The recent Mogadishu bombings have intensified Somalia’s resolve to defeat Al‑Shabaab. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, for the first time in years, enjoys widespread political will and public support for the fight. His administration’s counter‑Al‑Shabaab strategy rests on four pillars: military operations, targeting the group’s finances, ideological warfare, and denying it territorial control. Community‑driven uprisings in Hiiraan by Ma’awiisley militias have made rapid gains, pushing militants from key areas. Supported by Somali National Army (SNA) troops and state forces, they have reclaimed more territory in months than in years past. Yet questions remain over sustainability, coordination, and capacity. Al‑Shabaab fighters often retreat to other strongholds, regroup, and launch counterattacks. Experts warn that Somalia needs a “whole‑of‑government” approach — integrating federal, state, clan, civil society, and business stakeholders rather than relying solely on military force. A unified plan for post‑liberation stabilisation, resource mobilisation, and messaging is critical. International partners, while supportive, must provide sustained funding to prevent liberated areas from falling back into militant hands. Al‑Shabaab operates as a network, not a rigid hierarchy. Defeating it will require Somalia to build an equally adaptive and coordinated coalition that can match the group’s efficiency, discipline, and resilience.
The October bombings in Mogadishu underscore a persistent reality: Somalia’s capital remains under constant siege. While it is unclear whether the attacks were planned from rural Al‑Shabaab strongholds or orchestrated within the city, they reflect a centuries‑old pattern of urban vulnerability to rural discontent. Historically, Somalia’s port towns including Mogadishu were fortified to keep out nomadic incursions. From the seventeenth‑century Abgaal entry into Mogadishu, to early 20th‑century Dervish raids, to the looting by moryaan militias in the early civil war, urban centres have repeatedly been targeted during times of political and economic instability. This tension is more than cultural stereotype. It’s rooted in stark economic disparities between ‘cosmopolitan’ town dwellers and struggling rural communities. Urban elites benefit disproportionately from foreign aid, diaspora investment, and control of governance hubs, while rural populations face economic insecurity, displacement, and periodic natural disasters. Al‑Shabaab exploits these grievances, leveraging rural‑urban inequality in its recruitment and propaganda. Meanwhile, Somalia’s booming private security sector represents a modern version of ‘town walls,’ protecting elite assets but deepening social divides. Unless these disparities are addressed, the urban‑rural fault line will continue to be a source of instability, sustaining Al‑Shabaab’s relevance.
In October 2022, Mogadishu was once again struck by tragedy when twin suicide car bombs exploded at Zoobe Junction, killing over 100 people and injuring more than 300. The attack came just weeks after Somalis marked the fifth anniversary of the 2017 Zoobe bombing, the deadliest act of terrorism in Somalia’s history. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud vowed to crush Al-Shabaab, while ordinary citizens expressed their determination to rebuild. Somali resilience is deeply rooted in history — from the anti-colonial Daraawiish resistance to the volunteer-driven ‘iskaa wax u qabso’ projects of the pre-civil war era. Today, that spirit is alive in initiatives like the Gara’ad seaport in Puntland. Built entirely through local business and community investment, Gara’ad stands as Somalia’s first privately owned port and a model of what Somalis can achieve without heavy foreign dependency. These same grassroots-driven values power citizen militias reclaiming territory from Al-Shabaab in Hiiraan, Galgaduud, and Middle Shabelle — achieving more gains in four months than federal and AU forces did in five years.