Somalia’s Proxy Wars
On 19 August 2019, near the southern Somali port town of Kismayo, soldiers from the Kenyan
and Ethiopian armies faced off warily against one another at point blank range down the barrels
of their guns. The two countries have been strategic allies for over half a century, mainly to contain
a perceived common threat from Somalia. Their forces both wear the insignia of the African Union
peace support operation in that country, AMISOM; they fall under command of the same
headquarters in Mogadishu; and they face a common enemy -- the Al-Qaeda-affiliated terrorist
group, Al-Shabaab. So how did they find themselves in a heavily armed standoff – just a hair-
trigger away from opening fire on one another at a torrid, dust-blown checkpoint in a country they
have both come to assist?
The quarrel between the two forces concerned the presidential election of the Jubaland State of
Somalia, scheduled to take place early the following month. Ahmed Mohamed Islam ‘Madoobe’,
the incumbent, was widely expected to win. Kenya, whose forces had fought side-by-side with
Madoobe’s militias to liberate Kismayo from Al-Shabaab in 2012, and have protected his
embryonic administration ever since, favoured continuity of his leadership. Ethiopia, on the other
hand, was firmly aligned with the Somali Federal Government (SFG) in Mogadishu, which was
determined to remove Madoobe and replace him with a loyalist.
Addis Ababa was suspected of colluding with Mogadishu to prevent Madoobe’s re-election -- by
force if necessary. Less than a year earlier, in December 2018, Ethiopian forces had intervened in
a presidential election in Baidoa, the capital of Somalia’s South West State, arresting the front
runner, Mukhtar Roobow, in order to pave the way for the SFG’s preferred candidate. Roobow’s
seizure and subsequent detention without charge or trial triggered public protests in Baidoa in
which police gunned down 16 protesters.
In mid-August 2019, as the date of the Jubaland election approached, Addis Ababa sent a high-
level delegation to Kismayo to warn Madoobe that he must either step down or would be forcibly
removed. Just days later, when Ethiopian troops suddenly deployed to Kismayo airport in order
to receive an inbound Ethiopian military aircraft carrying reinforcements, Madoobe and his
Kenyan allies had little doubt that another Roobow-style abduction was about to unfold. Kenyan
army units based at the airport, buttressed by Jubaland Security Forces, blocked the gates with
armoured vehicles and battle wagons, and denied the Ethiopian aircraft permission to land.
Ethiopia’s undisguised hostility towards Madoobe represented an abrupt volte-face from its
previous posture as his ally. For over two decades, Addis Ababa had been a staunch advocate of
federalism in Somalia and one of the driving forces behind the adoption of a federal constitution
in 2004. But many Somalis remained resistant to the notion of federalism, and it was not until 2012
that the federal system finally began to take shape, with the emergence of several new provinces
or “federal member states” (FMS) in the south of the country – including Jubaland. While the SFG
sought to centralise power and resources in Mogadishu, Ethiopia vigorously defended and the
supported the embryonic FMS, both on the ground and through robust international diplomacy.2 But 2017 witnessed changes of government in both Somalia and Ethiopia. Under President
Mohamed Abdillahi Farmaajo, Somalia’s new federal authorities acted aggressively to centralise
power and marginalise the FMS. Meanwhile, Ethiopia’s new Prime Minister, Abiy Ahmed, moved
rapidly to embrace Farmaajo, implicitly endorsing his government’s centralist agenda and
suspending Ethiopian support to the FMS. Madoobe, like Roobow before him, found himself
brusquely abandoned as a trusted ally and re-branded as an unreformed terrorist.
The confrontation between Kenyan and Ethiopian troops outside Kismayo airport was
emblematic of much broader geopolitical shifts in the Horn of Africa and the wider region. Since
2014, competition has spiked as the Gulf States split into opposing camps led by Saudi Arabia and
the United Araba Emirates (UAE) on one side and Qatar on the other. The UAE has obtained
concessions for ports along the southern coast of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden while Turkey –
and ally of Qatar – obtained control over Mogadishu port and airport and eyed a possible military
base on the Sudanese island of Suakin. Following the election of President Farmaajo in Somalia in
2017, Qatar rapidly emerged as the federal government’s principal patron. But the UAE, which
had previously backed the FMS in coordination with Ethiopia, appears to have become
discouraged by Addis Ababa’s sudden change of heart and ceded Somalia to Doha – at least for
the time being.
Western governments, for the most part, have paid lip service to the need for consultation, co-
operation and inclusive politics in Somalia while deferring to the FGS in its attempts to centralise
power and subordinate the FMS. Mogadishu’s interference in state elections, its failure to respect
agreements on national security, its unilateral concession of oil exploration and fishing rights to
foreign companies despite the absence of a Constitutional or legal basis to do so, and its
determination to complete the constitutional review and electoral law without political
participation by the FMS have so far gone unchallenged.
