Ethiopia: Ending the conflict in Oromia
The US government over the weekend called on Ethiopian PM Abiy Ahmed Ali to “bring an end to ongoing instability in the Oromia region”. The call was made during a phone conversation between the PM and the US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken. Washington’s latest push to nudge Addis Ababa to find a peaceful settlement to the armed insurrection in Oromia is timely and laudable. A sustained US pressure, backed by the African Union (AU) and other international actors such as the EU and UN, is essential to encourage dialogue, broker a ceasefire and promote a lasting political settlement.
The conflict in Oromia is escalating. An armed rebellion led by the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), a militant splinter faction of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), has in recent years expanded and engulfed the whole region. Fighting between the OLA and federal forces backed by ethnic militias has caused hundreds of deaths and triggered a massive displacement; some reports put the figure of the displaced at over 800,000. In January, the army announced a new offensive to “eradicate” the OLA (officially referred to as “Shene”)
The violence has frayed social cohesion and periodically results in intercommunal fighting and massacres. Addis Ababa’s scorched earth counterinsurgency and deployment of armed militias like the Amhara Fano have inflamed and hardened Oromo sentiment. The region’s economy is grinding to a standstill. Unemployment is rife. Support for the government is flagging and public discontent rising. Regime supporters now feel beleaguered.
In December 2022, a group of Oromo parliamentarians presented a memorandum to the PM, demanding a speedy end to the conflict. The 10-point letter called on the government to engage the OLA and find a peaceful solution. The PM rebuffed the calls and seems intent on pursuing a military option.
The insurgency in Oromia predates the conflict in Tigray. The popular protests in Ethiopiathat catapulted Abiy to power in 2018 was largely led by militant Oromo youths, the Qeerroo. The new Oromo discontent is impelled by a profound sense of betrayal and disaffection with the Abiy administration. Oromo nationalists accuse the PM of doing little to tackle the region’s historical marginalisation. They argue that while the community is now visible and well-represented in government, the material benefits of power are yet to trickle down to the region. PM Abiy’s ambivalent view on ethnic federalism, his alliance with the Amhara and instrumentalization of Amhara ultranationalist ideology rankled with many Oromos.
The negotiated truce in Tigray in November 2022 has strengthened Abiy’s hand and could potentially incentivise dialogue with the OLA. The army is dominated by Oromo generals who are wearied by conflict and are likely to resist an all-out military offensive to force the OLA to capitulate.
Abiy stands to gain politically from making peace with the insurgents in Oromia. If he can end the conflict in the region and if the truce in Tigray continues to hold, he improves the prospects for the stalled national dialogue aimed at finding a durable political solution to Ethiopia’s multiple crises. Assuming he still has ambitions for another term, a peace pact in Oromia is beneficial in boosting his chances. Stability in Oromia is also crucial in reviving the ailing economy.
The PM’s relations with the Oromo elite and political factions is poor. His insecurity, divisive tactics, and constant purges has diminished the circle of real Oromo allies around him. Over the years, he has alienated and edged out prominent senior Oromo figures, among them his erstwhile close associate Lemma Megersa (whom he recently accused of sympathising with “shene”). To engage the OLA and make peace, the PM will need to reach out to senior and respected members of Oromo opposition parties, such as Merera Gudina, Bekele Gerba, and Jawar Mohammed. He will also need to repair his relations with the Oromo Gadaa Council, seriously damaged in 2022 by an incident in which scores of elders from the Karrayyu Gadaa were executed by regime forces.
The regional body IGAD, led by an Ethiopian of Oromo descent, Dr Workneh Gebeyehu, may also be encouraged to play a role in facilitating talks. The idea of peace talks with the OLA maybe gaining currency but is not universally popular. The Amhara nationalist factions that supported the PM’s military campaign in Tigray and
Oromia, seem disinclined to a peaceful settlement. Another pact with an insurgency deemed terrorist”, coming hot on the heels of the ceasefire in Tigray, could exacerbate the growing tensions between the administration and Amhara State.
The OLA favours talks with the Abiy administration even though its preferred outcome is unclear. A renewed national commitment and consensus to rebuild the federal system is an important incentive. The Oromo opposition, armed and unarmed, have long chafed against Abiy’s centralising tendency and favour a federal system based on a fair devolution of power and resources. Other incentives likely to improve prospects include a general amnesty for the OLA, a disarmament and reintegration scheme, and power-sharing in the regional government.
The OLA recently published a manifesto, spelling out its vision and goals ahead of possible talks. The manifesto reiterates its federal outlook, and willingness to work with other like- minded groups world-wide. The OLA also states that it wants Addis to be recognised as being part of Oromia, and Afaan Oromo to be instituted as a “federal working language”. Other demands include the release of political prisoners, an end to extrajudicial killings, humanitarian aid for victims of conflict, and third-party mediation by neutral states or international actors.
Abiy’s reluctance to engage the OLA is ill-advised. A military conquest to “eradicate” the armed insurrection in Oromia is unachievable. Abiy must be disabused of the notion a Tigray option is workable in Oromia. The region is vaster, the insurgency deeply-embedded. A peace pact in Oromia is urgent and essential to put Ethiopia on a stable path to peace and recovery.
By the Ethiopia Cable Team
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