Al-Shabaab’s tactics in Somalia have evolved since the devastating 2017 Mogadishu truck bombing that killed nearly 600 people. While vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs) remain a threat, the militant group has increasingly turned to person-borne IEDs (PBIEDs), often in the form of suicide vests. These smaller, more discreet devices require fewer resources and can be smuggled past checkpoints more easily than VBIEDs, making them effective in crowded urban environments. Since March 2021, more than ten PBIED attacks have occurred across Somalia, seven of them in Mogadishu. Many of these attacks target Somali National Army (SNA) personnel at tea shops during breakfast or afternoon khat sessions, when groups of security forces gather and are more vulnerable. High-profile incidents include the June 2021 bombing at the General Dhagabadan Training School that killed over 20 recruits, and the May 2021 Waberi Police Station attack that claimed senior police officials’ lives.
The re-emergence of Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama’a (ASWJ) in Galmudug is offering renewed hope for residents worn down by relentless Al-Shabaab offensives and the ineffective leadership of state president Ahmed Abdi Kariye “Qoor Qoor.” Once the most effective local force against Al-Shabaab, ASWJ was dismantled in 2020 through a Federal Government-backed operation, leaving a dangerous security vacuum. In the absence of ASWJ, Al-Shabaab swiftly expanded its presence, capturing territory and deepening instability in Galmudug. Led by respected spiritual leaders Moallim Mohamoud and Sheik Shakir, ASWJ’s return has been welcomed by the local population and elements of the Somali National Army (SNA). Their declaration of holy war against Al-Shabaab is seen as a credible call to action, supported by disaffected former members within the national forces. However, Qoor Qoor views ASWJ as a political threat and is mobilising state and clan forces against them, despite the pressing danger posed by Al-Shabaab.
Somalia’s security landscape remains fragile, shaped by political tensions, insurgent threats, and competing visions for national defense. The recent graduation of the Harama’ad unit from the TurkiSom Training Academy highlights both the potential and the pitfalls of Somalia’s federal security strategy. While elite federal forces such as Harama’ad and Gor-Gor are well-trained, their deployment has raised concerns over political bias, especially ahead of the scheduled parliamentary and presidential elections. Critics argue that true stability requires empowering Federal Member State (FMS) paramilitary police, who are deeply rooted in their communities, possess local knowledge, and have the trust of the population. Successful operations, such as Operation Badbado and the coordinated Galmudug offensive, demonstrate the value of joint planning and cooperation between federal forces, FMS units, and international partners. In contrast, poorly coordinated campaigns have resulted in chaos, mistrust, and the reoccupation of liberated territories by Al-Shabaab. Without holding forces, security gains are quickly reversed, eroding public confidence. To build lasting peace, Somalia needs a robust, coherent, and community-centered security model that prioritizes coordination, local empowerment, and a clear stabilization strategy over ad-hoc military deployments.