Issue No. 113

Has war returned to South Sudan?

'Things fall apart, the centre cannot hold'-- or can it? The peripheries of the South Sudanese state all but collapsed long ago, victim to the predatory exploitation of the ailing Salva Kiir's cabal in Juba. For years, the Machiavellian spider at the centre of South Sudan's web has presided over extreme gluttony, perpetually shuffling the capital's contorted patron-client networks to maintain his hold on power, while violence and poverty have surged in consequence. But has the government finally overplayed its hand? Having systematically violated the 2018 peace agreement, significant fighting between the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-In Opposition (SPLM-IO) and government troops has flared since the end of December. 

For years, Kiir's grip has barely wavered in Juba, promoting and demoting apparent successors and pretenders to his throne at whim, most recently defenestrating Benjamin Bol Mel —the fabulously corrupt politician with links to Kampala and Abu Dhabi. And while successive government offensives against myriad communities across the country may have diminished the government's standing, none could threaten the coterie of Dinka elite at Juba's centre. That still has not changed with the current offensive; it remains the brilliance and curse of Kiir's government that only the president can manage these vying forces. But what happens after the death of the ageing leader remains a concern, and an opportunity, for all.

Amid successive electoral delays and political atrophy, the SPLM-IO has repeatedly warned of the collapse of the 2018 peace agreement, even while it has appeared powerless to prevent Kiir's persistent meddling and the removal of its senior officials. Most egregious has been the detention and subsequent charging of Riek Machar, the first vice-president and leader of the opposition movement in 2025, in dubious connection with clashes in Nasir County with the White Army-- a coalition of Nuer self-defence militias. But such tensions finally appeared to prove too much towards the end of the year, with an alliance of SPLM-IO forces surging through Nuer-majority areas of Jonglei in recent weeks, overrunning government army positions in multiple locations, including at Pajut. 

Opposition troops are now bearing down on the Dinka-majority state capital of Bor, where thousands of soldiers have massed in expectation of intense fighting in the coming days. And since the end of December, clashes have also erupted close to the oil fields in Unity state, near Juba in Morobo County of Central Equatoria, and at border positions in Eastern Equatoria, including near the Kenyan border. While intermittent clashes have persisted between these forces for months, the latest bout marks the most significant fighting since 2018. And according to UN figures, over 180,000 people have already been displaced in the conflict-affected states, accentuating the calamitous humanitarian situation across the nation. With further clashes anticipated, it remains to be seen just how far the assorted Nuer forces can push towards the capital-- and whether it will trigger broader Nuer-Dinka violence.

Meanwhile, Kiir has continued to sack and reshuffle his officials at a pace, often late at night and with no warning, in his usual style. On Monday, the president moved again, sacking the interior minister —the wife of Machar —and a host of other security officials. The veteran Warrap politician, Aleu Ayieny Aleu, has now been promoted to interior minister, having previously served in the post between 2013 and 2015 when the civil war was at its most intense. This post, too, is intended for the SPLM-IO, representing just another signal that the peace agreement has long since disintegrated. 

These renewed clashes have certainly caught the headlines, particularly given that much of the analysis of South Sudan remains centred on the SPLM vs SPLM-IO lens. But government-allied ethnic militias and indiscriminate bombing have devastated communities in parts of Upper Nile, Western Equatoria, and Western Bahr el Ghazal since late 2024, often under the guise of removing checkpoints that hinder humanitarian aid delivery. Much of these offensives against disenfranchised, peripheral communities have been brutal, wresting the hinterland economies into the militarised orbit of the distant capital. Most heinous and one of the proximate causes of the surging violence today was the clashes in Nasir County, where Juba dropped incendiary barrel bombs on Nuer communities last March.

In turn, Machar and 7 senior SPLM-IO leaders were detained, and subsequently paraded on an unconstitutional show trial, charged with a host of crimes, including treason, murder, and terrorism. Few believe that Machar —whose own influence among the Nuer has faded significantly —played any role in the White Army's resistance to the government's offensive in Nasir. But Kiir is nothing if not an opportunist, and has wielded the incident to further diminish Machar. 

Today, though, the Nuer-majority forces on the offensive in Jonglei are a fractious coalition, with multiple commanders jostling for supremacy. SPLM-IO units and local Nuer militias remain loosely aligned, with overlapping and often conflicting command structures. Among the leaders is SPLM-IO Operations Commander Lt. Gen. Wesley Welebe, who has ordered the general offensive. Following a meeting with SPLM-IO commanders in Central Equatoria, a video of Welebe demanding the release of Machar has been circulated, with the commander stating that "there is nothing called 'peace' anymore. Only regime change."

Even if spurred on by purported support from the Sudanese army, regime change may not yet be feasible. The systematic erosion of R-ARCSS has left the opposition much-weakened, with a multitude of their militias and units bribed and cajoled into the army's umbrella. And while there are profound schisms within the Dinka elite as the petrodollars dry up, the demoralised South Sudanese 'army'-- an unpaid coalition of mostly Dinka militias-- has not yet fractured. Further, Uganda has a vested interest in maintaining Kiir's hold in power, with the military having repeatedly intervened to protect the regime. But while a conceivable threat from the Nuer may paper over these cracks for the time being, the system of venal power and patronage cannot be sustained forever-- and particularly without the spider-like Kiir at the centre.

Foreign diplomats in vain have repeatedly pleaded with Kiir to return to the calamitous R-ARCSS treaty, failing to grasp that the horse had long since bolted. This remains a state fundamentally predicated on extraction, on division, on violence against its own civilians. Even so, a joint statement from various European partners, Canada, the US, and Japan was issued on Tuesday, calling on "all parties to agree to an immediate cessation of hostilities and to resolve issues through peaceful dialogue." Further, UNMISS has called for peace and dialogue, even while it nominally enjoys the strongest civilian protection mandate of any peacekeeping force, which was renewed in 2025. Yet it has repeatedly failed to carry out such responsibilities, declining to intervene against the litany of abuses conducted by government soldiers in Upper Nile, Unity, Western Bahr el Ghazal and Western Equatoria, and more besides. Yet there has been no 'peaceful dialogue' for years, with R-ARCSS providing the cover for Kiir's dismantling of the peace agreement-- which, anyhow, represented a surrender in all but name.

This is not yet a reversion to the nationwide civil war that engulfed South Sudan between 2013 and 2018, but it does mark a break from the managed instability that followed. While the country may be falling apart, it is yet to be seen whether the centre can hold —and whether the SPLM-IO can pose a genuine threat to the torrid politics of Juba. While Kiir's elite networks have been stretched thin by shrinking oil revenues and fractured patronage, the wily politician has repeatedly proven his ability to weather the most intense storms. Indeed, one might say that things fall apart in South Sudan not because the centre collapses, but because it survives—extractive, insulated, and reliant on violence to remain so.

​The Horn Edition Team