Issue No. 79

Sudan's Islamist Resurgence Shapes a Fractured War

Since last September, when the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) launched its campaign to oust the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) from central Sudan and Khartoum, one constellation of forces has played a particularly notable role-- Islamist paramilitary groups. Often referred to as the 'Shadow Brigades,' these fighters have spearheaded the offensive that culminated in the retaking of the Republican Palace in the capital in March. These forces, the best known being the Al-Bara' ibn Malik Battalion, and their Islamist forebears have profound roots in Sudan and reflect a return of a number of senior officials from the former Omar al-Bashir regime within the SAF. Proving ever more influential within the uneasy coalition that comprises the Sudanese army, the trajectory of the war and Sudan's political direction is being increasingly shaped by its Islamist dimensions.

Sudanese Islamism has deep and myriad origins in the country. Dating back to the late 1940s, Sudanese proponents of the Muslim Brotherhood movement in neighbouring Egypt began to take root in universities and high schools. But it was the leadership of Hassan al-Turabi, the architect of the 1989 coup with al-Bashir, that propelled Sudanese political Islam for the latter half of the 20th century. Al-Turabi's particular strain of 'African Islamism' sought to promote the Islamising of the country through the state and its institutions. Interspersed between detention and senior roles in government under the vacillating Gaafar Nimeiry regime and its stalled democratic successor, al-Turabi drove the institutionalism of Sharia law in Sudan before establishing the National Islamic Front (NIF) in 1985. Eventually, though, al-Turabi, alongside al-Bashir as his vehicle, seized power in 1989, becoming one of the first post-colonial African states to adopt an explicitly Islamist form of governance.

Throughout the 1990s, the NIF-- which would later morph into the National Congress Party (NCP)-- consolidated its grip on the centres of hard power in the country. This included installing Islamist loyalists throughout the SAF, as despite the office corps being predominantly drawn from Riverain and Arab constituencies, they were largely unsympathetic to al-Turabi's Islamist vision. Never fully trusting the army, though, the new regime also created a number of Islamist paramilitary groups, such as the Popular Defence Forces (PDF), as a means to 'coup-proof' the regime and battle the insurgencies in southern and western Sudan. Simultaneously, known as the policy of 'tamkiin' (empowerment), Khartoum forged new patronage networks while emphasising conservative Islamic social reform and dismantled both trade unions and democratic groups. But the alliance between the ideologue al-Turabi and the authoritarian-minded al-Bashir remained uneasy, and in 1999 the latter deposed the influential figurehead of Sudanese Islamism. 

Post-1999, Islamist social policies were partially abandoned, with the regime adopting a more straightforward illiberal state-building posture funded by the exploitation of oil reserves. The deposition of al-Turabi, however, caused several rifts within the Islamist movement that endure to this day, with his Popular Congress Party (PCP) formed in turn to challenge the dominance of al-Bashir and the NCP. His removal fed into another schism as well, between the Darfuri Islamists, who had supported al-Turabi's vision of African Islamism but were sidelined by al-Bashir's government, and Khartoum. Nevertheless, influential Islamists, enticed by the hard power and money offered by Khartoum, such as Ali Osman Taha, remained in al-Bashir's camp. Though the ideology of the 'keizan', the term for NCP-loyalists, was somewhat diminished by al-Bashir, many senior officials remained within the senior echelons of the SAF and became immensely wealthy from the 2000s oil boom. Various charities, such as the Islamic Call and the Holy Quran Society, were used to funnel patronage for these clientelist networks and maintain regime loyalty.

But the deep unpopularity of the al-Bashir regime, coupled with growing financial pressures post-2011 secession of South Sudan, eventually proved too much to sustain. Rising bread and fuel prices triggered mass protests in December 2018, but it quickly took on a social and cultural dimension as well, with youth and women protesting the repressive Islamist elements of the regime. The ousting of al-Bashir in April 2019 by the now-warring security architecture was soon followed by the formal dissolution of the NCP later that year by the civilian-military transitional government. Aware that no serious change in Sudan was possible without tackling the 'deep state' of the entrenched Islamist-military interests within the economy, the Empowerment Dismantling Committee (EDC) was also formed. 

While some figures, such as former foreign minister Ali Karti, former vice-president Taha, and the former spy chief Salah Gosh, either fled overseas or were imprisoned post-2019, many of the Islamist networks simply faded into the background. This did not last for long, however, with the joint coup of General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo 'Hemedti' in October 2021 allowing for a resurgence of the Islamist elements of the government and security architecture. Senior figures were released from prison, and purged officials were reinstated in the civil service and judiciary. And-- unsurprisingly-- one of the first acts of the purged government was to dismantle the EDC.