There is no question that external influences, including the tumultuous events across the region,
have impacted Somalia. But they have only highlighted and deepened existing divisions – not
created them. After more than four decades of uninterrupted civil conflict, the Somali crisis
remains fundamentally unresolved. No victor has emerged nor has a comprehensive peace
agreement been attained: the current Provisional Constitution, which could potentially serve as the
basis for such an accord, is silent on many key aspects of federalism, stipulating only that areas of
contention should be resolved through dialogue and negotiation between the FGS and FMS.
The administration of President ‘Farmaajo’, was widely expected to lead this dialogue process,
convening the FMS leadership to conduct an inclusive constitutional review, clarify aspects of the
federal system such as distribution of power, rights, revenues, resources, security sector
governance etc., and continue consultations to develop a workable electoral system. Instead, it has
effectively discarded the Provisional Constitution, subverted the FMS and embarked on an
aggressive campaign to dismantle federalism – in whole or in part -- in favour of an autocratic,
unitary model of governance. Internationally supervised agreements with the FMS on how to
jointly rebuild Somalia’s security services have been transformed into an immensely expensive,
ineffective and corrupt project for the exclusive benefit of the FGS. As a result, the FMS have
become enfeebled and embattled, struggling to defeat Al-Shabaab on one front while fighting rear-
guard actions against Mogadishu on another.
Even more disturbing is the prospect of Farmaajo’s administration securing for itself another term
of office. The SFG is currently working to complete a National Elections Law by the end of 2019
and a constitutional review by June 2020. The draft electoral law alters the process of election of
4
the president and establishes a loophole that would permit the incumbent parliament and president
to extend their terms of office indefinitely. A brazenly rigged election or a unilateral extension of
the current government would risk plunging the country back into conflict.
It has become routine – event trite – to ascribe Somalia’s internal problems to the interference of
foreign states and the spill over of the Gulf crisis into the Horn. The geopolitics of the region
complicate the prospects of a solution to Somalia’s crisis, but they are not its cause, nor should
they be used to obfuscate responsibility for a crisis of Somali leaders’ own making. Qatar’s finances
and Ethiopian military support help to nurture Farmaajo’s autocratic instincts, but they are not
responsible for his refusal to accommodate other legitimate Somali political forces, nor his failure
to respect previous agreements.
Somalia is indeed engaged in a proxy war, but it is a conflict waged from the inside out. External
actors do exploit Somali differences for their own purposes, but far more toxic is the tendency of
rival Somali leaders to rely on external support as an alternative to internal accommodation and
compromise. If Farmaajo and his backers mistake international recognition and foreign aid as
substitutes for domestic approval and legitimacy, then Somalia is headed back into a war for which
no rationale – whether civil, proxy or counter-terrorism – will absolve the real perpetrators of their
culpability.
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and Ethiopian armies faced off warily against one another at point blank range down the barrels
of their guns. The two countries have been strategic allies for over half a century, mainly to contain
a perceived common threat from Somalia. Their forces both wear the insignia of the African Union
peace support operation in that country, AMISOM; they fall under command of the same
headquarters in Mogadishu; and they face a common enemy -- the Al-Qaeda-affiliated terrorist
group, Al-Shabaab. So how did they find themselves in a heavily armed standoff – just a hair-
trigger away from opening fire on one another at a torrid, dust-blown checkpoint in a country they
have both come to assist?
The quarrel between the two forces concerned the presidential election of the Jubaland State of
Somalia, scheduled to take place early the following month. Ahmed Mohamed Islam ‘Madoobe’,
the incumbent, was widely expected to win. Kenya, whose forces had fought side-by-side with
Madoobe’s militias to liberate Kismayo from Al-Shabaab in 2012, and have protected his
embryonic administration ever since, favoured continuity of his leadership. Ethiopia, on the other
hand, was firmly aligned with the Somali Federal Government (SFG) in Mogadishu, which was
determined to remove Madoobe and replace him with a loyalist.
Addis Ababa was suspected of colluding with Mogadishu to prevent Madoobe’s re-election -- by
force if necessary. Less than a year earlier, in December 2018, Ethiopian forces had intervened in
a presidential election in Baidoa, the capital of Somalia’s South West State, arresting the front
runner, Mukhtar Roobow, in order to pave the way for the SFG’s preferred candidate. Roobow’s
seizure and subsequent detention without charge or trial triggered public protests in Baidoa in
which police gunned down 16 protesters.
In mid-August 2019, as the date of the Jubaland election approached, Addis Ababa sent a high-
level delegation to Kismayo to warn Madoobe that he must either step down or would be forcibly
removed. Just days later, when Ethiopian troops suddenly deployed to Kismayo airport in order
to receive an inbound Ethiopian military aircraft carrying reinforcements, Madoobe and his
Kenyan allies had little doubt that another Roobow-style abduction was about to unfold. Kenyan
army units based at the airport, buttressed by Jubaland Security Forces, blocked the gates with
armoured vehicles and battle wagons, and denied the Ethiopian aircraft permission to land.
