South Sudan Slides Towards War
The seemingly inexorable slide towards widespread conflict in South Sudan continues to gather pace. In recent weeks, escalating violence between government forces, opposition groups, and various militias has destabilised multiple regions while the fragile national ruling coalition looks ready to splinter-- again. Rising tensions between the two principal signatories of the 2018 peace agreement-- President Salva Kiir and First Vice-President Riek Machar-- and their dominant factions threaten to plunge the volatile country back into widespread violence.
Last year, South Sudan's ruling elite ordered yet another delay to the country's first national elections, with the government having failed to implement a host of key articles from the peace deal that could have made them feasible. It was an unsurprising decision, with South Sudan's elite having shown little inclination for democracy or state-building since 2011. Still, it was hoped that the decision to delay, theoretically until 2026, could forestall the slip towards renewed conflict amid the worsening interconnected political and economic crises.
Since then, though, an ageing and weakened Salva Kiir has increased his sporadic pattern of late-night reshuffles, disproportionately targeting Sudan People's Liberation Movement-In Opposition (SPLM-IO) officials. Just this week alone, government security forces detained Paut Kang Chol, the oil minister, and General Gabriel Doup Lam in Juba, two senior allies of Machar. All other senior SPLM-IO security officials have also now been reportedly placed under house arrest in the capital. Most concerning, though, has been the deployment of soldiers to surround the house of Machar. It is yet unclear if the soldiers remain in place, but their positioning is a significant provocation and could be the final spark that re-ignites widespread conflict.
Though a government spokesperson has denied a return to war is imminent, the fragile peace deal known as the 'Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan' (R-ARCSS) is now at risk of total collapse. The SPLM-IO spokesperson, Pal Mai Deng, has warned that General Lam's arrest "violates" R-ARCSS, which distributed power and positions between the previously warring factions, and "puts the entire agreement at risk."
Juba's political churn is both driving and being influenced by the backdrop of the rapidly deteriorating security situation across the country. The SPLA-IO continues to operate as an autonomous military, maintaining independent command structures and territorial control across opposition strongholds in Upper Nile, Jonglei, and parts of Equatoria. Beyond these formal forces, an array of semi-autonomous militias further complicates the security environment. Western Equatoria, Western Bahr el Ghazal, and Upper Nile are currently wrestling with the worst of the surging political violence.
In Upper Nile's Nasir County, clashes since mid-February between South Sudan People's Defence Forces (SSPDF) forces and SPLM-IO-aligned youth have triggered mass displacement. In recent days, fighting between the White Army-- an SPLM-IO-aligned loosely organised Nuer militia-- and the SSPDF has rapidly intensified. General Lam's arrest this week appears to have been triggered by the instability in Upper Nile, with the SSPDF accusing the Nuer official and his forces of assisting the rebels. The White Army, however, has denied any cooperation with the SPLM-IO. Meanwhile, clashes involving forces aligned with Kiir and Machar in Western Equatoria and Western Bahr el Ghazal have also flared, precipitated by Kiir's dismissal of SPLM-IO Governor Alfred Futuyo Karaba without consultation with Machar-- in contravention of the agreement that allocated the region to opposition control. South Sudanese elite have repeatedly accessed and exploited tribalism to suit their own political benefits, and the latest episodes are no different.
Juba's latest attempts to consolidate power in the ruling SPLM faction have been apparent for some time. In late 2024, Kiir dismissed army chief Santino Deng Wol and National Security Services (NSS) head General Akol Koor in one of the most dramatic shake-ups in recent years. Koor, long regarded as one of South Sudan's most influential figures, resisted his removal, leading to a shootout in November. Moreover, the government has systematically sought to erode the SPLM-IO's influence by removing officials from state institutions. On 10 February, Kiir unilaterally dismissed two vice presidents and Karaba.
Simultaneously, the unelected president has elevated close allies to key positions, including Benjamin Bol Mel as vice president—widely interpreted as succession planning. Speculation over Kiir's declining health has intensified discussions about leadership transition, with some suggesting Bol could be his preferred successor despite lacking broad support within the ruling party. The president's office has also restructured key institutions such as the National Transitional Committee and state oil company Nilepet, where Kiir has installed loyalists in positions controlling critical economic and political resources. By sidelining opposition figures in favour of his allies, Kiir and his inner circle appear to be chaotically attempting to maintain his faction's dominance.
The UN Mission in South Sudan, IGAD, the US, the UK, and others have repeatedly called for urgent measures to de-escalate the situation and restore calm. The memories of the most recent bout of the internecine civil war are also still fresh for South Sudanese, with the conflict leaving over 400,000 people dead, displacing millions, and inducing famine in 2017. The world's youngest country has been plagued by inter-communal violence-- often driven by elite for self-interested political reasons-- and a fractured political settlement since, with little progress being made to pull South Sudan from its perennial crises. The country's broader issues, ranging from a lack of unified forces to inter-communal cattle raiding, will make it extremely difficult to achieve any semblance of security in the coming months.
Moreover, the massive instability in Sudan that has bled into its formerly connected southern neighbour has supercharged its various crises. The informal economy emanating from remittances from South Sudanese workers in Sudan, particularly Khartoum, has also evaporated. The latest seismic blow has come from the drastic USAID funding cuts that will certainly exacerbate already dire humanitarian conditions. The estimated number of those requiring humanitarian assistance in 2025 is 9.3 million, nearly 75% of the country's population.
The surge towards renewed conflict is also being partially driven by the drying up of South Sudan's patronage flows from oil. For years, the unstable patchwork of patron-client networks centred on 'big men' throughout the country has been held together by the dispensed patronage from the centre's oil revenue. The crisis began in March 2024 when Sudan's military government declared force majeure on crude shipments from Upper Nile following a major pipeline rupture, cutting off the key revenue stream that accounts for 90% of South Sudan's budget.
The prolonged disruption to this has upended the patron-client networks and further diminished already heavily limited government services, including payment of civil servants and-- particularly concerning-- security forces. In January 2025, Sudan lifted the force majeure, and the now-jailed Petroleum Minister Puot Kang Chol announced plans to restart production at 90,000 barrels per day. However, exports remain stalled due to infrastructure damage and security challenges. A key obstacle is the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which controls territory through which the arterial pipeline transits in Sudan. Without RSF cooperation, oil flows remain frozen, and the patronage that has kept the delicate peace cannot be dispensed.
Worrying parallels can be drawn to the December 2013 outbreak of civil war, which stemmed from similar political disputes related to power and resource sharing within the same SPLM leadership. Well over a decade later, the country's ageing leaders threaten to plunge the country into chaos once again. Kiir's forces may be able to wrest control of Juba from the SPLM-IO and others, but outside the capital, the story is different, and the government's attempts to consolidate its weakened grip threaten to trigger massive inter-communal violence. Preventing the slide towards fighting is becoming ever more challenging, with short-sighted political manoeuvring pushing South Sudan closer towards full-blown war.
The Horn Edition Team
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