Relations between Somalia and Ethiopia have sharply deteriorated since President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud took office. His government is seen as leaning closer to Kenya, a perception reinforced by reopening the Kenyan khat trade which ended Ethiopia’s monopoly. Tensions escalated after a major Al Shabaab incursion into Ethiopia, prompting Addis Ababa to deploy thousands of troops into Somalia and propose a controversial buffer zone. Ethiopia has also bypassed Mogadishu by striking direct security deals with Somali Federal Member States and Somaliland, challenging Somali sovereignty. An equally serious but often overlooked dispute involves water. Ethiopia’s ambitious irrigation and hydropower projects in the highlands have diverted large volumes from the Juba and Shabelle rivers, which supply Somalia’s breadbasket regions. With 90 percent of their flow originating in Ethiopia, these rivers are critical for irrigation and food security, especially during Somalia’s worst drought in decades. March saw the Juba River nearly dry for the first time since 1957. Without treaties governing shared water resources, Somalia lacks leverage to address upstream diversions. Many Somalis believe Ethiopia has exploited Somalia’s political fragility since 1991 to act unilaterally. With no resolution in sight, worsening political friction risks further destabilising the Horn of Africa.
At the African Union (AU) summit in Addis Ababa, outgoing Somali President Mohammed Abdullahi Farmaajo relished the opportunity for visibility, delivering a speech touting Somalia’s readiness to take over security from AMISOM by 2023 and claiming a clean electoral process, despite evidence to the contrary. Side meetings revealed the real dynamics. Ethiopian PM Abiy Ahmed granted Farmaajo only a brief audience, signaling limited engagement, while Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta avoided a meeting altogether due to years of strained relations. Somali Foreign Minister Abdisaid Muse failed in his push to include language in the final AU communiqué calling for the lifting of the UN arms embargo. Meanwhile, a major summit controversy erupted over Israel’s bid for AU observer status, a push backed by Abiy but strongly opposed by Algeria and South Africa, dominating the proceedings and revealing deep divisions within the AU. Other diplomatic frictions included a controversial AU Peace and Security Council statement praising Eritrea’s regional “contribution.” The summit reaffirmed the AU’s nature as a club of entrenched leaders who protect the status quo. For Farmaajo, it was a reminder that such forums offer more symbolism than substance while allowing him to position himself comfortably among Africa’s authoritarian elite.
Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s political fortunes are waning after years of civil war, regional destabilization, and controversial alliances most notably with Eritrea’s Isaias Afwerki. His exit would reverberate across the Horn of Africa, reshaping the balance of power from Ethiopia’s Somali Regional State to Somaliland’s trade ambitions. In Ethiopia, nine opposition parties, including the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), have united to remove Abiy. This shift could empower pro-federalist forces, benefiting Somalia’s Jubaland and Puntland, which have resisted Mogadishu’s centralization efforts. Conversely, Villa Somalia, led by Farmaajo and Fahad Yasin, views TPLF’s resurgence as a political threat, given their past alignment with Abiy’s centralist agenda. Somaliland could also see gains. Abiy’s lukewarm stance on the Berbera Trade Corridor and frosty relations with Hargeisa may give way to renewed Ethiopian interest, especially as the TPLF seeks alternatives to Djibouti, whose leadership backed the Tigray war.