Issue No. 86

Sudan's War Without End

On 11 June, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) seized a strategic tri-border zone between Sudan, Libya, and Egypt, known as Jebel Uweinat. Declaring the area "liberated" from a small Sudanese army border garrison, the capture of remote Jebel Uweinat will provide the paramilitaries with further access to Libya's porous southern frontier and their ally, the Libyan commander Khalifa Haftar, as well as Sudan's northern states. Amidst this flashpoint, which will allow the RSF to continue to funnel in weapons and supplies, the broader, destructive armed conflict remains intractable, with no credible political or peace process in sight. 

War is nothing new in Sudan, with the country predicated on the violent looting of the peripheries, but the scale and violence of this latest iteration go far beyond what has come before. It is a conflict that is tearing apart Sudan's very social fabric, and while the pyrrhic recapture of Khartoum by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) was hailed as a decisive turning point, it shows no sign of abating. Certainly, it has bolstered SAF's international claims as the inheritor of the state, aided by its recognition by the UN, as well as its allies in Cairo and Riyadh, and simultaneously dampened the reception of RSF's parallel government. But the battlefield continues to rage, with the paramilitaries having since pivoted towards fighting in the Kordofans. This week, dozens of people were killed in the shelling of the Al Mujlad Hospital in West Kordofan, near one of the frontlines of the two belligerents. The Sudanese army is also attempting to break the siege on its 54th Brigade forces in the town of Dilling, but the RSF has scored a string of strategic gains as well, including the capture of An-Nahud.

Any hopes that SAF's capture of Khartoum might offer some space for talks have quickly faded. For the first time in months, RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo 'Hemedti' delivered a public speech to his fighters in a highly choreographed video, pledging to fight on. Notably, however, he continued to soften his rhetoric towards Egypt —the principal ally of the Sudanese army —saying that "we don't have any problem with anyone, including the Egyptians." Cairo, which is also allied with Haftar, is likely alarmed by the RSF's capture of Jebel Uweinat. The RSF's alliance with the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), led by Abdel Aziz al-Hilu, a veteran opposition commander, may further expand the territorial access of the paramilitary forces towards Ethiopia. 

Nearly every international 'red line' has been crossed so far in this conflict-- war crimes, sexual violence, chemical weapons, mass killings, induced starvation, targeting of civilians and humanitarian infrastructure, and more besides. And on 23 June, yet another senior UN official warned that the risk of genocide remains "very high" in Darfur due to the ethnic targeting of the indigenous communities of the Zaghawa, Masalit, and Fur by the RSF. Pressure on El-Fasher-- the last remaining state capital of the western region not in the hands of the paramilitaries-- continues to mount following months of brutal bombardment and a siege that has induced famine. Nor have the nearby swollen displacement camps of Abu Shouk and Zamzam, where famine was first declared in Sudan last year, been spared, with hundreds killed in major attacks by the RSF in mid-April. And with the predominantly Arab militias having razed dozens of settlements across Darfur, it remains an existential fight in the eyes of the former Darfurian rebels, known as the Joint Forces, that are defending El Fasher, who are also allied to the SAF.

The humanitarian situation in Darfur is particularly dire, and it is worse than any of the limited data eking out of the country can convey. The weaponisation of starvation-- and of humanitarian aid-- has induced the world's largest hunger crisis, with both the RSF and SAF wielding it for their own gain. Those at the apex of the Sudanese political economy, including war profiteers and merchant intermediaries, continue to extract rents from the suffering, converting instability into capital and leverage. UN figures in mid-April estimated that 24.6 million people, roughly half the population, were experiencing acute food insecurity, and 648,000 were facing catastrophic hunger. The international response to this crisis has been shockingly absent, with a fraction of the UN's humanitarian plan currently funded. Beyond the deaths and malnutrition, it is impossible to fully grasp the extent of the damage to Sudanese society that such large-scale hunger will do.

The imminent rainy season, which would have been expected to slow the military campaigns in Sudan, may do little to alleviate the devastating bombardments. Continuing influxes of drones and other advanced military material from the belligerent's Gulf patrons have significantly shaped the war's dynamics so far, with the SAF deploying Bayraktar TB2s and Iranian models in retaking Khartoum. It is now the RSF that is showing off its particularly advanced drone technology, having struck Port Sudan on the Red Sea in early May in a series of sophisticated strikes. Hosting the army's rump government and formerly considered safe terrain, the strikes on Port Sudan-- as well as a series of others on fuel depots and infrastructure in Kassala-- indicate a new phase of the war. Still, despite these shock-and-awe tactics intended to lessen the sting of losing Khartoum, the RSF is also facing internal command issues, which may partially explain Hemetdi's recent appearance to his troops.

Internal schisms also continue to plague the SAF, with the appointment of former UN official Kamil Idris-- a political opportunist-- as a 'civilian' transitional prime minister last month failing to quiet them. Despite being welcomed by the African Union, which has maintained its de facto position aligned towards the army, Idris's appointment has been widely ridiculed as a farce. Having failed to co-opt them, the army continues to crack down on humanitarian relief being provided by the Emergency Response Rooms (ERRs), the partial successor to the civilian neighbourhood committees of the 2019 revolution, as well as any remaining civil society in-country. Many of the ERRs-- one of the very few effective ways of delivering life-saving humanitarian aid in Sudan right now-- have been forced to close due to USAID cuts. And Idris has already been criticised by a key faction of the Darfurian Joint Forces, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), after he proposed removing quotas from his government. Behind the scenes, despite some unease in Cairo, the various Islamist factions are continuing to consolidate power within the army, with their paramilitary forces proving integral to the retaking of the capital earlier this year. One of the war's central questions remains whether General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan will be able to break from their increasing hold-- all available evidence currently suggests he cannot.

Against this backdrop, the international community and the arrayed Arab regional powers have been unable to formulate a united response to the fighting. Sudanese civilians remain divided, and Western governments have shown little appetite for sustained engagement, and over two years into the conflict, no viable roadmap exists. The latest attempt – the London Conference held in April – instead only highlighted the sustained divisions in the Gulf, with the UAE and Saudi Arabia refusing to sign a joint communique. And in mid-June, over 100 Sudanese politicians, activists, and diplomats urged the UN Secretary-General to replace his Sudan envoy, former Algerian PM Lakhdar Brahimi Lamamra, accusing him of bias and inefficiency. Lamamra's 'peace mediation' was built on a fundamentally incorrect assumption-- that the SAF would be able to suppress the RSF militarily, and has been subsequently rendered irrelevant. 

Within the Horn, the absence of credible interlocutors and a single regional hegemon —alongside the particularly destabilising perforation of Gulf interests through the region —has undermined the long-standing principles of non-aggression, political dialogue, and collective security. And this disintegration of the regional order has opened the door for external actors to exploit the vacuum. Diplomats understand that the war in Sudan is an African problem that requires a solution through the capitals of Abu Dhabi, Riyadh, and Cairo. However, bringing the necessary clout and pressure to bear on them appears unlikely, as these key patrons double down on the conflict, considering it a zero-sum war. All the while, the probability of a de facto partition and unravelling of Sudan grows ever more likely.

The Horn Edition Team