children as young as 11 had been conscripted while others were ransomed off to their families to secure their release. The rank-and-file of the ENDF has been increasingly filled with Oromo, further driving frustration and sympathy for the OLA within Oromia.

The conflict in Oromia has now raged since 2019-- and extracted a savage humanitarian toll on much of the region. Millions remain acutely food insecure and displaced in Oromia, while infrastructure has been devastated by successive rounds of conflict and military offensives. Schools and healthcare centres have been shuttered, and civilians have been deliberately targeted by both the OLA and government troops. Meanwhile, months of persistently high inflation and the floating of the Ethiopian Birr in late July have raised the costs of essential goods and services. Creeping signs of discontent in the form of protests and small-scale strikes in Oromia have pockmarked much of 2024, but whether that will translate into the scale of the Qeerroo movement remains more complicated.

Though the disarming of Sagni Negasa's forces may impede the OLA's attempts to expand further east in the region, the centre of the insurgency remains in western and southern Oromia. If Addis wants to dispel the criticisms and concerns that it is solely using the agreement to fracture the OLA, it should look to reopen talks with Jaal Maroo's faction-- and be ready to offer far greater political concessions than it has done with Sagni Negasa. 

The Ethiopian Cable Team