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Search
  • The Somali Wire 396
  • The Ethiopian Cable 31
  • The Horn Edition 31
Archive
Filter by tags
Somalia (43) Al Shabaab (37) Villa Somalia (32) Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (25) Farmaajo (19) Somalia politics (17) Puntland (17) Mogadishu (16) Ethiopia (16) Somalia elections (14) Somaliland (13) Somalia political crisis (12) Jubaland (10) Somali politics (8) NISA (8) Fahad Yasin (8) AUSSOM (7) Mohamed Hussein Roble (7) Abiy Ahmed (7) Somalia crisis (7) Somalia security (7) Tigray (7) Eritrea (7) Kenya (7) Sudan (6) SSC-Khaatumo (6) African Union (6) Somalia drought crisis (6) TPLF (6) Amhara (6) Horn of Africa (6) Addis (6) USAID (5) Nairobi (5) OLA (5) HSM (5) Somali elections (5) Horn of Africa geopolitics (5) Somali culture (5) Somalia elections 2022 (5) South Sudan (5) Politics (5) Humanitarian (4) Conflict (4) US (4) Healthcare (4) China (4) Somali National Army (4) Somalia humanitarian crisis (4) Somali opposition (4) Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (4) Federalism (4) Oromo Liberation Army (4) History (4) Poetry (4) Disarmament (3) Fano (3) Somalia elections 2021 (3) Federal Government (3) Women (3) Security (3) OPOV (3) Kenya Somalia relations (3) GERD (3) Elections (3) Fighting (3) RSF (3) Qatar (3) Gulf (3) Mogadishu bombing 2022 (3) Somali security forces (3) Troop Contributing Countries (3) Villa Somalia crisis (3) Mogadishu unrest (3) Somalia electoral crisis (3) PM Roble (3) Laas Aanood (3) Turkey Somalia relations (3) Diaspora (3) Madoobe (3) Oromo Liberation Front (3) OLF (3) Oromo (3) Awdheegle (3) UPDF (3) SNA (3) Operation Silent Storm (3) Horn of Africa drought (3) Economy (3) NCC (3) Ethiopia Somalia relations (3) UN (3) ISS (3) Hawiye (3) UAE (3) Oromia (3)
  • Published January 6, 2022

    While many believe that a strong Somali military alone can defeat Al‑Shabaab, history shows most insurgencies end through negotiated settlements rather than outright military victory. Somalia’s conflict with Al‑Shabaab has reached a protracted stalemate, with neither side able to decisively win. The Somali government’s progress largely relies on international support from AMISOM and partners such as the US, UK, and Turkey, while Al‑Shabaab maintains the initiative in many areas. Al‑Shabaab’s resilience stems from three pillars: popular support (coerced or voluntary), significant financial resources, and access to weapons and explosives. Weakening the group requires disrupting these pillars. Strategies include supporting dissident clans, encouraging defections, denying access to population centres, freezing bank accounts, targeting revenue streams, and dismantling IED supply chains. Military measures such as high‑value target operations, reinforcing liberated areas, and forcing Al‑Shabaab to fight on multiple fronts could also degrade its capabilities.

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