Ruto's North Eastern Gambit
Political jockeying ahead of the 2027 presidential elections in Kenya is already underway. With the William Ruto administration nearing its third year and its approval ratings remaining slumped, the president appears to have shifted into campaign mode. In early February, accompanied by senior Cabinet officials, President Ruto embarked on a significant tour of North Eastern Kenya, offering several incentives to the long-marginalised border region that backed Raila Odinga in the 2022 polls. Among these was the pledge to abolish ID vetting, the reopening of the Garrissa passports office, and promising livestock vaccinations to open up market access. With support for the central government dwindling in the vote-rich Mt Kenya region and elsewhere, President Ruto's northern charm offensive is no coincidence—it's a political insurance policy.
President Ruto's trip to the North East has coincided with increasing political pressure from his ousted deputy, Rigathi Gachagua, in Mt Kenya. Echoing Ruto's own tactics after Uhuru Kenyatta passed over him for the 2022 presidential nomination, Gachagua has established the 'Ituungati' movement akin to President Ruto's 'Tangatanga' group to challenge the ruling Kenya Kwanza coalition. The former VP is lining up supporters to contest government allies in key battleground seats in the legislature and other areas. However, it is not only political necessity that has seen President Ruto turn towards courting Kenyan-Somali votes. Kenyan-Somalis have steadily accrued significant political and economic power in Nairobi, with several of the president's closest allies being ethnic Somali, including the current Environment Secretary Aden Duale. With the government's Mt Kenya support dwindling, Kenya Kwanza is fishing in new waters, hoping to reel in the Somali vote as a replacement. Garissa MP Amina Udgoon Siyad expressed it most succinctly when she said, "The North is ready to sing Ruto's praises where the Mountain once did."
For North Eastern Kenya, the abolishment of the ID vetting process is particularly noteworthy. According to the Registration of Persons Act, to acquire a national identity card, Kenyan citizens are required to present proof of their birth in the country, such as a birth certificate and evidence of citizenship, such as their parents' Kenyan ID. However, some communities must undergo further vetting processes to get their ID. This includes a notoriously corrupt vetting session where local chiefs or village elders confirmed their identity and family history and were required to provide additional documentation, including title deeds, screening cards, and grandparents' IDs. This is then followed by the 'Nairobi process', in which their documents were verified at Nyayo House.
These vetting requirements, however, were not unique to Somalis—they have affected several other border communities, including the Maasai, Turkana, Borana, Taveta, Kuria, Teso, Boni, and Bukusu. Despite this, President Ruto's decision to abolish vetting has been framed almost exclusively as a Somali issue, in part due to the long history of state suspicion towards Kenyan Somalis. The vetting requirement dates back over 60 years, having been first imposed after the brutal Shifta War (1963-1967), a conflict in which ethnic Somalis and Muslim Borana attempted to break away from Kenya to join Somalia. In an attempt to suppress secessionist sentiments and monitor the Somali population, whom it suspected of having divided loyalties, the Kenyan government imposed a mandatory vetting process in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
In 1989, an even more onerous screening process was implemented, explained by the influx of refugees escaping the civil war in Somalia. Ethnic Somalis were required to obtain special screening cards to demonstrate their citizenship under this new screening policy, similar to the colonial-era Kipande system. Kenyan Somalis were treated as foreigners by this vetting system, with the card determining access to fundamental rights, including the ability to move freely. Without one, you could face detention or deportation.
In the mid-2000s and 2010s, ID vetting became framed as a counterterrorism measure with the rise of Al-Shabaab in Somalia. As part of its Jaysh al-Ayman wing, Al-Shabaab operatives have been known to exploit Kenya's porous borders and have quietly perforated across significant parts of the border counties. While attacks are relatively rare today, ahead of President Ruto's trip, 5 clan chiefs were kidnapped in Mandera by the extremist group. There are also numerous documented cases of members of Al-Shabaab acquiring Kenyan citizenship fraudulently. Beyond Al-Shabaab, Kenya's flawed registration system has also been implicated in regional conflict. Ethiopian authorities, for instance, suspect that individuals holding Kenyan IDs have been involved in fighting for the Oromo Liberation Army. With the vetting process now abolished, some have raised concerns over whether Kenya has alternative safeguards to prevent potential cross-border security threats.
In this light, Wiper leader Kalonzo Musyoka has strongly criticised the decision, arguing that with declining support, the government is resorting to desperate measures at the expense of national security. Musoyka has further accused– without evidence– President Ruto of lifting the mandatory vetting of people in the North Eastern as part of a wider plan to smuggle voters from neighbouring Somalia into the country. Overlooked by many, though, is that the egregious corruption in the vetting process has actually allowed Al-Shabaab members to become Kenyan citizens rather than preventing them. The abolishment of the corrupt vetting process, rather than undermining national security, may instead enhance it.
It is clear that there would be immense electoral profits if President Ruto brought the North Eastern communities onside. With long-serving opposition leader Raila Odinga, a strong contender for the African Union Commission Chair position that will be decided by week's end, possibly out of the political equation with Nairobi's backing, the votes are there for the taking. The High Court in Garissa recently annulled the 2019 census results for Wajir, Mandera and Garissa counties and mandated a new census, but in the 2022 elections, 882,000 voters cast ballots in this region. However, significant numbers of qualified voters are said to have been excluded from elections because they do not possess identification due to the stringent vetting processes. And with the abolishment, if registration jumps by just 5%, the voter count could exceed 1 million by 2027. Still, this is still far behind the 5.7 million estimated registered voters in the Mt Kenya region and the 5.3 million in the Rift Valley area.
President Ruto's decision to abolish vetting is a gamble but one that could pay off handsomely if the North Eastern communities come behind him. With an eye on the next elections, those in the Kenya Kwanza coalition will also be eagerly looking to the AU elections in Addis this week to see whether Raila will win and be neutered as a domestic political force, with his Orange Democratic Movement already co-habiting with the government. But there is also a danger of launching a campaign too soon, with the 2027 elections still far off and Kenya still having to negotiate a complex economic environment and the return of US President Donald Trump. Offering voters inducements this far ahead of the polls may prove unsustainable.
While some have raised concerns about national security being sacrificed for political interest, the closing of a corrupt loophole in acquiring citizenship documents may prove to be a positive security development in the country. Moreover, abolishing the vetting process has certainly been welcomed by the marginalised communities in North Eastern Kenya, removing some of the onerous and corrupt processes inflicted upon them for decades.
By the Horn Edition Team
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