Al-Shabaab’s persistence in Somalia is less a purely military problem and more a governance challenge. US AFRICOM commander Gen. Stephen Townsend recently highlighted that Somalia’s political dysfunction exacerbated by the federal government’s conflicts with member states and the extra-constitutional extension of the president’s term is a greater obstacle than the insurgency itself. Years of counterterrorism campaigns, even those achieving territorial gains against Al-Shabaab since 2010, have failed to stabilize recovered areas due to poor governance, lack of local support, and ineffective political leadership. Newly liberated regions often became unstable, ungoverned, or prey to clan rivalries, while government troops engaged in predatory practices, alienating local populations. Scholars like David Kilcullen emphasize that successful counterinsurgency requires winning the public, not merely defeating the enemy. In Somalia, the connection between governance and security is stark: without political and administrative reforms accompanying military victories, Al-Shabaab remains resilient. The insurgent group continues to exploit weak institutions, poor leadership, and local grievances to sustain influence and operations across Somalia. Strengthening governance, ensuring accountability, and improving federal-local coordination are essential to complement military action and reduce the enduring threat posed by Al-Shabaab to Somalia and the wider region.
Al-Shabaab remains one of Africa’s most lethal and resilient militant groups, leveraging Somalia’s chronic political divisions and fractured governance to strengthen its influence. Sixteen years since its formation, the group continues to control rural south-central Somalia, pockets of the north, and regions in northeastern and coastal Kenya, causing thousands of civilian deaths. Under Emir Abu Ubaydah, Al-Shabaab has become more hard-line and lethal, expanding its territorial reach, intensifying attacks, and infiltrating Somali government and clan structures to consolidate political leverage. The group runs an alternative governance system, providing taxation, welfare, and arbitration services more efficiently than the state, and has developed sophisticated local IED expertise and innovative terror methods. Self-reliant, Al-Shabaab finances its operations through raids, smuggling networks, and in-house revenue mechanisms, while its urban affiliates increasingly engage in criminal activities, signaling a “mafiazation” trend. Despite losses to US Special Operations and drone strikes, the organization shows no interest in negotiated settlements, confident in its long-term survival. The combination of state fragility, political fragmentation in Mogadishu, and unresolved peripheral conflicts has created a conducive environment for Al-Shabaab to attempt a resurgence. Without sustained and coordinated action, the group will remain a persistent threat to Somalia and the wider East African region.