Issue No. 98

Published 18 Sep 2025

Machar Charged and Bol Mel Elevated in South Sudan

Published on 18 Sep 2025 22:51 min

Machar Charged and Bol Mel Elevated in South Sudan

After months and years of creeping, violent consolidation, the ailing South Sudanese President Salva Kiir has again moved decisively to cement his successor. In just a couple of weeks this September, Kiir has promoted 'First Vice-President' Benjamin Bol Mel to a full general in the National Security Service Internal Bureau, and levelled an array of trumped-up charges against Riek Machar. Though internationals have again furiously warned of contraventions against the 2018 peace deal, it was already in tatters long ago, systematically undermined by a rapacious Juba government that has fully captured the state. The simultaneous elevation of Bol Mel and the charging of Machar are simply another chapter in the sad betrayal of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) origins.

On 11 September, after holding Machar for months under house arrest, Kiir's government announced over a dozen charges for the Sudan People's Liberation Movement- in Opposition (SPLM-IO) leader and 20 other opposition figures, including murder, terrorism, treason, and crimes against humanity. The thinly-veiled political indictments nominally relate to deadly clashes earlier this year in Nasir County, where Nuer White Army militias violently resisted the sudden imposition of Juba's military on their communities. Though the White Army-- essentially a coalition of self-defence Nuer forces-- was aligned with Machar several years prior, any linkages today are negligible, and the SPLM-IO leader has no influence on their bearing. But the fighting, itself a response to Kiir's violent, extractive reach into South Sudan's restive peripheries, still provided the flimsiest excuse for the president to place his one-time rival under house arrest and sever his communications. Even before the clashes, the dominant party in the 'unity government' had unilaterally reshuffled and reappointed loyalists in positions promised for SPLM-IO politicians in the 2018 peace agreement.

Foreseeing further condemnation from Juba's absentee diplomatic community, the Justice Minister has warned internationals that the judicial proceedings against Machar and others could not be subject to "policy or diplomatic debate." Not that any foreign power has been able to compel Juba to abort its bloody consolidation of power and targeting of civilians anyhow, while the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) has been repeatedly accused of abandoning its mandate to actually protect South Sudanese civilians from their government. Having come away scot-free with abandoning the promises to hold South Sudan's first national elections in December last year-- itself another delay-- Juba has seized on the divided and distracted international community to consolidate its grip further. And in turn, Kiir has ditched any pretence of abiding by the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS), with even the prosecution of Machar expected to proceed in a military court-- contravening yet another element, Chapter V, that provides for the establishment of a Hybrid Court for war crimes and crimes against humanity.

On 15 September, the SPLM-IO unsurprisingly declared the transitional government "collapsed" and "illegitimate," urging supporters to "report for National Service" and use "all means available" to reclaim sovereignty. But the armed opposition movement has been neutered of much of its influence in the intervening years since the R-ARCSS. Irrespective of promises for cohesive security sector reform or unification of forces, Juba has instead steadily purged, violently suppressed or prised off factions of the SPLM-IO. And Machar himself has been rendered a pale imitation of his former clout, with his influence amongst the Nuer significantly diminished, in no small part due to his own blunders. Warnings that his arrest and now charging could plunge the country back into widespread violence akin to 2013-2018 fail to reflect the systematic transformations in influence and political networks within South Sudan.

But in a year pockmarked by extreme violence against civilians, recent weeks have seen yet another escalation, with clashes across the country between SPLM forces and remaining SPLM-IO troops as Kiir has looked to further undermine any vestiges of opposition. In recent months, under the guise of humanitarian operations or restoring stability, Kiir's forces have launched successive offensives into parts of Upper Nile, Western Equatoria, and Western Bahr el Ghazal, brutally targeting civilian communities from which their opposition has been historically drawn, including the Nuer. In Nasir as well, backed by the Ugandan military, incendiary bombs were dropped indiscriminately on several towns and villages, displacing hundreds of thousands of people in March. And just this week, the SPLM-IO's headquarters in Malakal was seized by Upper Nile authorities and handed to rival forces. Juba, meanwhile, continues to obfuscate and deny any involvement. But the soaring political violence across the country has accentuated the "alarming" humanitarian situation faced by South Sudanese, as described by the UN in August. Most of the country-- 7.7 million-- are now facing high levels of food insecurity.

And 74-year-old Kiir has publicly anointed a successor cast in his own image; the US-sanctioned Benjamin Bol Mel. With no real constituency to speak of, Bol Mel remains a highly unpopular choice-- not least for his infamous record of corruption. This week, a UN report cited the government's siphoning off of billions of dollars in oil revenue, with the newly elevated politician at the centre of the 'Oil for Roads' programme. In just a couple of years, an estimated USD 2.2 billion was funnelled into patronage rather than roadbuilding —reflecting the prioritisation of enriching senior government officials over delivering any kind of services to their people. From Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Bol Mel, able to wield the slush fund at whim, has now built up a formidable economic base and further enjoys a close relationship with Kampala. Now promoted to full general in the National Security Service's Internal Bureau, Bol Mel's position at the centre of South Sudan's coercive security apparatus has been further solidified. 

The charging of Machar arguably marks the final line in the grim history of the R-ARCSS's chapter, a peace deal that has done nothing to prevent Juba from waging a violent crusade against its citizens across the country. Unchecked by UNMISS or the international community, the final collapse of the unity government at the hands of the Kiir regime has been coming for some time. Now, with Bol Mel ascendant, little stands in the way of Kiir handing the reins over to his chosen successor-- and years of further peripheral violence and central avarice.

The Horn Edition Team 

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