Issue No. 81

Across the Borderlands: Migration Along the Eastern Route

Migrants transiting out of the Horn of Africa have historically moved through three distinct routes-- the 'Northern Route' that traverses Sudan and Libya to southern Europe or the Middle East, the 'Southern Route' down through Kenya and Tanzania, and finally, the 'Eastern Route' through Yemen to the Gulf. With state collapse, climate crisis, economic stagnation and armed conflict inducing mass displacement and dispersal from the Horn of Africa, millions have left their homes in search of a better life. But the dangers of these journeys remain immense, while the human smuggling networks that traffic people have swelled into a multi-million-dollar industry.

Today, migratory flows within and from the Horn are motivated by a diverse array of push and pull factors that encompass everything from desertification to Eritrea's forced military conscription to better job prospects in the Gulf. However, intra-regional migration patterns within and out of the Horn also have a long history that endures to this day, such as the nomadic groups of Sahelian camel herders that traverse vast stretches of modern-day Sudan, Chad, and beyond. The 'Oromo expansions' of the 16th and 17th centuries, as famously documented by an ethnic Gamo monk called Bahre, saw the ethnic group's land grow from northern Kenya and southern Ethiopia to across the centre and east of the country. Political violence, war, and armed conflict, too, have been a significant displacer of people, particularly in the Horn's post-colonial era. And with war raging in Sudan, as well as enduring conflicts in South Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia, displacement figures are at their highest ever levels within the Horn at nearly 24 million people, predominantly internal in nature and made up of women and children. Migrants from the region, however, are primarily men and overwhelmingly cite economic motivations for leaving, often aspiring to return remittances for their families. 

Naturally, there are different established routes for the varying Horn populations, each posing its own risks. With war raging in Sudan, the Northern Route has become even more treacherous towards Europe, without factoring in the detention camps run by influential Libyan cartels that imprison those attempting to cross the Mediterranean. For Ethiopian migrants, the Eastern Route through Yemen remains preferred, with the vast majority being men and hailing from rural areas of Oromia, Amhara, and the Southern regions. A combination of factors drives this ongoing exodus, particularly the harsh economic crunch in Ethiopia that has precipitated mass youth unemployment and significant inflation. So, too, is the climate crisis devastating the historically rural agro-pastoralist communities of the Oromo that make up around 35.8% of the country. And the raging conflicts in Oromia and Amhara are pushing young men towards Djibouti as well, seeking the promise of stability and better salaries in the Gulf. However, this route also carries forced migrants from Eritrea and now a larger number of Sudanese fleeing the civil war.

For these migrants, Djibouti is typically the last jumping-off point from the Horn of Africa, with vessels only required to ferry migrants and refugees a short distance across the Bab al-Mandab Strait to Yemen. But to reach the key smuggling towns of Tadjourah and Obock, the predominantly Oromo migrants are forced to traverse the blistering Danakil Desert before crossing into Djibouti via the Galfi border. The coastal town of Obock serves as the primary launchpad for maritime crossings, but this, too, is perilous, with tiny dhows crammed with dozens of people often capsizing. The UN's International Organisation for Migration documented the deaths of 558 people on the Eastern Route last year, while in March, four overcrowded boats overturned, leaving well over 150 people drowned. Smugglers routinely take hazardous risks to maximise profits and avoid the Djiboutian and international coast guards that patrol the arterial waterway.

Though perhaps less scrutinised than its Northern counterpart through Sudan, the Eastern Route similarly has a complex web of trafficking networks that facilitate these movements. One such hotspot is in Western Tigray and eastern Sudan, a highly militarised 'grey' zone of competing territorial and economic interests encompassing Eritrean, Tigrayan and Sudanese military groups. In Djibouti, traffickers – some more organised, others loosely connected groups – typically charge around USD 150 to 300 for the sea crossing alone. But much like Libya, migrants are often warehoused in informal holding centres in Obock to extort additional payments. For many impoverished migrants and refugees, these costs can plunge the families of those making the crossing into crippling debt. And while Djiboutian authorities have repeatedly asserted their opposition to human trafficking, they are frequently accused of facilitating these networks or turning a blind eye. 

However, the intensifying migration flows, particularly from Ethiopia and Sudan, are also inducing fresh strain on host/migrant interactions, as well as inter-governmental relations. This year already, administrations in Djibouti, Puntland, and Somaliland have all stepped up their deportations of predominantly unregistered Oromo migrants back to Ethiopia. In all three, rapidly growing Oromo populations now comprise a significant underclass, carrying out menial jobs such as labouring and shoe-shining. And much like Djibouti, Puntland's port city of Bosaaso has long been another arterial transit highway for trafficking and smuggling, but has also faced a particular danger from the Islamic State-Somalia's recruitment of foreign nationals. Puntland's ongoing 'Operation Hilaac' against the jihadists based in the Al-Miskaad mountains has revealed the group's composition of a diverse array of nationalities. 

Crossing the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, or the Bab al-Mandab Strait is only part of the journey, though, with migrants typically intent on searching out jobs in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, and other wealthy Gulf nations. Several of these countries-- that have played a principal role in the destabilisation of the Horn through pursuing their own competing geostrategic interests-- host immense numbers of African migrants. Around 750,000 Ethiopian migrants, for instance, live in Saudi Arabia, with over half estimated to have entered the country illegally. Most of those who entered illegally travelled through the Eastern Route over the Yemeni border, attempting to avoid the targeted violence by Saudi border guards. An extensive investigation by Human Rights Watch in 2023 revealed that hundreds of Ethiopians had been killed or wounded by Saudi guards over the preceding years, and the attacks have been reported to have not subsided. Clearly, not all make the dangerous maritime crossing, and many Ethiopian women are directly recruited by agencies to become domestic workers in the Gulf. However, there have also been numerous documented cases of migrant domestic workers undergoing physical and sexual abuse, working 18-hour days without pay, or being denied access to the outside world.

What is abundantly clear is that with further conflict, state contraction, displacement driven by the climate crisis, and economic stagnation, to name a few issues, displacement within and outside of the Horn is likely to only accentuate in the coming years. So, too, will demographic issues endure, such as the regional bulge and how administrations in Puntland and Somaliland respond to mass Oromo migration into their polities. And the transnational organised gangs that facilitate these movements, operating within the gaps of contracting states, will surely keep exploiting and profiting from the regional migratory 'brain drain.' So, with 'migration' an increasingly dirty word in large swathes of the world, formulating effective responses to the myriad opportunities and issues accompanying the mass dispersal of people will remain one of the most pressing challenges of the coming decades. Better understanding the complexities of these migration patterns, and not just the causational factors but also the innumerable interactions between migrants, border guards, administrations, militias, elders, and more en route to their destination, would be a good place to start.

The Horn Edition Team