New US ambassador and the challenge of Tigray
The U.S. Department of State just announced the nomination of Ervin Jose Massinga as Ambassador to Ethiopia. Ambassador Massinga currently serves as the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary in the State Department’s Bureau of African Affairs. His predecessor, Ambassador Geeta Pasi, served in Addis Ababa for less than a year.
Ambassador Massinga is no stranger to difficult posts. He has served in Sudan, Guinea and Beijing and was Deputy Assistant Secretary for Pakistan Affairs in the State Department’s Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs. His appointment to Addis comes after the signing of the Agreement for Lasting Peace through a Permanent Cessation of Hostilities (the CoHA) between the federal government of Ethiopia and the regional government of Ethiopia’s Tigray region, as shepherded by US Special Envoy to the Horn of Africa Ambassador Mike Hammer.
Despite the CoHA and media reporting on starvation, atrocities and displacement in Tigray, not much has yet changed there. Humanitarian aid, according to expert reports, has scaled up but not enough. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid (OCHA) this aid is "still inadequate to meet vast needs." Medical supplies have trickled into Tigray, where the entire public healthcare system—from small rural clinics to hospitals— was completely destroyed mainly by Eritrean and Ethiopian forces. Public services, such as water electricity and telecommunications, are slowly being restored in some parts of the region, yet large parts of the region remain dark and isolated. Although flights to and from the towns of Mekelle and Shire have been restored, there are numerous accounts on social media of Tigrayan men being refused boarding despite having tickets.
Especially concerning is the continuing presence of Eritrean forces and Amhara militia in Tigray. War crimes against the Tigrayan people committed over the past two years have included murder, rape, torture and looting. The challenges facing Ambassador Massinga are many and extraordinarily daunting.
The US government has taken a feckless approach to managing its relationship with the Ethiopian administration. Long wary of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), Washington jumped at the opportunity to support Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, sending in advisers on Day One. While loudly proclaiming Ethiopia’s sovereignty in response to US pressure to stop the war, the premier was also eager to fall under President Vladimir Putin’s influence. Even so, the US continued to support Abiy despite evidence of war crimes in Tigray.
If the current situation in Tigray is, at best, not worsening, the one in Abiy’s home region of Oromia is blowing up. The Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) recently announced renewed military operations against the rebel Oromo Liberation Army (OLA). So bad is the situation that last month, legislators from Abiy’s own ruling Prosperity Party sent him a letter, demanding an end to the conflict in Oromia and start of peace talks with the OLA. The
Oromia regional government however ruled out negotiating with the OLA.
The appointment of a new U.S. ambassador to Ethiopia offers some hope to a country teetering on collapse, a fall that would pull down the entire region. Ambassador Massinga, a career diplomat with extensive experience in global hot spots, needs to show imagination in navigating Ethiopia’s complex political terrain.
For starters, the ambassador needs to recognise the clear and present danger of the continued presence of Eritrean troops in Tigray. Washington has soft tools to pressure the Eritrean government to leave Tigray. Eritrea does not often respond to diplomacy. Washington needs to stop allowing pro-Asmara Eritreans in the US to raise funds for the Tigray war. The US also needs to stop allowing the illegal 2% tax on Eritreans living in the country. Washington also needs to broaden its sanctions to include any and all Eritrean high officials and businesspersons supporting the war against Tigray. The US should use all means at its disposal to choke the Eritrean government and its military until it completely disengages from Tigray.
Ambassador Massinga needs to take a hands-on approach to advocating for US financial assistance to stabilise Ethiopia and, moreover, to rebuild Tigray. Aid to Ethiopia should be conditioned on greater transparency and accountability of the government. Premier Abiy has fallen short of his promised reforms and has, instead, slipped into the uniform of the stereotypical strong man. An increasingly oppressive state apparatus guarantees continued conflict throughout the country, staging the scene for state collapse. It is risky to channel assistance to Tigray through the federal government. The US needs to bypass the Ethiopian government and provide direct aid to the region through the regional government and local NGOs.
Ethiopia’s justice system does not have the political independence to dispense fair and speedy justice to perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Ambassador Massinga should work with the international community to champion an appropriate mechanism to deliver justice to the Tigrayan people. Without justice, there is no peace.
By the Ethiopia Cable Team
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