Issue No. 99

The Quad's Sudan Roadmap

On 12 September, the members of the 'Quad'-- the US, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt–– announced a joint roadmap for ending Sudan's destructive civil war. It is a significant development; the first agreement by the belligerent's main Arab sponsors that has eluded negotiators. The statement offers some progress on the Sudan file, not least reflecting the efforts by the US to deconflict the Arab interests in the war. Elements of the statement —though parts are contradictory and unrelated to Sudan —should be welcomed, including moving past the binaries of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudanese army in a post-war administration. But there is a litany of concerns as well, not least the absence of firm guardrails to ensure that the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt do not simply continue to funnel weapons to their favoured proxies. And for the Sudanese, with these powers now seemingly in the driving seat, the space for issues of constitutional rule, restitution, democratic governance, civilian leadership, and transitional justice in any post-war Sudan is greatly diminished.

Coming after the Biden administration comprehensively failed to prioritise the Sudanese conflict, Trump has turned his performative and populist deal-making brand to the world's largest civil war. Such a style may be brash and self-congratulatory, but securing a joint statement between the three Arab members of the Quad proved too much for the London conference in April. Only the US can wield enough geopolitical clout to persuade these Arab nations to come to the table to genuinely negotiate and deconflict their vested interests in the war. And since June, US Senior Advisor for Africa Massad Boulos has led a flurry of intense negotiations, even after enduring rifts between Cairo and Abu Dhabi forced Washington to cancel a planned joint statement in late July. It was not the first time. 

The discord between the Arab capitals has been a defining feature of this conflict, with their opposing bearings derailing several summits—and, of course, fueling the war. Though inexperienced diplomats too often tout 'Sudanese solutions to Sudanese problems,' the path to a ceasefire has always lain through the three principal Arab capitals, which have funnelled eye-watering quantities of sophisticated armaments and money into the war. More broadly, the war in Sudan today reflects a maelstrom of violently competing geopolitical interests, with vested commercial interests in gold and arable land, access to its coastline, Islamist politics, and more besides, having fed into the 'internationalised' conflict. Iran, Türkiye, Russia, Qatar, and more besides have spied openings in the conflict to insert themselves. 

And so it was improbable that a truce could be brought about without Cairo, Riyadh, and Abu Dhabi coming to a collective understanding that if the war were allowed to chart its course unchecked, they could all lose their various interests. Now, although it reflects convergence on several issues, this Quad statement should not be understood as a palliative rather than a panacea to the deep distrust between the capitals, nor as a wholesale solution to what they consider their strategic competing interests within Sudan and beyond.

In the statement, however, the Quad members outline a push for a three-month humanitarian truce before a permanent ceasefire and a nine-month Sudanese political process, which will then supposedly lead to a transitional, civilian-led government. These vague timelines are brisk to say the least, and will require those with influence on the RSF and SAF to bring their pressure to bear, as well as a key implementation mechanism. In a subsequent press conference, Boulous confirmed that the Quad is not intending to serve as a new platform, but rather to augment other peace tracks, including the US-Saudi Jeddah platform and the African Union's process. If there is a 'return to Jeddah,' it will be a disappointment, with the feckless track repeatedly frustrated by an inability to agree on timelines and sequencing. But there was little political will behind Jeddah, and that may yet change with the Quad's support.

Further, the statement is explicit that the country's "future governance" should be decided through an "inclusive and transparent transition process" without any "warring party" interference. Such an insistence is no small matter. This line signals a shift away from the RSF-SAF binary, a move that others, including the UN, have failed to achieve. Naturally, there is anathema within both warring parties towards that, but this was a major point of discord between the UAE and Egypt, with the US invested heavily in bringing the two onside. It also symbolises somewhat of a win for the Emirates, with Cairo backing down on its stipulation that the Sudanese army must play a role in any post-war dispensation of government. Cairo losing out on this issue further reflects the region's relations with the US; Egypt's ties with Washington have soured amid Israel's obliteration of the Gaza Strip, while the US is leaning ever more on the UAE to protect the beleaguered Abraham Accords. Still, the notion that there may be an Arab-driven civilian government should be taken with a pinch of salt-- none of the three Arab Quad members are democratic, and the Trump administration has shown little interest in promoting democracy abroad either.

Another key line relates to the Muslim Brotherhood, with the four states vaguely insisting that the Islamist movement can have no role to play in the future of Sudan. All four Quad members-- to varying degrees-- are hostile to Islamist activism, with both Egypt and Saudi Arabia quelling homegrown versions. Since the start of the war, the Islamists within the Sudanese army and former National Congress Party officials have sought to engineer the conflict to manoeuvre their way back into power, with those such as former Foreign Minister Ali Karti ascendant. And to the alarm of the Quad, through these linkages, Iran has increasingly developed ties with senior members of SAF and the military government as well, leading to another round of sanctions by the US just in September. But the Quad's explicit repudiation of the Islamists raises once again a central question of the war: whether SAF Commander General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan can rid himself of the powerful Islamist constituency that he has depended upon to retake Khartoum. Alongside dismissing the role of these Islamist factions within a future Sudanese government, the Quad also rejects the notion that the RSF's parallel government, known as 'Tasis', can be a legitimate administration. A fragmented Sudan is in no one's interests.

Still, although a Quad statement has been secured, it remains to be seen whether it will translate into comprehensive pressure on the Sudanese army and the RSF. Bringing about a ceasefire is another matter entirely, and the situation on the ground does not appear particularly 'ripe' for one. Having retaken Khartoum earlier this year, the Sudanese army is keen to press its advantage in the Kordofans, while the Islamist elements within it are hardly likely to welcome the Quad's explicit rejection of the Muslim Brotherhood. Subsequently, the military government has insisted that it will not participate in any initiative that fails to respect Sudan's "sovereignty," a thinly veiled dismissal. The RSF, on the other hand, did not comment on the truce element of the Quad statement, while welcoming parts of it. Seemingly on the cusp of taking the final state capital of Darfur, El Fasher, after months of brutal, grinding fighting, it is improbable that the paramilitaries will want an immediate truce.

Any respite from this violence should be welcomed, but the Quad– and particularly with the Trump administration at the helm– should not be mistaken for a body interested in bringing about a Sudanese civilian-led democracy, quite the opposite. In the worst case, it risks continuing the subsuming of Sudan as a geopolitical pawn to the whims of foreign interests, and the Sudanese people's lives, livelihoods and dignity as disposable. And if Trump cannot secure a quick 'win' in Sudan and is unwilling to expend any further political capital without the promise of commercial sweeteners like in the DRC-Rwanda deal, he may simply turn elsewhere and allow the Arab states to continue prosecuting their proxy war. None of this is to say this is not a key development on the path towards a ceasefire; it is. But African multilaterals and neighbouring governments have been reduced to either passive observers or proxies. Thus, the Quad statement, in many ways, is a reflection of the deterioration of the power of the norms and principles that once underpinned deal-making on the continent, the very antithesis of the performative commercialised peacemaking of Washington. So while the Quad may have succeeded in sketching out a tentative path towards a ceasefire, it cannot bring about a comprehensive political settlement that speaks to the origins of the war itself. That can only come from the Sudanese people.

The Horn Edition Team