Former Somali intelligence chief Fahad Yasin recently published a self-congratulatory op-ed touting his tenure at NISA as a period of modernization and restored capability. While he expanded the agency’s reach, recruited more agents, and strengthened military intelligence units, critics argue these upgrades primarily served Villa Somalia’s political agenda rather than national security. NISA’s armed units, often loyal to Fahad, were deployed to intimidate opposition figures, seize control of key installations, and operate with impunity. Under his leadership, NISA controversially recruited ex-Al-Shabaab operatives without thorough vetting, integrated extremists into senior positions, and implemented questionable “counter-infiltration” strategies that failed to weaken the insurgency.
The assassination of British MP Sir David Amess by Somali-born Ali Harbi Ali has intensified scrutiny of Qatar’s influence over Somali radical networks. Harbi, from a well-connected Somali political family, was not the typical extremist, yet his path to radicalisation via online platforms, mosque study circles in the UK, and possible exposure to Salafist groups in Somalia raises critical questions.Qatar has become a central hub for Salafist activism, stepping into a role once held by Saudi Arabia. In Somalia, Doha strategically positioned Fahad Yasin at the helm of the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA), effectively embedding itself in the country’s political core. Qatar also funds Somali mosques and Islamic charities abroad, cultivating influence within diaspora communities. Its historical support for Al-Shabaab, coupled with allegations of orchestrating certain terror operations, fuels concerns about Doha’s long-term objectives. The Gulf state’s geopolitical strategy appears to involve building a Salafi belt across the Horn of Africa, increasing its leverage in regional politics.