Issue No. 72

Digital Chokehold: Internet Censorship in the Horn

In early November 2020, as Ethiopian federal troops and their allies invaded Tigray, Addis directed the severing of all telecommunications and Internet services to the region. For the next two years, the world's most prolonged Internet blackout was imposed on Tigray, lasting 670 days until its eventual restoration only after the Pretoria agreement in December 2022. The veil thrown over Tigray had numerous damaging consequences, not least the hardships faced by Tigrayans in both documenting the litany of human rights violations against them and revealing these atrocities to the world. While Tigray's blackout is one of the most extreme examples, with conflict and political repression proliferating across the Horn of Africa, government internet shutdowns are becoming far more commonplace.

In the 20th century, 'traditional' media, namely newspapers, radio, and television, were routinely co-opted by the Horn's ruling elite and deployed for propaganda purposes. For instance, Ethiopia's Derg regime in the 1970s, after deposing Emperor Haile Selassie, transformed all media outlets in the country into a singular voice that proclaimed their Marxist ideology, often spouting the famous phrase 'Land to the Tiller.' Somalia's military dictator, Siad Barre, on the other hand, used propaganda that evolved over time, moving away from his 'scientific socialism' to a hyper-nationalist and increasingly clannist dimension. Controlling the flow of information and debate was paramount for regime survival in Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, and Sudan in the latter half of the 20th century.

But the days of maintaining a singular government narrative across a country have naturally become more complex with the rise of the Internet and social media. Though intimidation of newspaper editors is still common, the nature of social media companies based in California's Silicon Valley complicates matters for any authoritarian-inclined government in the Horn of Africa. Though they may like to, Mogadishu and Addis Ababa cannot entirely suppress the voices of amorphous political opposition online, but they can push back through other means. 

In turn, as is the case globally, political elites in Kenya, Ethiopia, and Somalia routinely deploy social media to drive certain narratives. This often goes well beyond simply tweeting or sharing their perspectives on education or finance bills. Former Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo was an expert in whipping up an online nationalist mob, using 'bot farms' to both target his critics and burnish his credentials. The 'CBBs'—the term used to refer to Farmaajo's ultra-nationalist commentators and online supporters—were routinely deployed against those who questioned his rule. Others, including the Ethiopian federal government during the Tigray war, have also been accused of fueling hate speech and fostering violent discourses against political or ethnic opposition. With a dearth of independent traditional media in several of these countries, social media has become far more critical for information sharing and political commentary—something that none of these administrations overlook. Intelligence services across the region routinely police online forums, detaining those perceived as too critical of the government or ruling elite. But the rise of the Internet and the youth bulge in the Horn has also brought about a far more decentralised political opposition, complicating attempts to suppress dissenting voices.

But if a narrative cannot be easily shaped or suppressed, administrations in the Horn are increasingly turning towards shutting off or regulating internet access. The scale, length, and intent vary widely, ranging from targeted platform bans and bandwidth throttling to selectively disrupting mobile networks in specific regions. However, Internet blackouts have become particularly common in relation to armed conflict, with several Horn regimes preempting military offensives with shutdowns to prevent scrutiny. The prolonged communications blackout during the Tigray war, for example, helped conceal the full scale of atrocities, shielding perpetrators from scrutiny. Only gradually did information about the extent of the horrors leak out of the isolated northern region, with many of the largest massacres carried out in the war's first days. Moreover, it deliberately muddied the humanitarian response, with the scale of the famine not fully understood by the passive international community. Similarly, in Sudan, the damage to communications networks by the ongoing war has badly undermined ongoing aid operations.

More broadly, though, there remains significant regional variation in the accessibility of the Internet and the various administrations' attempts to regulate their citizens' use of it. On the most extreme end is, of course, Eritrea, where the autocratic regime radically restricts access to prevent any opposition mobilisation or information diffusion into the 'hermit kingdom.' With an internet penetration rate of just 1% and a single state-run telecommunications provider (EriTel), the government exerts near-total control over digital communications without the need for formal shutdowns. This digital isolation serves as preemptive repression, ensuring dissent is stifled before it can emerge.

On the other end of the spectrum, democratic Kenya has prided itself on its online freedoms. However, while long regarded as East Africa's technology hub—dubbed the 'Silicon Savannah'—Kenya's internet disruptions during the 2024 youth-led protests signalled a troubling departure from its traditionally open digital space. While the Communications Authority denied involvement, access to social media platforms was disrupted for hours following the storming of the national parliament on 25 June 2024. Connectivity was only restored that evening just minutes before President William Ruto's widely televised address, which most commentators regarded as no coincidence. 

While Silicon Valley tech companies may not listen to the concerns of Addis to the same extent as Beijing in quieting opposition, Horn governments have other means to suppress communication and information sharing. The region's telecommunications companies are not immune to their leaders' politicking—far from it-- and can be complicit in the shuttering of their own services. The fusion and perforation of the political-economic elite in the Horn is particularly pronounced, with telecom companies often having a vested political interest in the countries in which they operate. Their bottom line is not the only motivating factor, though many will acquiesce to government demands to protect their ability to operate in their respective countries. The ownership of Hormuud, for instance, Somalia's largest telecommunications company, has close ties to the influential hardline Salafist Al-I'tisaam movement. So, while the democratisation of information via the Internet is a near-ubiquitous element of modern life, its delivery to individuals nevertheless remains highly political and in the hands of a few companies within the Horn.

The shuttering of the Internet does not come without cost to governments, though. Internet blackouts are highly disruptive for economic sectors reliant on digital connectivity, including financial institutions. In 2024, it was estimated that internet shutdowns cost economies across the world USD 2.4 billion. For the more economically-minded leaders in the Horn with ties to business communities, there is a trade-off between suppressing political dissent and the resulting economic pain. During the Kenyan Internet blackout, for instance, business leaders reportedly complained to the government about the financial pain of the decision.

With democratic space shrinking and instability spreading across the Horn, access to the Internet and telecommunications is also shifting. Not only governments are increasingly able to shut down internet communications, but major rebel groups are as well, with the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan shutting two providers' connections in February 2024. Still, there are also increasing workarounds for digital restrictions and limitations, ranging from VPN usage to encrypted messaging platforms to Elon Musk's Starlink satellite program, which is being used in conflict zones in Sudan and Ukraine. Other issues, such as the rapid evolution of Artificial Intelligence, will likely play an increasingly significant role in African politics in the coming years. As all these dynamics continue to evolve, the battle over access to telecommunications, the Internet and information is likely to become only more fraught.

The Horn Edition Team