As Sudan experiences its third lean season since the start of the civil war, the humanitarian crisis continues to rapidly deteriorate. First officially declared in August 2024, famine continues to sweep across the country as fighting intensifies in Darfur and Kordofan. The latest UN Integrated Food Security Phase Classification update warns that Phase 5 (Famine) could spread to 17 additional areas, with 8.5 million people in Phase 4 (Emergency) and over 756,000 in Phase 5 (Famine). The scale of hunger is unprecedented in Sudan’s history, with nearly half of Sudan’s 50 million people now acutely food insecure and 637,000 facing “catastrophic” hunger – the highest figure globally, according to WFP. This is not just a by-product of war, but a deliberate tactic used to weaken and manipulate vulnerable populations. Both the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have weaponised starvation through systematic obstruction, looting, and destruction of food systems.
On 26 April 1937, the Spanish town of Guernica was reduced to rubble by German Luftwaffe bombers. Conducted in support of Franco's nationalist troops, the bombing marked a turning point in modern warfare, where civilians were considered no longer collateral damage — they were targets. A few weeks later, Pablo Picasso transformed the event into an enduring visual outcry: Guernica, a monumental black-and-white painting that captured the agony of civilians crushed beneath impersonal, mechanised violence. Nearly a century later, under a different sky — that of northern Ethiopia — the weapons have changed. Drones now replace planes, and the devastation they inflict is quieter, remote-controlled, but no less lethal. Today, the war is waged by algorithms, and yet the bodies are still real.
The factionalism that has defined Tigray's regional politics in recent months shows no sign of easing. With Getachew Reda having been ousted as Tigray Interim Administration (TIA) president in March, his replacement—Lt. Gen. Tadesse Werede—has inherited a hornet's nest of competing interests, with Addis and Asmara both dangerously seeking to ingratiate themselves amidst the looming threat of conflict. While the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) has successfully re-established its monopoly on the politics of Ethiopia's northernmost region, questions regarding the return of displaced persons, the resolution of the occupation of Western Tigray, and the party's participation in future elections remain unresolved-- and intensifying.
Kampala Redux as TCCs Assert Control Over the weekend, a video recorded in 2021 began circulating. In it, then-an opposition leader, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), warns incumbent President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo that if he failed to negotiate destabilising domestic tensions within the Afisioni Tent, he would end up in Kampala and with foreigners deciding Somalia's future. And that is precisely what happened- Farmaajo was diplomatically frog-marched to Kampala, forced to relinquish control over the political transition and appoint a new PM to oversee the process that returned HSM to Villa Somalia. Fast forward to today, and it is essentially Somalia redux. Having failed to heed his own advice from 2021, HSM travelled to Uganda last week, where African Union peacekeeping troop-contributing countries (TCCs) announced they would assume a leading role in Somalia's political and military affairs. Spearheaded by Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, the TCC's proposed political mechanism is intended to oversee Somalia's national security portfolio and, between the lines, to advance the domestic reconciliation that Villa Somalia has shunned.
Somalia’s President Mohammed Abdullahi Farmaajo traveled to Kinshasa for high-level talks with DRC President Felix Tshisekedi, chair of the African Union, following his controversial two-year term extension. The trip is both symbolic and strategic, projecting a sense of business-as-usual while signaling to regional and international actors that Farmaajo’s extension is a fait accompli. Reports indicate a possible Qatar-mediated deal offering recognition of the extension by Kenya in exchange for de-escalation over the maritime dispute. Qatar has been actively cultivating ties in Africa to protect its investments and broker solutions between Mogadishu and Nairobi. Recognition by Kenya could strengthen Farmaajo’s position against growing domestic and international pressure, while Tshisekedi might lobby other African states to follow suit. Recent maneuvers, including Abdirashid Janan’s return to Somalia, suggest Villa Somalia is consolidating support ahead of potential opposition challenges. However, Farmaajo’s shift toward negotiating with Kenya, despite his earlier resistance, underscores his political desperation and raises doubts about his ability to deliver on agreements. The Kinshasa visit highlights the complex geopolitics surrounding Somalia’s electoral crisis, illustrating the fragile calculations and regional dynamics that shape Farmaajo’s survival strategy.
On 12 March, the UN Security Council extended AMISOM’s mandate until 31 December 2021, though Niger, Tunisia, and Kenya expressed frustration over being insufficiently consulted. These objections reflect broader tensions between the UN and the African Union regarding decision-making on Somalia. While AMISOM has secured most major towns in southern Somalia, its political leadership, particularly Ambassador Francisco Madeira, has faced criticism for enabling Villa Somalia’s authoritarian practices and advancing a flawed electoral agenda. Opposition leaders have increasingly questioned AMISOM’s credibility as a neutral political actor. The African Union’s inability to coordinate effectively with troop-contributing countries (TCCs) and international stakeholders has left Somalia vulnerable amid ongoing political and security tensions. Newly appointed AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace, and Security, Amb Bankole Adeoye, faces a critical task: appoint a high-level Special Envoy to re-engage Somalia’s partners and implement a course correction for AMISOM’s civilian leadership. Once a new federal government is in office, Adeoye will have the opportunity to replace the current leadership with a competent team capable of overseeing a smooth security transition by 2023. Effective AU engagement is vital to stabilizing Somalia, supporting democratic processes, and ensuring AMISOM fulfills both its military and political mandates.