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  • The Somali Wire 353
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  • The Somali Wire 353
  • The Ethiopian Cable 31
  • The Horn Edition 31
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  • Published February 23, 2022

    China has appointed Xue Bing as Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa, with one of his top challenges being Somaliland’s expanding relationship with Taiwan. This partnership, established in 2020 with reciprocal representative offices, has deepened through high-level visits and investment deals, including upcoming oil exploration projects. Beijing has repeatedly pressured Hargeisa to cut ties with Taipei, offering infrastructure aid and development packages in return. Somaliland, however, has resisted, emphasizing its sovereignty and determination to maintain foreign relations on its own terms. China’s lack of debt leverage over Somaliland limits its ability to coerce compliance, leaving Beijing with few options beyond economic or symbolic retaliation. Potential Chinese countermeasures could include supporting Puntland’s claims over disputed Sool and Sanaag regions or expanding fishing and mining activities in contested waters and territories. These moves would likely irritate Somaliland but are unlikely to sever its strategic bond with Taiwan. The dispute underscores shifting geopolitical dynamics in the Horn of Africa, where smaller states like Somaliland can defy major powers, and where Taiwan’s outreach challenges China’s diplomatic dominance in the region.

  • Published February 3, 2022

    The global balance of power is shifting toward a new era, the Age of Middle Powers. Rising states in the Middle East and Asia are increasingly projecting military and political influence far beyond their borders, reshaping geopolitics in regions like the Horn of Africa. Turkey’s deployment of combat drones to Ethiopia during the Tigray conflict demonstrated how advanced military capabilities, once limited to superpowers, are now accessible to more states. This “democratization” of high-tech warfare risks fueling arms races and destabilizing fragile regions.

  • Published February 2, 2022

    The global balance of power is shifting toward a new era, the Age of Middle Powers. Rising states in the Middle East and Asia are increasingly projecting military and political influence far beyond their borders, reshaping geopolitics in regions like the Horn of Africa. Turkey’s deployment of combat drones to Ethiopia during the Tigray conflict demonstrated how advanced military capabilities, once limited to superpowers, are now accessible to more states.

  • Published December 8, 2021

    Somaliland’s pragmatic relationship with its powerful neighbor Ethiopia has been a cornerstone of regional stability in the Horn of Africa for nearly three decades. Emerging simultaneously from guerrilla wars in the early 1990s, Somaliland’s Somali National Movement (SNM) and Ethiopia’s Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) built a partnership grounded in shared experiences and strategic interests. Ethiopia’s support helped Somaliland maintain security, counter Somali irredentism, and advance economic integration through initiatives like the Berbera Port project. However, the rise of Abiy Ahmed in 2018 disrupted this long-standing alliance. Ethiopia’s shift in policy downgraded Somaliland’s special status and favored closer ties with Mogadishu, introducing mistrust and frictions. The ongoing Ethiopian civil war threatens Somaliland’s strategic buffer, leaving it vulnerable to an assertive Somalia and regional instability.

  • Published November 15, 2021

    The Horn of Africa is witnessing an unprecedented surge in Middle Power influence, reshaping its geopolitical and security landscape. Militarization has intensified, with Djibouti hosting over a dozen foreign military bases, including those of China, the U.S., Japan, and soon Saudi Arabia. Somalia has become a battleground for Gulf rivalries, with the federal government aligning with the Qatar–Turkey axis while regional states lean towards the UAE–Saudi bloc. This growing competition fuels authoritarianism, allowing strongmen like Eritrea’s Isaias Afewerki, Ethiopia’s Abiy Ahmed, Somalia’s Mohamed Farmaajo, and Sudan’s Gen. al-Burhan to bypass Western pressure and secure rapid, opaque support from Middle Eastern patrons. Middle Powers prioritize personal alliances over institutional reforms, ensuring their influence at each electoral cycle. While Western actors promote democracy, conflict resolution, and stability, their influence is waning against the assertive authoritarian agendas of Middle Powers. Gulf states and regional powers now dominate the Horn’s political recalibration, favoring illiberal governance structures over reformist movements.

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