The Perils of Referendums
On February 6, voters in six zones and five special districts will vote on whether they want an additional region created from Ethiopia’s Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples' Region (SNNPR). If the referendum passes, it will mean that in less than four years under the Prosperity Party, three separate regions will have been carved out of the SNNPR.
Partitioning a region is allowed under the Ethiopia’s Constitution. Article 39.1 of the 1995 Constitution gives every nation, nationality, and people in Ethiopia the right to self-determination, up to and including the right to secession. A request for secession can be made to the federal government, which then is required to hold a referendum
within three years.
This constitution was adopted around the same time that Eritrea gained its independence, which was formally ratified by referendum. That case was different from that of the SNNPR as Eritrea’s referendum determined sovereign statehood. However, the right of self-determination is a founding principle of contemporary Ethiopia, re-shaping it from a centralized empire to an ethnic federation.
The cascade of subsequent regional divisions was predictable. The recognition of each nation led to increasing ethnic nationalism. Since the 13th century, the Ethiopian
Empire, and later the Marxist-Leninist military regime, was dominated by the Amhara culture, which became confused with Ethiopian culture. When in 1991 the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF, a coalition of several ethnic parties led by the TPLF (Tigray People's Liberation Fron)) and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) overthrew the military regime, each nationality legitimately claimed recognition of its identity (languages, customs, forms of social organization). Paradoxically, it was then that some Amhara became particularly aware of their equating of the Amhara identity with Ethiopia—resulting in the emergence of hyper-nationalism.
Carving out more states out of the SNNP could potentially weaken Oromia politically and economically. New units would proliferate the number of authorities with whom
Oromia has to negotiate, especially over trade and border security. Moreover, the breakaway regions of the SNNPR serve as precedent for Western Tigray, also known as ‘Wolkait,’ from the Tigray region.
Following the signing of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) in Pretoria, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed announced that the issue of the internal borders (specifically Western Tigray) should be resolved according to the constitution. But the meaning of this is quite ambiguous: does it mean reverting to the 1995 borders or, as Abiy promised Amhara nationalists, borders would be settled by referendum according to the 1995 constitution?
Before the recent war, Western Tigray’s fertile land and border with Sudan did not go unnoticed by the Amhara. In August 2018, Gedu Andargachew, President of the
Amhara region, argued that ‘Wolkait’ should be separated from Tigray and annexed to the Amhara region to allow a corridor to Eritrea. Some have viewed this as a possible
reward for Amhara forces joining the war waged by Abiy, with Isaias Afewerki.
Immediately following the outbreak of the war on November 4, 2020, Amhara special forces and militias occupied Western Tigray. A brutal policy of ethnic cleansing there
was documented in a joint report by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. The title refers to the words of an Amhara militiaman to a Tigrayan from Western
Tigray: ”We will erase you from this land.” The aim was to tip the demographic balance in favour of the Amhara in Western Tigray and then legally claim it via referendum.
From the first days of the invasion, Tigrayan men were hunted down and executed Tigrayan women were raped and mutilated. Survivors were ordered to leave the area
within 24 hours. Signs were posted and injunctions were sent to Tigrinya-speakers, offering the choice of exile or death. Entire families fled with only the clothes on their
backs. Today these Tigrayans are crowded into one of 30 camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs). There are 30 of these camps in the town of Mekelle alone. According
to eyewitnesses, there are 800,000 IDPs dependent on humanitarian aid, surviving without enough water or food, and suffering from hygiene related diseases. Thousands more have found refuge in Sudan. Some came from Humera. Some survived the Mai Kadra massacre. Some lost their homes, which were expropriated and given to new settlers. Today Western Tigray is empty of its traditional inhabitants. A referendum of those who took over the area would be unjust.
Elections, votes, referendums - all major democratic events - require a calm and peaceful environment. Ethiopia’s 1995 constitution guarantees the right of peoples to self-determination, whether in the SNNPR or in Western Tigray. How Abiy and his government can fairly address the issue of ‘Wolkait’ remains unresolved.
By the Ethiopia Cable Team
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