Fast forward to the outbreak of war in April 2023, and with the SAF military leadership facing a dearth of both armaments and personnel, senior Islamist officials have gained even greater prominence. Just a few days after the start of the war, in contested circumstances, several senior SAF officials broke out of the infamous Kober prison, including former Interior Minister Ahmed Harun, who is wanted by the ICC for crimes against humanity in Darfur but has since returned to play a central role in the SAF. But more broadly, the Islamists' ability to mobilise and arm thousands of young men in Kassala and Gedarif, particularly after the sweeping advances of the paramilitaries in the first months of the war, has proven highly consequential. And their links to foreign powers, particularly Qatar and Türkiye, have been instrumental in facilitating new weapons flows that have helped turn the tide against the RSF in recent months. However, human rights organisations have documented a disturbing wave of atrocities committed by forces linked to the 'Shadow Brigades' in Wad Madani, Khartoum, and elsewhere. These include extrajudicial killings, targeted attacks on civilians from Darfur and Kordofan, and the vandalism of religious sites, such as the Sheikh Qarib Allah Mosque in Omdurman. These abuses raise critical questions about the SAF's ability—or willingness—to control its Islamist factions.

However, neither the al-Bashir regime nor factions within the SAF today have exercised control over expressions of diverse political Islam in Sudan, particularly with the majority of these leaders drawn from the Riverain elite. Other differing strains are present in a number of the warring parties today, including the predominantly Zaghawa Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), which has aligned itself with the army following the razing of Darfur by the RSF. And some of the divisions of the 1990s and 2000s persist within the fractious coalition that makes up the SAF. While some officers are ideologically aligned with Islamist goals, others possess a more nationalist vision and are fighting to prevent another partition of Sudan.    

Further, al-Burhan's reported interest in improving relations with Israel has alienated some Islamists as well. The general may be the figurehead of the government, perhaps now to transition to Khartoum, but the flinging open of the doors to the Islamists may well come back to haunt him. A number of more radical factions that have fought alongside the SAF are reported to be discontented with al-Burhan's leadership, including after he asserted that the victories in eastern Sudan were not spearheaded by the Islamists but by SAF troops. However, while al-Burhan may be unpopular, he nevertheless maintains a veneer of authority that the Islamists have been denied since their ousting in 2019. Most understand that their route back into power still lies through al-Burhan and the SAF.

Still, multiple other fractures exist within the Islamist bloc itself. For instance, while the radical cadres leading the Al-Bara' bin Malik Brigade have forged a close relationship with al-Burhan, their relationship with his deputy, Shams al-Din Kabbashi, is said to be strained. And another schism exists within the core of the NCP, with one faction led by Ahmed Harun and Ali Karti and another opposed to these older regime loyalists. Nevertheless, these factions share several core objectives-- no peace with the RSF, preventing Sudan's partition, and restoring centralised authoritarian rule. Indeed, many senior Islamists have repeatedly sought to undermine the failed peace talks with the paramilitary group. For instance, it was reported that some tentative clauses had been hammered out in Bahrain last year between the RSF and SAF but were sabotaged by senior Islamist officials within the UN-recognised government.

The 2018 uprising dealt a major blow to the public image of Islamism in Sudan, something that the RSF have been keen to capitalise on and attempt to frame themselves as the inheritors of the thwarted civilian transition. Their statements and propaganda routinely seek to frame the SAF as terrorist-aligned, emphasising the presence of the Al-Bara' ibn Malik Battalion, whose leadership has proclaimed "jihad" against the paramilitaries. And the presence of jihadists in Sudan is also a contested subject, though there was an Islamic State presence known to be in the country prior to the outbreak of war. Famously, the home of Osama bin Laden in the early 1990s, many have warned that the continuing violence and destruction of Sudan threatens to reintroduce elements of jihadism within the country.

Islamism in Sudan is fraught and complex, not least with the role of Gulf powers seeking to exert influence over the political direction of the country. However, several elements are clear. First, any hope of a return to a civilian dispensation of government in Sudan is highly improbable post-war at this current juncture, given that the Islamists are so resurgent with the SAF. And second, any kind of comprehensive political settlement with the RSF also remains unlikely, with al-Burhan having to manage his fractious coalition of forces. No matter what, though, the Islamists in Sudan are back-- if they ever left-- and will not relinquish power so easily this time.

The Horn Edition Team