Issue No. 73

Beyond Assab: The Stakes of an Ethiopia-Eritrea War

Eritrea and Ethiopia are unmistakably preparing for war. Since the Pretoria agreement in 2022 that ended the Tigray war, ties between the allies in the conflict have steadily worsened. From the misleading heights of the 2018 Addis-Asmara rapprochement, bilateral relations today are at their lowest ebb in years. In recent weeks, senior Ethiopian federal officials have increasingly resurfaced forceful historical, anthropological, and economic justifications for restoring 'access' to the Red Sea through Assab. Any Ethiopian attempt to seize the strategic port city, however, would likely come as part of a broader push for regime change in Asmara. In turn, both sides have further begun mobilising significant forces in anticipation of renewed conflict, while Eritrea has also sought to rally support from its allies in Cairo and Riyadh. But with the Horn of Africa and the fragile security of the Red Sea region so unstable, any return to war in northern Ethiopia and Eritrea would be calamitous.

The renewed Ethiopian focus on Assab should be understood in the context of uncertainty over the implementation of the Ethiopia-Somaliland Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), which appears to have stalled in the face of international diplomatic pressure. Though Ethiopia-Somalia negotiations are still ongoing as part of the Turkish-driven 'Ankara Declaration,' Mogadishu's offer of Hobyo Port and insistence that any access be commercial has dampened interest. It is no coincidence that Addis's gaze has since returned to Assab. But while the rhetoric from Addis has primarily emphasised access to the Red Sea, any Ethiopian military intervention is likely to prioritise regime change in Asmara due to Eritrea's threat to Ethiopian security and stability rather than the sole annexation of Assab. A friendly regime in Eritrea could freely offer Ethiopia privileged access to Assab, whereas annexation by force - without regime change - would only invite international condemnation and sustained resistance.

For Addis, not only could regime change in Asmara offer access to Assab and realise its aspirations of sea access, but it may also stem the flow of Eritrean support to the raging Fano insurgency in Amhara. Since the Pretoria agreement, Eritrea has steadily deepened its military support for the Amhara insurgent militias through western Tigray and eastern Sudan. During the two-year Tigray war that left the region in ruins, Asmara forged a close relationship with several of the Fano paramilitary forces, which it has maintained as the insurgency has expanded since August 2023. Today, Fano militias control significant portions of East and West Gojjam, North Wollo, and parts of Gondar in the Amhara region, as well as substantial rural areas. Amhara elite, who once agitated for restoring an Ethiopian coastline during the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) era, are now largely opposed to any invasion. Eritrean troops, too, occupy parts of northeastern Tigray and have effectively annexed the Irob-majority communities living there, in contravention of the Pretoria agreement that Asmara is not party to.  

Assab was always the preferred route for Ethiopia's vaguely worded 'sea access,' with Addis having previously laid the groundwork for an invasion towards the end of 2023. In October 2023, Ethiopian PM Abiy Ahmed referred to access as a "matter of existence" for the country. In another instance, he cited Ras Alula—the famous 19th-century Ethiopian leader—who stated that the Red Sea was the country's "natural boundary." Ethiopia's interest in Assab is both historical and geostrategic, with the southeastern port city lying just across the Red Sea from Yemen. Intra-Gulf competition over influence in the littoral administrations on both sides of the arterial waterway has become an increasingly dominant feature of the Horn's geopolitics. In fact, Assab was one of the early sites of this ongoing Gulf-Horn perforation, with the UAE developing a military airbase in the port city in 2015 to bomb the Iran-backed and resurgent Houthi rebels. Ethiopia would later use the same airstrip to deploy drones during the Tigray war. 

Though the federal government often abruptly alters domestic and foreign policy, the sabre-rattling in Ethiopia is readily apparent. Online pro-Addis commentators are posting AI-generated photos of Ethiopian troops in Assab, while legal experts from the Justice Ministry have been drafted into the Foreign Ministry to formulate strategies to push Ethiopia's claim. On 8 March, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed inaugurated SkyWin Aeronautics Industries, announcing that Ethiopia is now able to produce its own drones, coming shortly after his visit to the Homicho Ammunition Engineering Industry factory. Addis has further sought to revive anti-Eritrean insurgent groups in the Afar region and host the development of an armed wing of the anti-Asmara youth diaspora movement, Brigade N'Hamedu. But Ethiopia's legal claims to Eritrean territory are dubious at best, having wilfully ceded the territory in the early 1990s after the overthrow of the Derg regime in Addis, which was later confirmed by the 1993 Eritrean referendum. 

However, fighting multiple conflicts simultaneously in Amhara and Oromia, in addition to the Tigray war, has left the Ethiopian military severely weakened, as evidenced by accelerated military training programmes and forced conscription in Oromia. Further complicating Ethiopia's preparations for conflict is the schism within the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF). Despite the complicated Mekelle-Addis relations, the federal government would still prefer to use Tigray as a launching pad for any invasion towards Asmara and call upon the still-mobilised Tigrayan forces within the region. But so drastic has been the reversal of alliances since the Tigray war that Asmara has increasingly reached out to the TPLF-- the bête noire of Isaias Afwerki for the past two decades. Yet, having repeatedly railed against Ethiopia's former ruling party, Afwerki even recently voiced his opposition to the dissolution of the fractured TPLF. Particularly concerning for the war-weary and traumatised Tigrayan population is that any renewed conflict between Addis and Asmara could easily pull the region back into war. 

Simultaneously, the Eritrean government has mobilised forces in anticipation of an Ethiopian military invasion, stationing increasing personnel in the southern Red Sea zone and along the border. Asmara is further seeking to draw on regional African and Arab support, particularly from its Egyptian and Saudi allies. Just last week, Riyadh announced it would invest USD billions in Assab Port to expand its geostrategic and commercial influence along the Red Sea. As a member of the new 'Tripartite Alliance' with Somalia and Eritrea, Egypt has remained staunchly opposed to an Ethiopian presence on the Red Sea and would likely provide some military support to Asmara.

This would not be the first Ethiopian-Eritrean war over contested border territory, with the 1998-2000 Badme War leaving around 80,000 people dead. But the scale and depth of the instability across the Horn of Africa is far more significant in 2025 than at the turn of the century. Today, the alliances in any war between Ethiopia and Eritrea would likely mirror elements of the conflict in neighbouring Sudan. This would probably result in the UAE falling behind Addis, a close ally, and Egypt and Saudi Arabia supporting Eritrea. And, much like Sudan, it could well pull in a host of opportunistic actors, including the 'Middle Powers' of Iran and Turkey. Possible access to the world's most strategic waterway would surely prove tempting for others like Russia.

The consequences of any Ethiopian invasion or accidental eruption of conflict would reverberate across the Horn of Africa and its Gulf patrons, and super-charge the region's humanitarian, economic, and political crises. 'Simple' regime change in Asmara or the attempted annexation of Assab would present a host of unforeseen challenges, not least managing the highly militarised 'shell state' of Eritrea that is liable to collapse. In turn, urgent intervention is needed to avoid the looming conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia and the further disintegration of the Horn, most likely from the Gulf allies that still hold sway over their African counterparts. Yet another internationalised cross-border conflict in the Horn of Africa could well pull more of the teetering region under.

The Horn Edition Team