Ethiopia’s undisguised hostility towards Madoobe represented an abrupt volte-face from its
previous posture as his ally. For over two decades, Addis Ababa had been a staunch advocate of
federalism in Somalia and one of the driving forces behind the adoption of a federal constitution
in 2004. But many Somalis remained resistant to the notion of federalism, and it was not until 2012
that the federal system finally began to take shape, with the emergence of several new provinces
or “federal member states” (FMS) in the south of the country – including Jubaland. While the SFG
sought to centralise power and resources in Mogadishu, Ethiopia vigorously defended and the
supported the embryonic FMS, both on the ground and through robust international diplomacy.2 But 2017 witnessed changes of government in both Somalia and Ethiopia. Under President
Mohamed Abdillahi Farmaajo, Somalia’s new federal authorities acted aggressively to centralise
power and marginalise the FMS. Meanwhile, Ethiopia’s new Prime Minister, Abiy Ahmed, moved
rapidly to embrace Farmaajo, implicitly endorsing his government’s centralist agenda and
suspending Ethiopian support to the FMS. Madoobe, like Roobow before him, found himself
brusquely abandoned as a trusted ally and re-branded as an unreformed terrorist.
The confrontation between Kenyan and Ethiopian troops outside Kismayo airport was
emblematic of much broader geopolitical shifts in the Horn of Africa and the wider region. Since
2014, competition has spiked as the Gulf States split into opposing camps led by Saudi Arabia and
the United Araba Emirates (UAE) on one side and Qatar on the other. The UAE has obtained
concessions for ports along the southern coast of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden while Turkey –
and ally of Qatar – obtained control over Mogadishu port and airport and eyed a possible military
base on the Sudanese island of Suakin. Following the election of President Farmaajo in Somalia in
2017, Qatar rapidly emerged as the federal government’s principal patron. But the UAE, which
had previously backed the FMS in coordination with Ethiopia, appears to have become
discouraged by Addis Ababa’s sudden change of heart and ceded Somalia to Doha – at least for
the time being.
Western governments, for the most part, have paid lip service to the need for consultation, co-
operation and inclusive politics in Somalia while deferring to the FGS in its attempts to centralise
power and subordinate the FMS. Mogadishu’s interference in state elections, its failure to respect
agreements on national security, its unilateral concession of oil exploration and fishing rights to
foreign companies despite the absence of a Constitutional or legal basis to do so, and its
determination to complete the constitutional review and electoral law without political
participation by the FMS have so far gone unchallenged.
There is no question that external influences, including the tumultuous events across the region,
have impacted Somalia. But they have only highlighted and deepened existing divisions – not
created them. After more than four decades of uninterrupted civil conflict, the Somali crisis
remains fundamentally unresolved. No victor has emerged nor has a comprehensive peace
agreement been attained: the current Provisional Constitution, which could potentially serve as the
basis for such an accord, is silent on many key aspects of federalism, stipulating only that areas of
contention should be resolved through dialogue and negotiation between the FGS and FMS.
The administration of President ‘Farmaajo’, was widely expected to lead this dialogue process,
convening the FMS leadership to conduct an inclusive constitutional review, clarify aspects of the
federal system such as distribution of power, rights, revenues, resources, security sector
governance etc., and continue consultations to develop a workable electoral system. Instead, it has
effectively discarded the Provisional Constitution, subverted the FMS and embarked on an
aggressive campaign to dismantle federalism – in whole or in part -- in favour of an autocratic,
unitary model of governance. Internationally supervised agreements with the FMS on how to
jointly rebuild Somalia’s security services have been transformed into an immensely expensive,
ineffective and corrupt project for the exclusive benefit of the FGS. As a result, the FMS have
become enfeebled and embattled, struggling to defeat Al-Shabaab on one front while fighting rear-
guard actions against Mogadishu on another.
Even more disturbing is the prospect of Farmaajo’s administration securing for itself another term
of office. The SFG is currently working to complete a National Elections Law by the end of 2019
and a constitutional review by June 2020. The draft electoral law alters the process of election of
4
the president and establishes a loophole that would permit the incumbent parliament and president
to extend their terms of office indefinitely. A brazenly rigged election or a unilateral extension of
the current government would risk plunging the country back into conflict.
It has become routine – event trite – to ascribe Somalia’s internal problems to the interference of
foreign states and the spill over of the Gulf crisis into the Horn. The geopolitics of the region
complicate the prospects of a solution to Somalia’s crisis, but they are not its cause, nor should
they be used to obfuscate responsibility for a crisis of Somali leaders’ own making. Qatar’s finances
and Ethiopian military support help to nurture Farmaajo’s autocratic instincts, but they are not
responsible for his refusal to accommodate other legitimate Somali political forces, nor his failure
to respect previous agreements.
Somalia is indeed engaged in a proxy war, but it is a conflict waged from the inside out. External
actors do exploit Somali differences for their own purposes, but far more toxic is the tendency of
rival Somali leaders to rely on external support as an alternative to internal accommodation and
compromise. If Farmaajo and his backers mistake international recognition and foreign aid as
substitutes for domestic approval and legitimacy, then Somalia is headed back into a war for which
no rationale – whether civil, proxy or counter-terrorism – will absolve the real perpetrators of their
culpability.