One has to hand it to the Somali Regional State (SRS) President, Mustafa Omer Agjar; in a country not without unpopular politicians, he has a striking ability to aggravate so many in a single stroke. Without warning, on 27 July, the Somali Regional State Council announced that 14 new woredas, four zonal administrations, and 25 municipal leadership offices were to be established. The outcry has been furious and immediate, with senior Oromo and Afar politicians voicing their displeasure at what they perceive as irredentism by the SRS in their regions. Overhauling administrative units along the Oromia-SRS boundary was always likely to prove highly contentious, but the host of changes has triggered major protests in several towns within the SRS as well. With a year out from elections, the much-loathed Agjar appears to be continuing to consolidate his position as regional president.
To much fanfare, Oromia's regional President Shimelis Abdisa and a breakaway faction of the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) agreed upon a 'peace deal' in early December 2024. At the time, Addis hailed the agreement as further proof of itself as a peacemaker, both nationally and for the Oromo people, no matter that fighting continued to rage across much of western and southern Oromia. But with its abysmal track record of adhering to domestic peace agreements, optimism was low that the accord marked a genuine turning point in the enduring conflict in Oromia rather than being another cynical attempt to splinter the Oromo political and armed opposition. Six months on, all evidence would suggest the latter, with the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) of surrendered OLA fighters in particular having been reneged upon.
Between 19-22 February, several major Oromo opposition parties met in Addis to discuss Oromia's sustained upheaval, including the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) insurgency. For several years now, the region has been gripped by still-worsening humanitarian, political, and security crises, while the regional opposition has been essentially co-opted into the government or splintered and unable to mount a response to the deteriorating situation. In this light, the two principal Oromo opposition parties-- the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC)-- met in Addis alongside representatives from the ruling Prosperity Party and Oromo civil society actors.