Relations between Somalia and Ethiopia have sharply deteriorated since President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud took office. His government is seen as leaning closer to Kenya, a perception reinforced by reopening the Kenyan khat trade which ended Ethiopia’s monopoly. Tensions escalated after a major Al Shabaab incursion into Ethiopia, prompting Addis Ababa to deploy thousands of troops into Somalia and propose a controversial buffer zone. Ethiopia has also bypassed Mogadishu by striking direct security deals with Somali Federal Member States and Somaliland, challenging Somali sovereignty. An equally serious but often overlooked dispute involves water. Ethiopia’s ambitious irrigation and hydropower projects in the highlands have diverted large volumes from the Juba and Shabelle rivers, which supply Somalia’s breadbasket regions. With 90 percent of their flow originating in Ethiopia, these rivers are critical for irrigation and food security, especially during Somalia’s worst drought in decades. March saw the Juba River nearly dry for the first time since 1957. Without treaties governing shared water resources, Somalia lacks leverage to address upstream diversions. Many Somalis believe Ethiopia has exploited Somalia’s political fragility since 1991 to act unilaterally. With no resolution in sight, worsening political friction risks further destabilising the Horn of Africa.
Since emerging from Al‑Ittihad Al‑Islamiya in the 1990s, Al Shabaab has evolved from a small militant faction into one of East Africa’s most dangerous extremist groups. Affiliated with Al‑Qa’ida, it rose to prominence in the mid‑2000s under the Islamic Courts Union before Ethiopia’s invasion forced it into a guerrilla campaign across southern Somalia. Leadership changes, internal purges, and Godane’s 2014 death reshaped the movement, but its resilience has kept it a major security threat. Today, Al Shabaab faces unprecedented challenges. The group recently staged a large‑scale incursion into Ethiopia, signalling its regional ambitions, but military setbacks, botched bombings, and clan‑driven conflicts reveal vulnerabilities. Competition from the Islamic State in Somalia (ISS) for recruits and funding adds pressure, as does the Somali government’s two‑pronged strategy of military offensives and ounter‑extremism policies. The appointment of Mukhtar Roobow as Minister for Religious Affairs has rattled the group, prompting death threats from its leadership. While Al Shabaab remains capable of deadly operations, its current defensive posture offers Somalia a rare opportunity to press its advantage, disrupt recruitment pipelines, and challenge the group’s ideological foundations before it can regroup and expand.