Somalia Redux
Somalia Redux
Somalia marked a milestone in September 2012 with the establishment of a new fed-
eral government that has since won the support and recognition of the international com-
munity. After more than 20 years of conflict, crisis, and statelessness and 12 years of
ineffectual transitional authorities, the Somali federal government (SFG) has been
widely welcomed as Somalia’s fi rst “post- transition” government. It has been greeted with
such a groundswell of optimism that many observers, including British Prime Minister
David Cameron, have drawn parallels with the “Arab Spring” that has transformed parts
of the Middle East.1 It is tempting to imagine that Somalia is fi nally on the path to
recovery.
Such buoyant judgments, however, are based on highly selective appraisals of the
situation. Despite having earned an unpre ce dented degree of international recognition and
breathlessly upbeat media coverage, the SFG remains frail and embattled, dependent upon
African Union troops to protect its leaders and defend its sovereignty. The stream of return-
ees, investors, aid workers, and diplomats to Mogadishu has not been replicated elsewhere
in the country, creating an artifi cial, almost surreal bubble of optimism around the capital.
Most of Somalia’s territory is governed or controlled by other authorities whose relations
with the SFG range from pragmatic to openly hostile. Rarely has it been so important to
bear in mind the old maxim: Mogadishu is not Somalia.
The government’s plans to expand its authority beyond Mogadishu and stabilize the
rest of the country are outlined in a “Six Pillar” strategy that highlights stability, eco-
nomic recovery, peace building, ser vice delivery, international relations, and national
unity. International donors have expressed their support for the SFG by pledging more
than US$300 million in aid at a May 2013 conference in London. But the government’s
strategy makes no reference to three critical challenges that it must address if it is to
succeed.
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eral government that has since won the support and recognition of the international com-
munity. After more than 20 years of conflict, crisis, and statelessness and 12 years of
ineffectual transitional authorities, the Somali federal government (SFG) has been
widely welcomed as Somalia’s fi rst “post- transition” government. It has been greeted with
such a groundswell of optimism that many observers, including British Prime Minister
David Cameron, have drawn parallels with the “Arab Spring” that has transformed parts
of the Middle East.1 It is tempting to imagine that Somalia is fi nally on the path to
recovery.
Such buoyant judgments, however, are based on highly selective appraisals of the
situation. Despite having earned an unpre ce dented degree of international recognition and
breathlessly upbeat media coverage, the SFG remains frail and embattled, dependent upon
African Union troops to protect its leaders and defend its sovereignty. The stream of return-
ees, investors, aid workers, and diplomats to Mogadishu has not been replicated elsewhere
in the country, creating an artifi cial, almost surreal bubble of optimism around the capital.
Most of Somalia’s territory is governed or controlled by other authorities whose relations
with the SFG range from pragmatic to openly hostile. Rarely has it been so important to
bear in mind the old maxim: Mogadishu is not Somalia.
The government’s plans to expand its authority beyond Mogadishu and stabilize the
rest of the country are outlined in a “Six Pillar” strategy that highlights stability, eco-
nomic recovery, peace building, ser vice delivery, international relations, and national
unity. International donors have expressed their support for the SFG by pledging more
than US$300 million in aid at a May 2013 conference in London. But the government’s
strategy makes no reference to three critical challenges that it must address if it is to
succeed.