The Enemy Gets A Vote "Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative…" 2nd Principle of War, US Army FM 3-0 In war, as former US Secretary of Defence James Mattis, a decorated four-star Marine Corps general, was fond of saying: "the enemy gets a vote." His point was that, however careful and calibrated a plan is, its execution and outcome will be determined in part by your adversary's actions. In Somalia today, the flailing federal government not only lacks a lucid military strategy to combat Al-Shabaab, but it has also utterly ceded the initiative on the battlefield to the jihadists. Since its much-vaunted offensive in the Hiiraan region petered out in early 2023, the federal government's military effort has been incoherent, unfocused and mainly reactive. In turn, jihadist forces tied down much of the Somali National Army (SNA) in a painful and essentially pointless struggle for Middle Shabelle and southern Galmudug, leaving Al-Shabaab's headquarters and strongholds in Lower Shabelle and the Juba Valley undisturbed. Apparently oblivious to the SNA's corrosion, Villa Somalia even demanded that the African Union Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) be reduced – over AU objections - to less than 12,000 strong. When Al-Shabaab subsequently tightened its cordon around the capital earlier this year, Mogadishu desperately dispatched untrained police and prison guards to the front lines, and now has entreated for a 'surge' of 8,000 new AU troops, so far to no avail. Today, there remains little to prevent Al-Shabaab from seizing Mogadishu at a time and in a manner of its own choosing.
Al-Shabaab’s persistence in Somalia is less a purely military problem and more a governance challenge. US AFRICOM commander Gen. Stephen Townsend recently highlighted that Somalia’s political dysfunction exacerbated by the federal government’s conflicts with member states and the extra-constitutional extension of the president’s term is a greater obstacle than the insurgency itself. Years of counterterrorism campaigns, even those achieving territorial gains against Al-Shabaab since 2010, have failed to stabilize recovered areas due to poor governance, lack of local support, and ineffective political leadership. Newly liberated regions often became unstable, ungoverned, or prey to clan rivalries, while government troops engaged in predatory practices, alienating local populations. Scholars like David Kilcullen emphasize that successful counterinsurgency requires winning the public, not merely defeating the enemy. In Somalia, the connection between governance and security is stark: without political and administrative reforms accompanying military victories, Al-Shabaab remains resilient. The insurgent group continues to exploit weak institutions, poor leadership, and local grievances to sustain influence and operations across Somalia. Strengthening governance, ensuring accountability, and improving federal-local coordination are essential to complement military action and reduce the enduring threat posed by Al-Shabaab to Somalia and the wider region.