COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN SOMALIA: ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO DISENGAGEMENT OF AL-SHABAAB LEADERS AND FIGHTERS

From its modest beginning as a Somali Al-Qaeda ancillary in the early 2000s, Harakaat Al-
Shabaab Al-Mujaahidiin (Al-Shabaab, or AS) has evolved into a formidable jihadist

organisation active in at least six countries of the Horn and East Africa. Although the group
has lost considerable territory, and suffers reduced access to recruits and resources since its
2009 zenith, it still constitutes a serious threat to Somalia and the wider region.
Military operations against Al-Shabaab have depleted its senior leadership and displaced it
from most major Somali urban centres, but the militants have proven capable of
replenishing lost cadres and have sustained their operational momentum, regularly staging
major attacks against AMISOM positions and high-profile targets in Mogadishu and other
major Somali towns. Control and operation freedom of the movement in rural areas of the
country, has not been significantly affected.
However, a spike in terror attacks in October 2017 in Mogadishu resulted in announcements
of renewed military operations against Al-Shabaab. In the first weeks of November, Ethiopia
reportedly sent thousands of troops back into Somalia to engage in increased military
operations against the militant group. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has
announced the start of a new offensive to remove Al-Shabaab from strongholds in southern
parts of the country, with support from the Somali National Army (SNA). US authorities,
who had already been increasingly engaged in Somalia since the Trump administration’s
decision in April 2017 to deploy additional troops there, announced increased support to the

Somali government after the Zoobe bombing, carried out several airstrikes against Al-
Shabaab targets between mid-October and November, and confirmed in mid-November

that over 400 US soldiers are now operating inside Somali territory.1
The resilience and persistence of Al-Shabaab movement in Somalia cannot be understood in
isolation from the kinship-based organisation of Somali society and the clan dynamics that
shape the conflict. Where militant Islamists groups inside Somalia have historically been
denied the space to move and operate has been not through external military operations or
the influence of one leader but rather when clan groups themselves have come together to
remove militants from their area of operations, denying then space, movement and financial
support.
Strategy focussing on individual desertions, defections or killings has on the other hand
borne little fruit. In the absence of a broader strategy and understanding of the internal rifts
within the movement, even the recent surrenders of high profile Al-Shabaab leaders – such
as former intelligence commander Zakariya Ahmed Ismail Hersi, head of operations in
1 http://www.newsweek.com/somalia-war-us-military-president-trump-al-shabab-714622

2
Puntland Sheikh Mohamed Sa’iid ‘Atam’ and the withdrawal Muktar Robow, the former
deputy Emir – from the group have failed to make significant impact on the conflict
dynamics or to induce large numbers of the rank and file to follow suit. Rather, individuals
who have publicly left the organization, have in almost every instance, left behind the militias
that supported them, leaving their former areas of influence in the hands of AS or at the very
least outside of government control.
Al-Shabaab’s resilience and persistence in Somalia cannot be understood in isolation from
the kinship-based organisation of Somali society and the clan dynamics that shape the
conflict. This study examines two minority clans in Somalia – the Awrmale and the Geledle -
so as to identify the factors that initially influenced these groups to align with Al-Shabaab
and the nature of the conflicts that led both clans to in part move away from this alliance.