Ethiopia’s recent decision to redeploy its troops from southern Somalia marks a significant shift in the region’s security landscape. The Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF) will abandon Forward Operating Bases in Gedo and South West State, replacing them with mobile teams based in Baidoa. While this move is intended to bolster internal security in Ethiopia amid escalating domestic conflicts, it carries far-reaching implications for Somalia’s fragile stability. The withdrawal leaves critical areas along the Somalia-Kenya-Ethiopia tri-border vulnerable, creating potential security vacuums that could be exploited by armed groups. This transition also disrupts coordination between regional forces and AMISOM (African Union Mission in Somalia) operations, complicating counterinsurgency strategies against Al-Shabaab. Local communities dependent on ENDF presence for protection may face heightened insecurity, while political tensions between Mogadishu, regional states, and Ethiopia could intensify. The development underscores the intricate link between Ethiopia’s internal challenges and broader regional security.
Al-Shabaab’s tactics in Somalia have evolved since the devastating 2017 Mogadishu truck bombing that killed nearly 600 people. While vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs) remain a threat, the militant group has increasingly turned to person-borne IEDs (PBIEDs), often in the form of suicide vests. These smaller, more discreet devices require fewer resources and can be smuggled past checkpoints more easily than VBIEDs, making them effective in crowded urban environments. Since March 2021, more than ten PBIED attacks have occurred across Somalia, seven of them in Mogadishu. Many of these attacks target Somali National Army (SNA) personnel at tea shops during breakfast or afternoon khat sessions, when groups of security forces gather and are more vulnerable. High-profile incidents include the June 2021 bombing at the General Dhagabadan Training School that killed over 20 recruits, and the May 2021 Waberi Police Station attack that claimed senior police officials’ lives.
The re-emergence of Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama’a (ASWJ) in Galmudug is offering renewed hope for residents worn down by relentless Al-Shabaab offensives and the ineffective leadership of state president Ahmed Abdi Kariye “Qoor Qoor.” Once the most effective local force against Al-Shabaab, ASWJ was dismantled in 2020 through a Federal Government-backed operation, leaving a dangerous security vacuum. In the absence of ASWJ, Al-Shabaab swiftly expanded its presence, capturing territory and deepening instability in Galmudug. Led by respected spiritual leaders Moallim Mohamoud and Sheik Shakir, ASWJ’s return has been welcomed by the local population and elements of the Somali National Army (SNA). Their declaration of holy war against Al-Shabaab is seen as a credible call to action, supported by disaffected former members within the national forces. However, Qoor Qoor views ASWJ as a political threat and is mobilising state and clan forces against them, despite the pressing danger posed by Al-Shabaab.
Somalia’s security landscape remains fragile, shaped by political tensions, insurgent threats, and competing visions for national defense. The recent graduation of the Harama’ad unit from the TurkiSom Training Academy highlights both the potential and the pitfalls of Somalia’s federal security strategy. While elite federal forces such as Harama’ad and Gor-Gor are well-trained, their deployment has raised concerns over political bias, especially ahead of the scheduled parliamentary and presidential elections. Critics argue that true stability requires empowering Federal Member State (FMS) paramilitary police, who are deeply rooted in their communities, possess local knowledge, and have the trust of the population. Successful operations, such as Operation Badbado and the coordinated Galmudug offensive, demonstrate the value of joint planning and cooperation between federal forces, FMS units, and international partners. In contrast, poorly coordinated campaigns have resulted in chaos, mistrust, and the reoccupation of liberated territories by Al-Shabaab. Without holding forces, security gains are quickly reversed, eroding public confidence. To build lasting peace, Somalia needs a robust, coherent, and community-centered security model that prioritizes coordination, local empowerment, and a clear stabilization strategy over ad-hoc military deployments.
Somalia is facing a growing threat from Al-Shabaab as the country’s political elite remain mired in internal disputes. Over the past year, the terrorist group has increased deadly raids, targeted killings, abductions, and IED attacks, extending its influence into urban areas, including Mogadishu. In February 2021 alone, more than 150 incidents were reported across the country, including 32 attacks in the capital. Between January and mid-March 2021, IED attacks killed nearly 200 people and injured around 150 others, primarily targeting the Somali National Army. Experts link Al-Shabaab’s resurgence directly to Somalia’s deepening political crisis. The Farmaajo regime’s focus on suppressing political opponents has diverted resources from the fight against jihadists. Military build-ups in Gedo and Mogadishu have weakened campaigns in strategic regions such as the Shabelle Valley, allowing jihadists to regain control of villages and key points. Unless Somali leaders prioritize national security over personal power struggles and demonstrate cohesion, the war against Al-Shabaab is likely to be lost. Effective coordination, unified strategy, and renewed focus on counterterrorism operations are urgently needed to protect civilians and stabilize Somalia. Without decisive action, the Islamist insurgency will continue to grow, posing severe risks to the country’s security and governance.
On 12 March, the UN Security Council extended AMISOM’s mandate until 31 December 2021, though Niger, Tunisia, and Kenya expressed frustration over being insufficiently consulted. These objections reflect broader tensions between the UN and the African Union regarding decision-making on Somalia. While AMISOM has secured most major towns in southern Somalia, its political leadership, particularly Ambassador Francisco Madeira, has faced criticism for enabling Villa Somalia’s authoritarian practices and advancing a flawed electoral agenda. Opposition leaders have increasingly questioned AMISOM’s credibility as a neutral political actor. The African Union’s inability to coordinate effectively with troop-contributing countries (TCCs) and international stakeholders has left Somalia vulnerable amid ongoing political and security tensions. Newly appointed AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace, and Security, Amb Bankole Adeoye, faces a critical task: appoint a high-level Special Envoy to re-engage Somalia’s partners and implement a course correction for AMISOM’s civilian leadership. Once a new federal government is in office, Adeoye will have the opportunity to replace the current leadership with a competent team capable of overseeing a smooth security transition by 2023. Effective AU engagement is vital to stabilizing Somalia, supporting democratic processes, and ensuring AMISOM fulfills both its military and political mandates.