Issue No. 100

Published 02 Oct 2025

The RSF's Starvation of El Fasher

Published on 02 Oct 2025 28:02 min

The RSF's Starvation of El Fasher

Carthage, Biafra, Stalingrad, Aleppo, Sarajevo, Tigray, Gaza and El Fasher in Sudan. Deliberate starvation as a weapon of war and as part of siege tactics dates back millennia, a brutal, attritional ploy that does not discriminate between civilian and enemy combatant. For some commanders and regimes, it is motivated by a vicious 'surrender or die' rationale-- but for others, it veers toward the genocidal, an attempt to wipe out an entire people or population. And in the case of the Sudanese paramilitary Rapid Support Forces' (RSF) months-long siege on the city of El Fasher in Darfur, it is hard to view the choking siege and induced starvation as anything other than genocide.

After over 500 days of siege, El Fasher-- with around 260,000 people remaining-- has been transformed into a rabbit warren, with innumerable trenches dug by civilians and the military alike to protect themselves from the RSF's incessant bombardments. Some near the Sudanese army's 6th Infantry Division headquarters, still in the military's hands, are deep enough to drive an entire technical vehicle into. Now, with much of El Fasher having been razed and the paramilitaries advancing inch by inch, tens of thousands of people are mostly crammed into the city's north-west sector, living alongside the Darfurian fighters and the Sudanese army defending the city. There is little escape, with massive earthworks having been erected by the RSF to the south, east, and north of El Fasher to choke off routes into and out of the city over the past 17 months-- barring the treacherous road out to Tawila, roughly 60 kilometres away. Even reaching the Abu Shouk or Zamzam displacement camps near El Fasher does not promise protection, having been repeatedly and indiscriminately targeted by the RSF as well.

Meanwhile, within El Fasher's neighbourhoods, cholera and starvation are rife, with reports of dozens of infants and elderly dying in droves in recent weeks. Venturing outside to risk buying animal fodder or ambaz-- the peanut residue eaten by animals-- risks death or maiming from the RSF's drone strikes. With no international aid having reached the city for months, two kilograms of millet have been reported to sell for around USD 100 —more than the average monthly pre-war salary. However, unlike in Gaza, even if a ceasefire were declared today, the scale of deprivation and difficulties in reaching El Fasher and other complex, remote parts of Sudan would mean it would take several weeks to deliver sufficient aid. Several dozen aid trucks are reportedly ready to be deployed into the city, yet it is unlikely that the RSF will allow them to pass through their siege, as this would precisely undermine their siege tactics.

Time and again, it has appeared that El Fasher has been on the cusp of falling to the paramilitaries, but has been repeatedly beaten back by the majority ethnic Zaghawa fighters under the Joint Forces command that are aligned with the army. This is an existential fight for those on the frontlines, with all well aware of the fate of the Masalit, Fur, and Zaghawa elsewhere in Darfur at the hands of the RSF and its allied Arab militias in the past two years-- as well as two decades ago by the Janjaweed. The frictions and nuances surrounding the Arab pastoralists and camel herders migrating into Darfur to settle alongside the indigenous Darfurian farming communities date back centuries. The gut-wrenching violence playing out today did not emerge from a vacuum, but rather emerged from the successive neglect and exploitation by Khartoum of its restive western peripheries and the consequent tearing of the febrile social fabric. Until now, the most prominent consequence was, of course, the genocide and state-sponsored devastation of 2003-2005, where over 300,000 people-- predominantly indigenous Darfurians-- died at the hands of the Janjaweed, when the Omar al-Bashir government supported the 'devils on horseback' as a brutal counter-insurgency force against the same constituent rebels fighting in El Fasher today. Such a painful cyclical history of Darfur and the city is all too apparent, with pre-war El Fasher hosting tens of thousands of displaced persons-- mostly ethnic Zaghawa-- from the violence in the early 2000s. Meanwhile, for the former Darfurian rebels and Joint Forces leadership, such as Minni Minnawi, this is also a political struggle, as they are aware that losing El Fasher risks undermining their own claims in divvying up post-conflict Sudan. 

There is little doubt what will happen if the RSF are able to break through the resistance; it will be a slaughter. Emboldened by the international indifference to their litany of war crimes and human rights violations, the paramilitaries appear eager to repeat their predatory, extractive, and extremely violent actions on the citizens of El Fasher. Not least because many of the fighters besieging the city are drawn from the same nomadic Arab tribes, and heavy casualties have been inflicted over the dozens of battles fought in the preceding months. In turn, nearly all settlements on the outskirts of El Fasher have been razed to the ground since the cautious ceasefire broke in mid-2024. 

More positively, the first shoots of an alignment within the Quad —the US, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE —appeared last month, marking the first time that the principal Arab sponsors of the war converged on several key issues. Without alignment on questions such as the role of the Sudanese army post-war, an issue that Cairo has now conceded on, it was always improbable that a ceasefire could emerge. However, this has yet to translate into the Emirati-backed RSF alleviating pressure on El Fasher, and geolocated photos suggest that the paramilitaries are still gradually advancing deeper into the city. Having lost Khartoum in March, the RSF's command remains hellbent on capturing the last state capital in Darfur, with recognition for their parallel government-- Tasees-- still floundering. There are military considerations as well, with the RSF keen to source more armaments from southern Libya and better secure its supply routes through Sudan's porous western borders. And having lost ground in the Kordofans in recent weeks to the Sudanese army, the paramilitaries would be able to divest their forces away from the siege back towards the country's centre, and possibly intensify pressure on Khartoum once again.

Last week, however, for the first time in several months, Sudanese military aeroplanes were able to drop weapons and humanitarian supplies into the city, having damaged some of the RSF's anti-aircraft batteries near El Fasher. This may alleviate some pressure if it can be sustained, but the tide remains with the paramilitaries, and having undergone months of deprivation, the genocidal massacre of civilians within the city still appears imminent. Just a few years ago, it seemed that the age of starvation as a weapon of war was over, but it has roared back amid the breakdown of the liberal international order. In this light, El Fasher and Gaza are two sides of the same coin, cruel evidence that siege-induced starvation is re-emerging-- and that the international community has comprehensively failed in its duties to protect both the Sudanese and Palestinian people.

The Horn Edition Team 

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