Issue 105

The Man and The Chokepoint: Djibouti’s Succession Gamble

Despite rumours of declining health, Djibouti’s President Ismaïl Omar Guelleh’s (IOG) is maneuvering to extend his grip on power amid growing tensions over succession. The 77 year-old leader, who took power in 1999 as his uncle’s hand-picked successor, has pushed through constitutional changes that allow him to run again in 2026, with the age limit having been scrapped on 2 November – moves that have further ignited both public discontent and simmering rivalries between Djibouti’s Afar and Issa communities. Guelleh, has maintained a relatively low public profile in the past year. In late September 2024, social media reports claimed he had been hospitalised and flown to Paris due to critical illness, with some even suggesting internet outages in Djibouti aimed at suppressing news of his condition. His Finance Minister, Ilyas Moussa Dawaleh, flatly disputed reports that Guelleh was critically ill, confirming only that the president had an issue with his right knee. But these denials, along with his refusal to establish a clear succession plan, have only intensified speculation about Djibouti’s political future. As IOG clings to power, the prospect of a succession crisis looms large, threatening instability in the nation.  

Personal rule and family connections have shaped Djibouti’s politics for decades. After gaining independence from France in 1977, President Hassan Gouled Aptidon, an Issa Somali elder, governed for twenty years. In 1999, he stepped down and his nephew, Ismaïl Omar Guelleh, took over, winning four more elections, often without real opposition. In 2010, Guelleh changed the constitution to remove the two term limit, allowing him to seek a third term in 2011 and ultimately remain in power through five consecutive terms. 

Under Guelleh’s iron grip, Djibouti has remained stable, despite being one of Africa’s poorest states. Virtually no domestic industry or agriculture sustains the economy. Instead, the regime lives off income from foreign militaries and transit fees. Geographically, Djibouti is tiny, with a population of about 1 million, yet it controls the Bab-el-Mandeb chokepoint at the mouth of the Red Sea, which is a key location on global trade routes. It is for that reason that several countries maintain military bases on Djiboutian soil, including the US Camp Lemonnier, and France’s Djibouti garrison,  later joined by China’s first overseas base in 2017, as well as facilities for Japan, Italy, and others. Ethiopia reportedly pays around USD 2 billion a year in port fees to Djibouti, while foreign navies contribute over USD 300 million for access to its harbors. Moreover, a predicted USD 38 million Chinese-backed deal envisions producing 6 million tonnes of salt annually, from the desolate shores of Lake Assal, one of the saltiest bodies of water on Earth. Yet in 2023, the country’s salt exports totaled less than USD 200’000 – a stark reminder of how thin Djibouti’s domestic economic base remains. 

Behind closed doors, a bitter contest for power is already underway among the ruling family and clan elite. Guelleh’s inner circle is built on two tiers: the family sphere and his Issa clan. Within the family, Guelleh’s wife, Kadra Mahamoud Haid, has been described as the real centre of power. In particular, Kadra has been pushing for her elder son from a previous marriage, Naguib Abdallah Kamil, to play a leading political role. Naguid, being Afar, is not the choice of the powerful Issa clan to which Guelleh belongs. With the clan favouring an Issa successor to maintain traditional dominance, Alexis Mohammed Guelon has reportedly been put forward to scuttle Naguib’s bid. In September 2025, Gueldon, an important aide to Guelleh, resigned, bringing the long-simmering rift within the ruling elite into the open. According to reports, many members of Guelleh’s own clan now resent the first lady’s influence on the politics of the country. Clan elders have felt that Kadra has tried to manipulate political decision-making around her children and has been exploiting Guelleh’s declining health to advance their standing. It was rumoured that the current AU chairman and former foreign minister, Mohamoud Ali Youssouf, who is also Afar, was eased out primarily to clear the path for Naguib and narrow the field of potential contenders. There has even been talk of factional discontent within the military and security organs, with some officers seen as loyal to Guelleh personally and others quietly supportive of alternative successors. It was as early as 2022 that these dynamics came to light when Djibouti’s Chiefs of Army and Police were briefly arrested in a rumoured plot of a coup.

In late October, succession plans shifted sharply following a special Parliament session to discuss amending the constitution. Under Article 91, an amendment requires signatures from one-third of MPs to move to the voting stage and a two-thirds majority to pass, with the Speaker having the option to bypass a referendum. On 2 November, lawmakers unanimously approved the change to the constitution and removed the bar on running for president past the age of 75.  This has cleared the way for Gulleh - who will be 78 at the time of the 2026 elections - to run for his sixth term, wholly complicating the ethnic dynamics of the succession struggle. The Issa Somalis make up roughly two thirds of the population at 60%, with Afar accounting for most of the rest. During Gouled’s rule in the 1980s to 1990s, a disenfranchised Afar minority rose in rebellion under the Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD), which accused the Issa-led regime of systematic exclusion by shutting Afars out of government jobs and security forces. The 1991-1994 civil war ended with a shaky peace deal, but grievances persisted with sporadic Afar protests and clashes in the 2000s and then again in the 2011 elections. And though these issues are not silenced, Guelleh’s strongman state has kept the peace by balancing Issa and Afar interplays . 

Earlier this year, in late January, Djibouti conducted a drone strike in a rural area about six kilometres away from the Ethiopian border, which, according to reports, targeted the Afar militant group Armed Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUDA). Djibouti’s military spokesman claimed eight “terrorists” were killed and labelled the attack as being within Djibouti’s sovereign territory, but local Afar residents on the Ethiopian side disputed the narrative, reporting civilian casualties. The Djiboutian League for Human Rights even denounced the raid as a ‘war crime’ against Afar communities. And though Addis did not publicly retaliate, the incident stoked anger among Afars on both sides of the border.

Djibouti’s future is important to countries far beyond its borders. China has invested heavily in Djibouti’s ports and railways, especially the Doraleh Container Terminal, which is now mostly run by Chinese companies. The United States and its allies have also put significant resources into the country. If there is a contested leadership change, Djibouti could quickly become a stage for international competition. In the past, foreign powers have disagreed over Djibouti, such as when France and the US argued about using the port for a French military contractor. Now, China’s growing role is causing new concerns.

Looking at broader Horn dynamics, Ethiopia is one of Djibouti’s key partners, but it too is beginning to look elsewhere. Addis Ababa is developing alternative routes to the sea via Somaliland. Ethiopia’s leaders have loudly encouraged port deals that bypass Djibouti, planning to ship Ethiopian goods through Berbera with potential Gulf investment, thus draining Djibouti of its financial lifeblood. And though Somaliland itself can be considered a wildcard, the unrecognised republic wants international backing and could offer incentives to attract Djibouti’s neighbours. If Somaliland expands ties with Ethiopia and the UAE, Djibouti could lose both trade and prestige in the Horn of Africa.

​The Horn Edition Team